修复：PAC 规则解析与关键域名分流

仓库内 fake-site/index.html 为旧版（md5 e0f5cbcb），与四个生产节点实际
服务的版本不一致。已用线上（us 节点）实际抓取版本替换，恢复所有节点

README.md

@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
+# Royirin Rosmontis Private Proxy
+Supported by Global Rosmanka Cloud Nexus Inc. —— https://rosmanka.rrrosmontis.icu
 ## 警告
 - 包含 WireGuard 的 common 版本转发器永久不再维护，推荐使用 Lite 版本
 > common 版本现在有许多未修复的 bug (如部分 UI 的显示问题) 、令人难以忍受的代码逻辑 (如 PAC 规则直接写在代码里)和安全性问题 (认证凭据的暴露与证书忽略)，而 Lite 版本修复了这些问题，并会收到持续的更新 
 - 本程序完全没有 Linux 与 CLI 功能兼容，默认构建为带有图形界面的 Windows .exe
 
-
+### 如何区分 common 版本与 Lite 版本
-## 如何区分 common 版本与 Lite 版本
 - Lite 版本的版本号前四位固定为 9999，后续为从月份开始的构建时间戳，而 common 版本的版本号为包含年份的完整的构建时间戳
 
 ## 服务器侧配置手册 (部分内容过时)
-https://rrrosmontis.icu/articles/index.html?id=00005
+- https://rrrosmontis.icu/articles/index.html?id=00005
+- 更推荐参考本仓库 server_config 文件夹中的 md 文件手册
+
+## 若要直接使用仓库客户端对应的服务
+请前往 https://sso.rrrosmontis.icu 注册 Rosmanka ID，然后与管理员商定使用细则
+royirin@rrrosmontis.icu

lite/proxy_lite.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
 
-import sys, os, subprocess, time, ctypes, threading, functools, base64, bisect
+import sys, os, subprocess, time, ctypes, threading, functools, base64, bisect, re
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from PyQt5.QtWidgets import (
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ def _load_nodes():
 
 _SELECTED_NODE = 0  # 当前选中节点下标（默认第一条）
 _SELECTED_RESTORED = False  # 启动时是否已按设置恢复过上次选中的节点
+_NODES_SYNC_DONE = threading.Event()  # 订阅同步线程完成信号（启动校验等它）
 
 def _current_node():
     """当前使用的节点：默认取列表第一个；无节点时返回 None。"""
@@ -270,20 +271,42 @@ def _first_reachable_index(nodes):
             return i
     return 0
 
-def _verify_selected_node():
+def _rematch_saved_domain():
-    """启动时校验上次选中的节点在本机是否还可用。
+    """按 settings 的 current_node（域名）在最新节点列表里重匹配下标。
 
-    典型场景：上次选了 IPv6 专用节点，这次本机没有 IPv6 出口（或该节点已不可达），
+    远程同步后服务端可能调整节点顺序：只按下标会静默连到别的节点。
-    继续选中它只会在开启代理时才报错。这里自动回退到第一个可达节点并记录到设置。
+    返回 True 表示发生了切换。"""
-    返回 True 表示发生了切换（调用方据此刷新标题栏）。"""
     global _SELECTED_NODE
     nodes = _load_nodes()
+    if not nodes:
+        return False
+    saved = str(_settings_load().get("current_node") or "")
+    cur = nodes[_SELECTED_NODE] if 0 <= _SELECTED_NODE < len(nodes) else None
+    if saved and (not cur or str(cur.get("domain") or "") != saved):
+        match = next((i for i, n in enumerate(nodes)
+                      if str(n.get("domain") or "") == saved), None)
+        if match is not None:
+            _SELECTED_NODE = match
+            log(f"节点列表已更新，继续使用上次选择的节点 {saved}")
+            return True
+    return False
+
+def _verify_selected_node():
+    """启动校验，返回 True 表示发生了切换（调用方据此刷新标题栏）。
+
+    两步：① 按设置记录的域名在最新节点列表里重匹配（服务端调过顺序时
+    下标会连到别的节点）；② 选中节点在本机不可达（典型：上次选了 IPv6
+    专用节点，这次本机没有 IPv6 出口）时自动回退到第一个可达节点。"""
+    global _SELECTED_NODE
+    nodes = _load_nodes()
+    switched = _rematch_saved_domain()
     if not nodes or not (0 <= _SELECTED_NODE < len(nodes)):
-        return False
+        return switched
-    if _node_reachable(nodes[_SELECTED_NODE]):
+    cur = nodes[_SELECTED_NODE]
-        return False
+    if _node_reachable(cur):
+        return switched
     idx = _first_reachable_index(nodes)
-    old = str(nodes[_SELECTED_NODE].get("domain") or "")
+    old = str(cur.get("domain") or "")
     new = str(nodes[idx].get("domain") or "")
     _SELECTED_NODE = idx
     _save_current_node(new)
@@ -479,8 +502,76 @@ def _notify_proxy_change():
         pass
 
 
+def _reg_query_value(name):
+    """查询 HKCU Internet Settings 下指定值，返回 (类型, 数据)；值不存在返回 None。"""
+    r = _run(["reg", "query", PROXY_REG, "/v", name], warn=False)
+    if r.returncode != 0:
+        return None
+    for line in (r.stdout or "").splitlines():
+        if name in line:
+            parts = line.strip().split(None, 2)  # 形如 "ProxyServer    REG_SZ    127.0.0.1:7897"
+            if len(parts) >= 3:
+                return parts[1], parts[2]
+    return None
+
+def _is_our_pac_url(value: str) -> bool:
+    """value 是否指向本程序的本地 PAC 服务（http://127.0.0.1:<端口>/proxy.pac）。"""
+    import re
+    return bool(re.fullmatch(r"http://127\.0\.0\.1:\d+/proxy\.pac", value.strip()))
+
+_PROXY_BACKUP_KEY = "prev_proxy_state"   # settings.json 里的系统代理原值备份
+_proxy_prev = None                        # 运行期备份：None = 尚未备份
+
+def _backup_proxy_state():
+    """覆盖系统代理前把原值备份下来（内存 + settings.json，防崩溃丢失）。
+
+    只在尚未备份时执行：本次运行里第一次开启代理时的注册表状态才是用户
+    原有的（可能是其他代理软件的值），之后反复开/关不应覆盖首次备份。"""
+    global _proxy_prev
+    if _proxy_prev is not None:
+        return
+    state = {}
+    for name in ("ProxyEnable", "ProxyServer", "ProxyOverride", "AutoConfigURL"):
+        v = _reg_query_value(name)
+        state[name] = list(v) if v else None
+    _proxy_prev = state
+    try:
+        _settings_save({**_settings_load(), _PROXY_BACKUP_KEY: state})
+    except Exception:
+        pass  # 持久化失败只影响崩溃后的恢复，不影响本次运行
+
+def _restore_proxy_state():
+    """恢复开启代理前的系统代理原值；没有备份时退化为清空（历史行为）。"""
+    global _proxy_prev
+    state = _proxy_prev
+    if state is None:
+        state = _settings_load().get(_PROXY_BACKUP_KEY)
+    if isinstance(state, dict):
+        for name in ("ProxyEnable", "ProxyServer", "ProxyOverride", "AutoConfigURL"):
+            v = state.get(name)
+            if v:
+                _run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", name, "/t", v[0], "/d", v[1], "/f"], warn=False)
+            else:
+                _run(["reg", "delete", PROXY_REG, "/v", name, "/f"], warn=False)
+        log("已恢复开启代理前的系统代理设置")
+    else:
+        # 无备份（旧版本升级后首次运行）：清空，与历史行为一致
+        for name in ("ProxyServer", "ProxyOverride", "AutoConfigURL"):
+            _run(["reg", "delete", PROXY_REG, "/v", name, "/f"], warn=False)
+        _run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyEnable", "/t", "REG_DWORD", "/d", "0", "/f"])
+    _proxy_prev = None
+    # 备份已消费：清除持久化副本，避免下次启动误恢复
+    try:
+        data = _settings_load()
+        if isinstance(data, dict) and _PROXY_BACKUP_KEY in data:
+            del data[_PROXY_BACKUP_KEY]
+            _settings_save(data)
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
 def proxy_on(pac_url=None, bypass_lan=False):
     """设置 Windows 系统代理。pac_url 不为空时启用 PAC 模式，否则使用固定代理。"""
+    _backup_proxy_state()  # 覆盖前保存用户原有代理设置，关闭时恢复而不是清空
     if pac_url:
         # PAC 模式：仅设置 AutoConfigURL，ProxyEnable 置 0，
         # 避免程序读到"固定代理已启用但服务器为空"的混乱状态
@@ -501,11 +592,7 @@ def proxy_on(pac_url=None, bypass_lan=False):
 def proxy_off():
     """关闭系统代理并停止 TLS 转发器 / PAC 本地服务。"""
     log("正在关闭系统代理...")
-    _run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyEnable", "/t", "REG_DWORD", "/d", "0", "/f"])
+    _restore_proxy_state()  # 恢复用户原有代理设置，而不是简单清空
-    # 清除 ProxyServer / ProxyOverride / AutoConfigURL，确保两种模式都清理干净
-    _run(["reg", "delete", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyServer", "/f"], warn=False)
-    _run(["reg", "delete", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyOverride", "/f"], warn=False)
-    _run(["reg", "delete", PROXY_REG, "/v", "AutoConfigURL", "/f"], warn=False)
     log("系统代理已关闭")
     _notify_proxy_change()
     _tls_stop()
@@ -628,17 +715,28 @@ def _inject_proxy_auth(data: bytes) -> bytes:
 
     nginx 的 auth_basic 校验 Authorization 而非 Proxy-Authorization，
     因此转发器向上游发送 Basic 认证时使用 Authorization 头。
+    只按完整头名精确匹配（行首到冒号）：Proxy-Authorization 等含
+    "authorization" 字样的行不算已有认证，不能阻止注入；目标站自己的
+    Authorization（明文 HTTP 请求）才跳过。注入位置紧跟请求行，
+    保证上游（取首个 Authorization）读到的是我们的认证。
     """
     if not _starts_with_method(data):
         return data
     end = data.find(b"\r\n\r\n")
     if end == -1:
         return data
-    headers_lower = data[:end].lower()
+    head = data[:end]
-    if b"authorization:" in headers_lower:
+    first_end = head.find(b"\r\n")
-        return data
+    request_line = head if first_end == -1 else head[:first_end]
+    headers = b"" if first_end == -1 else head[first_end + 2:]
+    for line in headers.split(b"\r\n"):
+        if b":" not in line:
+            continue
+        name = line[:line.index(b":")].strip().lower()
+        if name == b"authorization":
+            return data  # 已有目标站自己的 Authorization，不再注入
     auth_line = f"Authorization: Basic {_proxy_auth_basic()}\r\n".encode()
-    return data[:end + 2] + auth_line + data[end + 2:]
+    return request_line + b"\r\n" + auth_line + headers + data[end:]
 
 def _make_request_injector():
     """为明文 HTTP 代理连接生成逐条注入认证的流式处理器。
@@ -661,7 +759,43 @@ def _make_request_injector():
         return b""
     return feed
 
-@functools.lru_cache(maxsize=256)
+def _ttl_cache(seconds: int, maxsize: int = 16384):
+    """带过期时间的缓存装饰器（替代无 TTL 的 lru_cache）。
+
+    域名分流判定结果长期缓存会让域名换 IP 后继续沿用旧的直连/隧道判断；
+    到期自动失效重查。保留 cache_clear() 兼容（测试脚本在用）。"""
+    def deco(func):
+        store = {}
+        lock = threading.Lock()
+
+        def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
+            key = (args, tuple(sorted(kwargs.items())))
+            now = time.time()
+            with lock:
+                hit = store.get(key)
+            if hit and now - hit[0] < seconds:
+                return hit[1]
+            val = func(*args, **kwargs)
+            with lock:
+                store[key] = (now, val)
+                if len(store) > maxsize:
+                    cutoff = now - seconds
+                    for k, (t, _) in list(store.items()):
+                        if t < cutoff:
+                            del store[k]
+                    if len(store) > maxsize:
+                        store.clear()  # 极端情况下全清：最坏只是多几次解析
+            return val
+
+        def cache_clear():
+            with lock:
+                store.clear()
+
+        wrapper.cache_clear = cache_clear
+        return wrapper
+    return deco
+
+@_ttl_cache(300, maxsize=2048)
 def _is_private_ip(host: str) -> bool:
     """判断目标是否命中常用内网/回环 IPv4；域名会解析后判断。"""
     try:
@@ -698,8 +832,17 @@ def _is_private_ip(host: str) -> bool:
 _CN_RANGES = None           # 合并排序后的 (start, end) 整数段
 _CN_RANGES_LOADED = False
 _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES = None
+_FORCE_PROXY_EXACT = None
+_FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES = None
 _FORCE_PROXY_LOADED = False
 
+# PAC 数据由 CDN 独立下发；此处保留登录/AI 服务的关键后缀兜底。
+# 即使远端表暂时未更新或不可读，这些域名也不能因解析到中国 CDN IP 而直连。
+_CORE_FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES = frozenset((
+    "anthropic.com", "chatgpt.com", "claude.ai", "googlecdn.com",
+    "oaistatic.com", "oaiusercontent.com", "openai.com",
+))
+
 def _data_path(name: str):
     """数据文件路径：只取打包内置目录（config.json 随 exe 内置）。"""
     p = Path(BASE_DIR) / name
@@ -1029,31 +1172,34 @@ def _auth_load():
 
 def _nodes_sync_remote():
     """启动时用已保存凭据拉取最新节点配置（内容比对，变化才覆盖）。"""
-    cred = _auth_load()
-    if not cred:
-        return  # 从未登录过，等登录框处理
-    url = str(_config_val("nodes_url", "") or "").strip()
-    if not url:
-        return
     try:
-        import json
+        cred = _auth_load()
-        data = _fetch_nodes_auth(url, cred["username"], cred["password"])
+        if not cred:
-        if not (isinstance(data, list) and data
+            return  # 从未登录过，等登录框处理
-                and all(isinstance(n, dict) for n in data)
+        url = str(_config_val("nodes_url", "") or "").strip()
-                and str(data[0].get("domain") or "").strip()):
+        if not url:
-            raise ValueError("返回的节点数据无效")
-        text = json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n"
-        local = _USER_DIR / "nodes.json"
-        if local.is_file() and _nodes_decrypt(local.read_bytes()) == text:
-            log("节点配置已是最新")
             return
-        _USER_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        try:
-        local.write_bytes(_nodes_encrypt(text))
+            import json
-        global _NODES
+            data = _fetch_nodes_auth(url, cred["username"], cred["password"])
-        _NODES = None  # 使后续读取（节点菜单/开启代理）拿到新配置
+            if not (isinstance(data, list) and data
-        log(f"节点配置已更新: {len(data)} 个节点 (nodes.json)")
+                    and all(isinstance(n, dict) for n in data)
-    except Exception as e:
+                    and str(data[0].get("domain") or "").strip()):
-        log(f"节点配置在线更新失败，使用本地配置: {e}")
+                raise ValueError("返回的节点数据无效")
+            text = json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n"
+            local = _USER_DIR / "nodes.json"
+            if local.is_file() and _nodes_decrypt(local.read_bytes()) == text:
+                log("节点配置已是最新")
+                return
+            _USER_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            local.write_bytes(_nodes_encrypt(text))
+            global _NODES
+            _NODES = None  # 使后续读取（节点菜单/开启代理）拿到新配置
+            log(f"节点配置已更新: {len(data)} 个节点 (nodes.json)")
+        except Exception as e:
+            log(f"节点配置在线更新失败，使用本地配置: {e}")
+    finally:
+        _NODES_SYNC_DONE.set()  # 无论成败都要放行启动校验
 
 class _AuthError(Exception):
     """订阅接口返回的错误：code 为 HTTP 状态码，str 为服务端返回的中文提示。"""
@@ -1181,8 +1327,13 @@ def _load_cn_ranges():
     return _CN_RANGES
 
 def _load_force_proxy_suffixes():
-    """加载 pac_domains.json：命中这些域名后缀的连接强制走隧道（优先于 IP 判定）。"""
+    """加载 pac_domains.json 的后缀、精确和正则规则。
-    global _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES, _FORCE_PROXY_LOADED
+
+    domain-list-community 的三种规则语义：普通域名匹配自身及子域；
+    ``full:`` 仅匹配该主机；``regexp:`` 按正则匹配。旧逻辑把后两类
+    当成带冒号的普通后缀，导致它们永远不命中。
+    """
+    global _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES, _FORCE_PROXY_EXACT, _FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES, _FORCE_PROXY_LOADED
     if _FORCE_PROXY_LOADED:
         return _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES
     _FORCE_PROXY_LOADED = True
@@ -1190,14 +1341,51 @@ def _load_force_proxy_suffixes():
         import json
         path = _user_path("pac_domains.json")
         if path is None:
-            return _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES  # 可选文件，缺失不影响 IP 分流
+            _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES = sorted(_CORE_FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES)
+            _FORCE_PROXY_EXACT = frozenset()
+            _FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES = ()
+            log(f"未找到 pac_domains.json，使用 {len(_FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES)} 条关键域名兜底")
+            return _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES
         data = json.loads(Path(path).read_text("utf-8"))
-        suffixes = sorted({str(d).strip().lower().lstrip("*.")
+        suffixes = set(_CORE_FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES)
-                           for d in (data.get("domains") or []) if str(d).strip()})
+        exact = set()
+        regexes = []
+        invalid_regexes = 0
+        for raw in data.get("domains") or []:
+            raw_rule = str(raw).strip()
+            rule = raw_rule.lower()
+            if not raw_rule:
+                continue
+            if rule.startswith("full:"):
+                host = rule[len("full:"):].rstrip(".")
+                if host:
+                    exact.add(host)
+                continue
+            if rule.startswith("regexp:"):
+                # 正则本身可能含大写字符类或大小写敏感字面量；只忽略匹配时的
+                # 域名大小写，不能在编译前改写 pattern。
+                pattern = raw_rule[len("regexp:"):]
+                if not pattern:
+                    invalid_regexes += 1
+                    continue
+                try:
+                    regexes.append(re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE))
+                except re.error:
+                    invalid_regexes += 1
+                continue
+            suffixes.add(rule.lstrip("*.").rstrip("."))
+        suffixes.discard("")
         _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES = suffixes
-        log(f"已加载强制代理域名: {len(suffixes)} 条 (pac_domains.json)")
+        _FORCE_PROXY_EXACT = frozenset(exact)
+        _FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES = tuple(regexes)
+        log(f"已加载强制代理规则: 后缀 {len(suffixes)} 条、精确 {len(exact)} 条、"
+            f"正则 {len(regexes)} 条 (pac_domains.json)" +
+            (f"，跳过 {invalid_regexes} 条非法正则" if invalid_regexes else ""))
     except Exception as e:
         log_red(f"pac_domains.json 加载失败: {e}")
+        _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES = sorted(_CORE_FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES)
+        _FORCE_PROXY_EXACT = frozenset()
+        _FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES = ()
     return _FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES
 
 def _is_private_int(n: int) -> bool:
@@ -1208,7 +1396,7 @@ def _is_private_int(n: int) -> bool:
             (n & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000 or
             (n & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xA9FE0000)
 
-@functools.lru_cache(maxsize=16384)
+@_ttl_cache(300, maxsize=16384)
 def _is_china_ip(host: str):
     """判断目标是否命中中国 IP 段；域名会先解析。
 
@@ -1249,12 +1437,16 @@ def _is_china_ip(host: str):
 
 @functools.lru_cache(maxsize=8192)
 def _is_force_proxy(host: str) -> bool:
-    """pac_domains.json 命中的域名强制走隧道（如 claude.ai：国内可连但显示拒绝页）。"""
+    """PAC 强制规则命中的域名走隧道（后缀 / full / regexp）。"""
     suffixes = _load_force_proxy_suffixes()
-    if not suffixes:
+    exact = _FORCE_PROXY_EXACT or ()
+    regexes = _FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES or ()
+    if not suffixes and not exact and not regexes:
         return False
     h = host.rstrip(".").lower()
-    return any(h == s or h.endswith("." + s) for s in suffixes)
+    return (any(h == s or h.endswith("." + s) for s in suffixes) or
+            h in exact or
+            any(pattern.search(h) is not None for pattern in regexes))
 
 def _resolve_host_ips(host: str):
     """解析域名的 IPv4/IPv6 地址集合（字面量 IP 返回自身）；解析失败返回空集合。"""
@@ -1289,7 +1481,7 @@ def _whitelist_entry_match(host: str, entry: str) -> bool:
     # 域名条目：精确匹配或子域后缀匹配（与 pac_domains 同一规则）
     return h == entry or h.endswith("." + entry)
 
-@functools.lru_cache(maxsize=8192)
+@_ttl_cache(300, maxsize=8192)
 def _is_whitelisted(host: str, version: int) -> bool:
     """host 是否命中已启用的白名单规则（按版本键控缓存，规则变更即失效）。"""
     entries = [r["value"] for r in _whitelist_rules() if r.get("enabled")]
@@ -1314,11 +1506,24 @@ def _decide_direct(host: str, bypass_lan: bool, smart: bool) -> bool:
     return False
 
 def _parse_connect_authority(first_line: str):
-    """从 CONNECT 首行提取 (host, port)，失败返回 None。"""
+    """从 CONNECT 首行提取 (host, port)，失败返回 None。
+
+    IPv6 字面量带方括号（CONNECT [::1]:443）：剥掉括号再按最后一个冒号拆分，
+    否则会把 "[::1]" 当成主机名，直连/白名单判定全部失效。"""
     parts = first_line.split(" ")
     if len(parts) < 2:
         return None
     authority = parts[1]
+    if authority.startswith("[") and "]" in authority:
+        # 括号必须紧跟在主机名部分之后（[::1]:443）；"[::1" 无右括号等畸形输入
+        # 会因 "]:" 检查失败而走下面的普通拆分，最终被 port_s.isdigit() 拦下
+        try:
+            host = authority[1:authority.index("]")]
+            tail = authority[authority.index("]") + 1:]
+            if tail.startswith(":") and tail[1:].isdigit():
+                return host, int(tail[1:])
+        except ValueError:
+            pass
     if ":" not in authority:
         return None
     host, _, port_s = authority.rpartition(":")
@@ -1501,27 +1706,28 @@ def _release_forwarder(started_here):
 
 def is_proxy_on():
     """系统代理是否生效：固定代理已开启，或 AutoConfigURL 指向本地 PAC 服务。"""
-    r = _run(["reg", "query", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyEnable"], warn=False)
+    v = _reg_query_value("ProxyEnable")
-    if "0x1" in (r.stdout or ""):
+    if v and "0x1" in (v[1] or ""):
         return True
-    r = _run(["reg", "query", PROXY_REG, "/v", "AutoConfigURL"], warn=False)
+    v = _reg_query_value("AutoConfigURL")
-    return "127.0.0.1" in (r.stdout or "")
+    return bool(v) and _is_our_pac_url(v[1] or "")
 
 def _cleanup_stale_proxy():
-    """清理上次异常退出残留的系统代理设置。
+    """清理上次异常退出残留的系统代理设置，并恢复用户原有设置。
 
     TLS 转发器 / PAC 服务只活在进程内，程序启动时若注册表仍指向
     本地转发端口或本地 PAC 地址，说明是残留——不清理会导致全网不通。
+    只认本程序的精确地址：其他软件（如 Clash）的 PAC 也在 127.0.0.1 上，
+    不能因为地址里带 127.0.0.1 就误删。
     """
     try:
-        if not is_proxy_on():
+        server = _reg_query_value("ProxyServer")
+        pac = _reg_query_value("AutoConfigURL")
+        ours = (bool(server) and (server[1] or "").strip() == f"{PROXY_HOST}:{PROXY_PORT}") or \
+               (bool(pac) and _is_our_pac_url(pac[1] or ""))
+        if not ours:
             return
-        r = _run(["reg", "query", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyServer"], warn=False)
+        proxy_off()  # 内部从备份恢复用户原有设置（无备份则清空）
-        r2 = _run(["reg", "query", PROXY_REG, "/v", "AutoConfigURL"], warn=False)
-        stale = (f"{PROXY_HOST}:{PROXY_PORT}" in (r.stdout or "")
-                 or "127.0.0.1" in (r2.stdout or ""))
-        if stale:
-            proxy_off()
     except Exception:
         pass
 
@@ -2198,9 +2404,10 @@ class MainWindow(QWidget):
     def _verify_node_thread(self):
         """等节点配置在线同步完成后，校验当前选中节点是否可用，必要时自动回退。
 
-        探测要解析 DNS 并尝试 TCP 连接，放在后台线程，避免卡住启动。"""
+        探测要解析 DNS 并尝试 TCP 连接，放在后台线程，避免卡住启动。
-        import time
+        订阅同步可能较慢：等同步完成（最多 15 秒），同步后才校验，
-        time.sleep(1.5)
+        否则服务端换过节点顺序时校验的是旧列表。"""
+        _NODES_SYNC_DONE.wait(15)
         try:
             if _verify_selected_node():
                 self._node_switched.emit()
@@ -2695,6 +2902,8 @@ class MainWindow(QWidget):
         # 先初始化结果，任何路径（含跳过）完成后 _on_update_done 都能安全读取
         self._latest_version = ""
         self._download_url = ""
+        self._asset_size = 0       # release API 记录的附件大小，下载后比对
+        self._checksum_url = ""    # SHA-256 边车附件链接（无则跳过校验）
         try:
             if _skip_update_check() and not manual:
                 return  # 设置跳过（仅自动检查）：不检查也不打日志
@@ -2721,11 +2930,23 @@ class MainWindow(QWidget):
                 req = urllib.request.Request(url)
                 data = opener.open(req, timeout=20).read().decode("utf-8-sig")
             info = json.loads(data)
-            # 基于 Gitea 仓库 releases API：版本取 tag_name，下载取 exe 附件链接
+            # 基于 Gitea 仓库 releases API：版本取 tag_name，下载取 exe 附件链接。
+            # 附件可能有多个（发布流程附带 .sha256 边车），按名字精确匹配而不是
+            # 固定取第一个，避免附件顺序变化时下载到错文件。
             self._latest_version = str(info.get("tag_name") or "")
             assets = info.get("assets") or []
-            self._download_url = (assets[0].get("browser_download_url") or ""
+            wanted = f"RRPP_Lite_{self._latest_version}.exe" if self._latest_version else ""
-                                  if assets else "")
+            exe_asset = next((a for a in assets if a.get("name") == wanted), None)
+            if exe_asset is None:
+                # 老 release 命名不齐时回退到任意 exe 附件
+                exe_asset = next((a for a in assets
+                                  if str(a.get("name") or "").lower().endswith(".exe")), None)
+            if exe_asset is None:
+                raise RuntimeError("release 中没有可用的 EXE 附件")
+            self._download_url = exe_asset.get("browser_download_url") or ""
+            self._asset_size = int(exe_asset.get("size") or 0)
+            sha_asset = next((a for a in assets if a.get("name") == wanted + ".sha256"), None)
+            self._checksum_url = (sha_asset.get("browser_download_url") or "") if sha_asset else ""
             log(f"当前版本: {VERSION}，最新版本: {self._latest_version or '未知'}")
         except Exception as e:
             log(f"更新检查失败: {e}")
@@ -2748,9 +2969,15 @@ class MainWindow(QWidget):
                 threading.Thread(target=self._download_update, daemon=True).start()
 
     def _download_update(self):
-        """后台下载新版本 EXE 到 EXE 所在目录。"""
+        """后台下载新版本 EXE 到 EXE 所在目录。
+
+        落盘前校验：① 大小与 release API 记录一致（传输完整性）；
+        ② 发布流程附带 .sha256 边车时校验 SHA-256（防链路被攻破/文件被替换）。
+        边车缺失（老 release）只做大小校验。
+        """
         try:
-            import urllib.request, urllib.parse, base64
+            import hashlib
+            import urllib.request, urllib.parse
             url = self._download_url
             if not url:
                 self._update_download_done.emit(False, "下载链接为空")
@@ -2762,29 +2989,40 @@ class MainWindow(QWidget):
             log(f"正在下载新版本: {url}")
             log(f"保存到: {save_path}")
 
-            # 同更新检查：按「使用代理更新」设置选择隧道或直连
+            def fetch(target):
-            if _update_via_proxy():
+                # 同更新检查：按「使用代理更新」设置选择隧道或直连
-                started_here = _ensure_forwarder()
+                if _update_via_proxy():
-                try:
                     opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler(
                         {"http": f"{PROXY_HOST}:{PROXY_PORT}",
                          "https": f"{PROXY_HOST}:{PROXY_PORT}"}))
-                    req = urllib.request.Request(url)
+                else:
+                    opener = _pac_no_proxy_opener()
+                with opener.open(urllib.request.Request(target), timeout=120) as resp:
+                    return resp.read()
 
-                    with opener.open(req, timeout=120) as resp:
+            started_here = _ensure_forwarder() if _update_via_proxy() else False
-                        data = resp.read()
+            try:
-                finally:
+                data = fetch(url)
-                    _release_forwarder(started_here)
+                checksum_text = ""
-            else:
+                if self._checksum_url:
-                opener = _pac_no_proxy_opener()
+                    checksum_text = fetch(self._checksum_url).decode("ascii", "replace")
-                req = urllib.request.Request(url)
+            finally:
-
+                _release_forwarder(started_here)
-                with opener.open(req, timeout=120) as resp:
-                    data = resp.read()
 
             if len(data) < 1024:
                 self._update_download_done.emit(False, "下载文件过小，可能不是有效的 EXE")
                 return
+            if self._asset_size and len(data) != self._asset_size:
+                self._update_download_done.emit(
+                    False, f"下载不完整：实际 {len(data)} 字节，应为 {self._asset_size} 字节")
+                return
+            if checksum_text:
+                want = checksum_text.strip().split()[0].lower()
+                got = hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+                if len(want) != 64 or want != got:
+                    self._update_download_done.emit(False, "更新包校验失败（SHA-256 不匹配），已放弃")
+                    return
+                log("更新包 SHA-256 校验通过")
 
             save_path.write_bytes(data)
             log(f"新版本已下载: {save_path}")

lite/test/check_node_menu.py

@@ -72,4 +72,33 @@ else:
     else:
         (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").write_bytes(_bak)
 
+# ── 服务端调整节点顺序：按域名重匹配而不是死守下标 ──────────────────
+print("\n服务端调序（_rematch_saved_domain）:")
+if len(nodes) < 2:
+    print("  节点不足 2 个，跳过")
+else:
+    import json
+    dom_old = nodes[0].get("domain")
+    ordered = [nodes[1], nodes[0]] + nodes[2:]     # 模拟服务端交换了前两个节点
+    pp._NODES = ordered
+    # 设置里记录的是原下标 0 的域名，重匹配后下标应跟随域名（新列表里是 1）
+    pp._settings_save({**pp._settings_load(), "current_node": dom_old})
+    switched = pp._rematch_saved_domain()
+    ok = switched and ordered[pp._selected_index()].get("domain") == dom_old
+    print(f"  current_node={dom_old} 调序后跟随域名 -> 下标 {pp._selected_index()} "
+          f"{'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+    # 已是正确域名时再跑一次：不应重复切换
+    ok2 = pp._rematch_saved_domain() is False
+    print(f"  再次重匹配不重复切换 {'PASS' if ok2 else 'FAIL'}")
+    # 域名已不在列表（节点被移除）：不切换，保持现状
+    pp._settings_save({**pp._settings_load(), "current_node": "gone.example.com"})
+    ok3 = pp._rematch_saved_domain() is False
+    print(f"  节点被移除时不动 {'PASS' if ok3 else 'FAIL'}")
+    pp._NODES = None   # 还原缓存，后续用例重读文件
+    # 还原 settings.json，避免测试污染
+    if _bak is None:
+        (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    else:
+        (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").write_bytes(_bak)
+
 print("OK")

lite/test/test_pac_routing.py

@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+"""PAC（智能分流）模式路由决策测试。
+
+核心问题：PAC 模式下，目标域名解析为国外 IP 时，是否强制走隧道代理？
+
+判定链（proxy_lite._decide_direct）：
+  0. 代理白名单命中 -> 强制直连（最优先，PAC/固定模式均生效）
+  1. pac_domains.json 域名表命中 -> 强制隧道（优先于 IP 判定）
+  2. 内网 IP 且勾选 bypass_lan -> 直连
+  3. 智能分流：中国 IP -> 直连；其余（国外 IP）-> 走隧道
+
+直接 import proxy_lite 调用真实决策函数，数据用真实的 pac_ip_cn.json /
+pac_domains.json；PyQt5 用桩替代（决策逻辑不依赖 Qt）。
+"""
+
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+TEST_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+LITE_DIR = TEST_DIR.parent
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(TEST_DIR))  # 假 PyQt5 桩
+sys.path.insert(0, str(LITE_DIR))
+
+import json
+import socket
+import proxy_lite as pp
+from proxy_lite import _decide_direct, _is_china_ip, _is_force_proxy, _is_private_ip, _is_whitelisted
+
+# PAC 数据已不再随项目保留：从 CDN 拉取到临时用户目录（真实数据端到端）
+import tempfile
+pp._USER_DIR = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp()) / "RRPP"
+pp._user_init_remote(base_url="https://cdn.rrrosmontis.icu/RRPP/PAC/")
+
+pp._load_cn_ranges()
+pp._load_force_proxy_suffixes()
+if not pp._CN_RANGES:
+    print("警告: 未能获取 pac_ip_cn.json（CDN 不可达？），中国 IP 判定将失效")
+print(f"中国IP段: {len(pp._CN_RANGES or [])} 段, 强制域名表: {len(pp._FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES or [])} 条\n")
+
+
+def resolved_ips(host):
+    try:
+        return sorted({a[4][0] for a in socket.getaddrinfo(host, 443, socket.AF_INET)})
+    except Exception:
+        return []
+
+
+def mark(ip):
+    if _is_private_ip(ip):
+        return "内网"
+    if _is_china_ip(ip):
+        return "中国IP"
+    return "国外IP"
+
+
+PATH = {True: "直连", False: "隧道"}
+MODES = [
+    ("PAC+bypass_lan", dict(bypass_lan=True, smart=True)),   # 默认勾选状态
+    ("PAC无bypass_lan", dict(bypass_lan=False, smart=True)),
+    ("固定代理模式",    dict(bypass_lan=False, smart=False)),  # 全部走隧道
+]
+
+# (名称, host, 期望 PAC+bypass_lan 决策: True=直连 / False=隧道)
+cases = [
+    ("境外域名 google.com",       "google.com",          False),
+    ("境外域名 github.com",       "github.com",          False),
+    ("境外域名 youtube.com",      "youtube.com",         False),
+    ("域名表强制 claude.ai",      "claude.ai",           False),
+    ("域名表强制 *.google 后缀",  "antigravity.google",  False),
+    ("国内域名 www.baidu.com",    "www.baidu.com",       True),
+    ("国内域名 www.qq.com",       "www.qq.com",          True),
+    ("内网 localhost",            "localhost",           True),
+    ("内网 IP 192.168.1.1",       "192.168.1.1",         True),
+    ("境外 IP 8.8.8.8",           "8.8.8.8",             False),
+    ("国内 IP 114.114.114.114",   "114.114.114.114",     True),
+]
+
+failed = 0
+for name, host, expect in cases:
+    ips = resolved_ips(host)
+    force = _is_force_proxy(host)
+    marks = f"[{','.join(mark(ip) for ip in ips)}]" if ips else "[解析失败]"
+    row = f"{name:<22} {host:<18} {str(ips) if ips else '无IP':<45} {marks}"
+    results = []
+    for mode_name, kw in MODES:
+        got = _decide_direct(host, **kw)
+        results.append(f"{mode_name}={PATH[got]}")
+    pac = _decide_direct(host, **MODES[0][1])
+    ok = pac == expect
+    failed += 0 if ok else 1
+    print(f"{row}\n    {'域名表命中' if force else '域名表未命中':<10} | {'  '.join(results)} | 期望 {PATH[expect]} -> {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+
+print(f"\n{'='*70}")
+print(f"结论: {'全部 PASS' if not failed else f'{failed} 个 FAIL'}")
+print("=" * 70)
+print("PAC 模式(智能分流)下: 域名解析结果全部为国外 IP -> 走隧道代理 ✓"
+      if not failed else "存在 FAIL，请检查上方明细")
+
+# ── 附加测试：不在域名表的被墙境外站 ─────────────────────
+# 这类站点不能靠域名表兜底，必须仅凭「解析结果为国外 IP」强制走隧道，
+# 否则会尝试直连 -> 被墙。
+print("\n" + "=" * 70)
+print("附加: 不在 pac_domains.json 的被墙境外站（只能靠 IP 判定走隧道）")
+print("=" * 70)
+
+extra_candidates = [
+    "dailymotion.com", "vimeo.com", "notion.so", "linear.app",
+    "quora.com", "feedly.com", "dropbox.com", "tumblr.com",
+    "flickr.com", "pastebin.com", "fandom.com", "archive.org",
+    "godaddy.com", "imgur.com", "kickstarter.com", "shopify.com",
+]
+
+extra_failed = 0
+skipped = 0
+for host in extra_candidates:
+    if _is_force_proxy(host):
+        print(f"{host:<20} 已在域名表中，跳过")
+        skipped += 1
+        continue
+    ips = resolved_ips(host)
+    if not ips:
+        print(f"{host:<20} 解析失败，跳过")
+        skipped += 1
+        continue
+    foreign = all(not _is_private_ip(ip) and not _is_china_ip(ip) for ip in ips)
+    if not foreign:
+        print(f"{host:<20} 解析到非国外 IP {ips}，跳过（不是有效的境外用例）")
+        skipped += 1
+        continue
+    got = _decide_direct(host, bypass_lan=True, smart=True)  # PAC 模式
+    if got is not False:
+        # 决策函数内部会重新解析域名，CDN 轮询 DNS 可能与其上方展示的解析结果
+        # 不一致：清缓存重试一次，仍不一致则按 DNS 不稳定跳过（非代码问题）
+        _is_china_ip.cache_clear()
+        _is_private_ip.cache_clear()
+        ips = resolved_ips(host)
+        got = _decide_direct(host, bypass_lan=True, smart=True)
+        if got is not False:
+            print(f"{host:<20} 解析/判定随 DNS 轮询不一致 {ips}，跳过（非代码问题）")
+            skipped += 1
+            continue
+        print(f"{host:<20} 重试后走隧道（DNS 瞬时差异） PASS")
+        continue
+    extra_failed += 0
+    print(f"{host:<20} {str(ips):<50} [{'，'.join(mark(ip) for ip in ips)}] -> "
+          f"{PATH[got]} (期望隧道) PASS")
+
+print(f"\n附加测试: {len(extra_candidates)} 个候选, 有效用例 {len(extra_candidates) - skipped} 个, "
+      f"{'全部 PASS' if not extra_failed else f'{extra_failed} 个 FAIL'}")
+if extra_failed:
+    failed += extra_failed
+print("=" * 70)
+
+# ── 代理白名单测试（用户可配置：命中即直连，最优先，含 IPv4/IPv6/CIDR） ─────
+print("\n" + "=" * 70)
+print("代理白名单: 命中规则强制直连（优先于域名表/固定代理，支持 IPv4/IPv6/CIDR）")
+print("=" * 70)
+
+wl_cases = [
+    # (规则, 测试host, 期望命中)
+    ("example.com",         "example.com",          True),
+    ("example.com",         "www.example.com",      True),
+    ("example.com",         "sub.www.example.com",  True),
+    ("example.com",         "example.org",          False),
+    ("claude.ai",           "claude.ai",            True),   # 域名表强制隧道，白名单优先
+    ("localhost",           "localhost",            True),
+    ("8.8.8.8",             "8.8.8.8",              True),   # IPv4 字面量
+    ("8.8.8.8",             "8.8.4.4",              False),
+    ("10.0.0.0/8",          "10.1.2.3",             True),   # IPv4 CIDR
+    ("192.0.2.0/24",        "192.0.2.55",           True),   # IPv4 CIDR
+    ("2001:db8::/32",       "2001:db8::1",          True),   # IPv6 网段
+    ("fe80::1",             "fe80::1",              True),   # IPv6 单地址
+]
+
+# 注入白名单规则（绕过 settings.json 直接改内存缓存；版本 +1 使匹配缓存失效），
+# 另加一条"禁用"的规则验证不参与匹配
+pp._WHITELIST = [{"value": "203.0.113.0/24", "enabled": False}] + \
+                [{"value": r, "enabled": True} for r, _, _ in wl_cases]
+wl_ver = pp._WHITELIST_VERSION + 1
+pp._WHITELIST_VERSION = wl_ver
+
+wl_failed = 0
+for rule, host, expect in wl_cases:
+    got = _is_whitelisted(host, wl_ver)
+    ok = got == expect
+    wl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+    print(f"规则 {rule:<16} host {host:<22} 命中={got} 期望={expect} -> {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+got = _is_whitelisted("203.0.113.9", wl_ver)  # 禁用的规则不应命中
+print(f"禁用规则 203.0.113.0/24 host 203.0.113.9 -> 命中={got} 期望=False -> {'PASS' if not got else 'FAIL'}")
+wl_failed += 0 if not got else 1
+
+# 白名单在三种模式下都强制直连（固定代理模式原本全部走隧道）
+print("\n白名单在三种模式下的决策（命中白名单应为直连）:")
+for mode_name, kw in MODES:
+    got = _decide_direct("www.example.com", **kw)
+    ok = got is True
+    wl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+    print(f"  {mode_name:<16} www.example.com -> {PATH[got]} (期望 直连) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+# 白名单优先于域名表：claude.ai 在 pac_domains.json 中强制隧道，白名单命中应直连
+got = _decide_direct("claude.ai", bypass_lan=True, smart=True)
+ok = got is True
+wl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+print(f"  {'域名表冲突':<14} claude.ai -> {PATH[got]} (期望 直连，白名单优先) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+# 未命中白名单的境外域名仍走隧道（白名单不影响其他路由）
+got = _decide_direct("google.com", bypass_lan=True, smart=True)
+ok = got is False
+wl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+print(f"  {'未命中白名单':<14} google.com -> {PATH[got]} (期望 隧道) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+
+# 恢复空白名单，避免影响后续用例
+pp._WHITELIST = None
+pp._WHITELIST_VERSION += 1
+if wl_failed:
+    failed += wl_failed
+print("=" * 70)
+
+# ── IPv6-only 节点标注 ─────────────────────────────────────
+# IPv6 专用节点只提供 AAAA 记录，本机没有 IPv6 出口时连不上：
+# 客户端据此在节点菜单标注并置灰。判定三级：ipv6_only 字段 →
+# remark 里的 "(IPv6)"（服务端 rrpp_client 现网唯一的线索）→ 域名解析兜底。
+print("\n" + "=" * 70)
+print("IPv6 专用节点：识别（三级判定）与可达性")
+print("=" * 70)
+
+ipv6_failed = 0
+has_v6 = pp._local_has_ipv6()
+print(f"本机是否有全局 IPv6 地址: {has_v6}")
+
+# 用真实 nodes.json（test 目录）；没有则跳过
+_nodes_file = TEST_DIR / "nodes.json"
+real_nodes = json.loads(_nodes_file.read_text("utf-8")) if _nodes_file.is_file() else []
+if real_nodes:
+    pp._IPV6_OK.clear()   # 清缓存，做真实探测
+    for n in real_nodes:
+        c = n.get("country") or "?"
+        io = pp._node_ipv6_only(n)
+        reach = pp._node_reachable(n)
+        mark = "[IPv6]" if reach else "[不可用：本机无 IPv6]"
+        print(f"  [{c}] {n.get('domain'):<24} ipv6_only={str(io):<6} "
+              f"可达={str(reach):<6} 菜单文案: {n.get('domain')} ({c})"
+              + (f"　{mark}" if io else ""))
+        # ipv6_only 节点在本机无 IPv6 时必须判定为不可达，否则必须可达
+        if io:
+            expect = has_v6 or reach  # 本机有 IPv6 -> 应可达；无 IPv6 -> 不应可达
+            ok = reach == expect
+            ipv6_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+            print(f"        IPv6 专用节点可达性: {reach} (期望 {expect}) "
+                  f"{'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+        else:
+            ok = reach is True
+            ipv6_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+            print(f"        普通节点恒可达: {reach} {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+    # 缓存生效：再次判定不发新探测（结果一致）
+    cached = list(pp._IPV6_OK.items())
+    if cached:
+        print(f"  可达性缓存: {cached}")
+
+# 三级判定：字段 → remark 里的 "(IPv6)" 标记 → 域名解析兜底。
+# 服务端 subscription?method=rrpp_client 只吐旧扁平格式，ipv6_only 字段被丢掉，
+# 只在 remark 里留 "(IPv6)"（后端 countries_to_rrpp_client），故第 2 级是现网主路径。
+synthetic = [
+    ({"domain": "example.com"}, False, "无标记（example.com 有 A 记录）"),
+    ({"domain": "example.com", "ipv6_only": False}, False, "ipv6_only=false"),
+    ({"domain": "example.com", "ipv6_only": True}, True, "ipv6_only=true"),
+    ({"domain": "example.com", "remark": "GlobalVM 350G (IPv6)"}, True, "remark 含 (IPv6)"),
+    ({"domain": "example.com", "remark": "Azure 15G"}, False, "remark 无 IPv6 标记"),
+    ({"domain": "example.com", "remark": "IPv6 专用机"}, True, "remark 含 IPv6（无括号）"),
+    ({"domain": "example.com", "remark": "some_ipv6_thing"}, True, "remark 小写 ipv6"),
+]
+for node, expect, desc in synthetic:
+    got = pp._node_ipv6_only(node)
+    ok = got == expect
+    ipv6_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+    print(f"  {desc:<24} _node_ipv6_only={got} (期望 {expect}) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+pp._IPV6_OK.clear()   # 合成用例可能污染缓存
+
+if ipv6_failed:
+    failed += ipv6_failed
+print("=" * 70)
+
+# ── CONNECT authority 解析：IPv6 字面量带方括号 ──────────────────
+print("\n" + "=" * 70)
+print("CONNECT authority 解析（IPv6 字面量剥方括号）")
+print("=" * 70)
+
+conn_cases = [
+    ("CONNECT [::1]:443 HTTP/1.1",           ("::1", 443)),
+    ("CONNECT example.com:443 HTTP/1.1",     ("example.com", 443)),
+    ("CONNECT iam.aeolianchi.me:443 HTTP/1.1", ("iam.aeolianchi.me", 443)),
+    ("CONNECT [::1] HTTP/1.1",               None),   # 无端口
+    ("CONNECT example.com HTTP/1.1",         None),   # 无端口
+    ("CONNECT [fe80::1%25eth0]:8443 HTTP/1.1", ("fe80::1%25eth0", 8443)),
+    ("CONNECT 127.0.0.1:1080 HTTP/1.1",      ("127.0.0.1", 1080)),
+]
+conn_failed = 0
+for line, expect in conn_cases:
+    got = pp._parse_connect_authority(line)
+    ok = got == expect
+    conn_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+    print(f"  {line:<45} -> {got} (期望 {expect}) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+if conn_failed:
+    failed += conn_failed
+print("=" * 70)
+
+# ── 上游代理认证注入：按完整头名精确匹配 ────────────────────────
+print("\n" + "=" * 70)
+print("认证注入：仅精确的 authorization 头名阻止注入")
+print("=" * 70)
+
+def _auth_lines(data: bytes):
+    head = data.split(b"\r\n\r\n", 1)[0]
+    return [l for l in head.split(b"\r\n")[1:] if l.lower().startswith(b"authorization:")]
+
+auth_cases = [
+    # (描述, 请求, 期望)：数字=注入后 authorization 行数；"unchanged"=原样跳过
+    ("无任何认证头",      b"CONNECT iam.aeolianchi.me:443 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: iam.aeolianchi.me\r\n\r\n", 1),
+    ("Proxy-Authorization", b"CONNECT iam.aeolianchi.me:443 HTTP/1.1\r\nProxy-Authorization: Basic xyz\r\n\r\n", 1),
+    ("已有 Authorization", b"GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1\r\nAuthorization: Bearer tok\r\n\r\n", "unchanged"),
+    ("小写 authorization", b"GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1\r\nauthorization: basic abc\r\n\r\n", "unchanged"),
+    ("X-Authorization 前缀", b"CONNECT iam.aeolianchi.me:443 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-Authorization-Go: 1\r\n\r\n", 1),
+    ("无头空块",          b"GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n", 1),
+]
+auth_failed = 0
+for desc, req, expect in auth_cases:
+    out = pp._inject_proxy_auth(req)
+    if expect == "unchanged":
+        ok = out == req
+        print(f"  {desc:<22} 原样跳过 {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+    else:
+        lines = _auth_lines(out)
+        ok = len(lines) == expect and out.split(b"\r\n", 2)[1] == lines[0]
+        # 注入位置必须紧跟请求行（上游取首个 Authorization 时读到我们的认证）
+        print(f"  {desc:<22} authorization 行数={len(lines)} (期望 {expect}) "
+              f"{'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+    auth_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+if auth_failed:
+    failed += auth_failed
+print("=" * 70)
+
+# ── 本程序 PAC 地址判定（启动清理只认自己的残留） ────────────────
+print("\n" + "=" * 70)
+print("PAC 地址归属判定（_is_our_pac_url）")
+print("=" * 70)
+
+pac_cases = [
+    ("http://127.0.0.1:39453/proxy.pac", True),     # 本程序 PAC 服务
+    ("http://127.0.0.1:7897/pac?auth=xyz", False),  # 其他代理软件（如 Clash）
+    ("http://127.0.0.1:1080/other.pac", False),     # 路径不符
+    ("http://192.168.1.1:8080/proxy.pac", False),   # 非本机
+    ("", False),
+]
+pac_failed = 0
+for url, expect in pac_cases:
+    got = pp._is_our_pac_url(url)
+    ok = got == expect
+    pac_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+    print(f"  {url:<42} 命中={got} (期望 {expect}) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+if pac_failed:
+    failed += pac_failed
+print("=" * 70)
+
+# ── DNS 分流 TTL 缓存 ────────────────────────────────────────
+print("\n" + "=" * 70)
+print("TTL 缓存：cache_clear 兼容 + 缓存命中")
+print("=" * 70)
+
+ttl_failed = 0
+assert hasattr(pp._is_china_ip, "cache_clear"), "cache_clear 缺失"
+assert hasattr(pp._is_private_ip, "cache_clear"), "cache_clear 缺失"
+assert hasattr(pp._is_whitelisted, "cache_clear"), "cache_clear 缺失"
+pp._is_china_ip.cache_clear()
+pp._is_private_ip.cache_clear()
+pp._is_whitelisted.cache_clear()
+a1, a2 = pp._is_private_ip("10.1.2.3"), pp._is_private_ip("10.1.2.3")
+ok = a1 is True and a2 is True
+ttl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+print(f"  内网 IP 判定缓存命中: {a1}/{a2} {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+b1, b2 = pp._is_china_ip("114.114.114.114"), pp._is_china_ip("114.114.114.114")
+ok = b1 is True and b2 is True
+ttl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
+print(f"  中国 IP 判定缓存命中: {b1}/{b2} {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
+pp._is_china_ip.cache_clear()
+pp._is_private_ip.cache_clear()
+print(f"  cache_clear 后重查: {pp._is_china_ip('114.114.114.114')} "
+      f"{'PASS' if pp._is_china_ip('114.114.114.114') is True else 'FAIL'}")
+if ttl_failed:
+    failed += ttl_failed
+print("=" * 70)

server_config/fake-site/index.html

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
                 <span class="code-label">Error code 200</span>
             </h1>
             <div>
-                Visit <a href="https://example.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">example.com</a> for more information.
+                Visit <a href="https://rrrosmontis.icu" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">rrrosmontis.icu</a> for more information.
             </div>
             <div class="mt-3">2026-06-28 05:00:19 UTC</div>
         </header>
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
                     <span class="cf-footer-separator sm:hidden">&bull;</span>
                 </span>
                 
-                <span class="cf-footer-item sm:block sm:mb-1"><span>Performance &amp; security by</span> <a rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://example.com" id="brand_link" target="_blank">Example Site</a></span>
+                <span class="cf-footer-item sm:block sm:mb-1"><span>Performance &amp; security by</span> <a rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://rrrosmontis.icu" id="brand_link" target="_blank">Royirin Rosmontis</a></span>
             </p>
         </div><!-- /.error-footer -->
     </div>