docs: nodes.json 位置改回后端目录（与 app.py 同级），同步 API.md

- jp（Azure 无 IPv6）双栈域名曾拨 AAAA 导致 network is unreachable 刷屏；修复采用 1.12+ 新写法
  dns.servers(local) + outbound.domain_resolver(strategy=ipv4_only)
- 明确 legacy domain_strategy 字段在 sing-box 1.13 已 FATAL 拒绝，禁止使用
- 注明 ru/hk2/us/aq 经实测无此问题，无需配置

.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +1,12 @@
 __pycache__/
 *.pyc
+
+# Local development state and reproducible build outputs.
+.claude/
+lite/.claude/
+lite/backups/
+lite/build/
+lite/dist/
+lite/RELEASE_WORKFLOW.md
+*.bak
+*.bak-*

README.md

@@ -1,17 +1,13 @@
 # Royirin Rosmontis Private Proxy
 Supported by Global Rosmanka Cloud Nexus Inc. —— https://rosmanka.rrrosmontis.icu
+
 ## 警告
-- 包含 WireGuard 的 common 版本转发器永久不再维护，推荐使用 Lite 版本
+- 自构建的客户端永远不再维护。推荐使用 Clash Verge 或其他软件结合服务器端配置使用。  
-> common 版本现在有许多未修复的 bug (如部分 UI 的显示问题) 、令人难以忍受的代码逻辑 (如 PAC 规则直接写在代码里)和安全性问题 (认证凭据的暴露与证书忽略)，而 Lite 版本修复了这些问题，并会收到持续的更新 
+> 这些客户端使用了 HTTP 直接连接，具有流量识别的安全隐患。  
-- 本程序完全没有 Linux 与 CLI 功能兼容，默认构建为带有图形界面的 Windows .exe
+- 其中，common 版本过于过时，具有严重的安全问题和大量功能缺失。Lite 版本（版本号开头为 9999 的版本）则更为安全，但部分功能（TUN 模式）严重不可用，且似乎无法修复。  
+- 在 Release 中保留了 Lite 版本的 Pyinstaller 构建产物，可能启动较慢。如果需要使用此客户端，可以考虑用 Nuitka 自行再次构建。  
+- 本仓库中的构建产物与源码没有做 Linux 系统的适配。
 
-### 如何区分 common 版本与 Lite 版本
+## 服务器侧配置手册
-- Lite 版本的版本号前四位固定为 9999，后续为从月份开始的构建时间戳，而 common 版本的版本号为包含年份的完整的构建时间戳
+- https://rrrosmontis.icu/articles/index.html?id=00005 (部分内容过时)
-
-## 服务器侧配置手册 (部分内容过时)
-- https://rrrosmontis.icu/articles/index.html?id=00005
 - 更推荐参考本仓库 server_config 文件夹中的 md 文件手册
-
-## 若要直接使用仓库客户端对应的服务
-请前往 https://sso.rrrosmontis.icu 注册 Rosmanka ID，然后与管理员商定使用细则
-royirin@rrrosmontis.icu

lite/RRPP_Lite.spec

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# -*- mode: python ; coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+from pathlib import Path
+from PyInstaller.utils.hooks import collect_all
+
+# 强制收集 PyQt5 全部模块及二进制文件
+qt_datas, qt_binaries, qt_hiddenimports = collect_all('PyQt5')
+
+# 只内置 config.json（普通设置）。nodes.json / pac_*.json 属用户数据：
+# 运行时读 %LOCALAPPDATA%\RRPP（首启自动创建模板 / 从 CDN 拉取），不进 EXE。
+_JSON_DATAS = [(str(Path(SPECPATH) / 'config.json'), '.')]
+_TUN_RUNTIME = [
+    (str(Path(SPECPATH) / 'runtime' / name), '.')
+    for name in ('tun2socks.exe', 'wintun.dll', 'LICENSE.tun2socks.txt',
+                 'LICENSE.wintun.txt', 'README.txt')
+]
+print(f"[spec] 打包 json 数据文件: {[Path(src).name for src, _ in _JSON_DATAS]}")
+
+# 自定义 manifest：普通权限运行 + 声明 PerMonitorV2 DPI 感知，
+# 避免程序在不同缩放比例的显示器之间移动时被 Windows 位图拉伸。
+_MANIFEST = r'''<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
+<assembly xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1" manifestVersion="1.0">
+  <assemblyIdentity version="1.0.0.0" name="RRPP_Lite" type="win32"/>
+  <description>Royirin Rosmontis Private Proxy Lite</description>
+  <trustInfo xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v2">
+    <security>
+      <requestedPrivileges>
+        <requestedExecutionLevel level="asInvoker" uiAccess="false"/>
+      </requestedPrivileges>
+    </security>
+  </trustInfo>
+  <compatibility xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:compatibility.v1">
+    <application>
+      <supportedOS Id="{8e0f7a12-bfb3-4fe8-b9a5-48fd50a15a9a}"/>
+      <supportedOS Id="{1f676c76-80e1-4239-95bb-83d0f6d0da78}"/>
+    </application>
+  </compatibility>
+  <application xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3">
+    <windowsSettings>
+      <dpiAwareness xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2016/WindowsSettings">PerMonitorV2, PerMonitor, system</dpiAwareness>
+      <dpiAware xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSettings">true/pm</dpiAware>
+    </windowsSettings>
+  </application>
+  <dependency>
+    <dependentAssembly>
+      <assemblyIdentity type="win32" name="Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls" version="6.0.0.0" processorArchitecture="*" publicKeyToken="6595b64144ccf1df" language="*"/>
+    </dependentAssembly>
+  </dependency>
+</assembly>
+'''
+
+a = Analysis(
+    ['main.py'],
+    pathex=[],
+    binaries=qt_binaries,
+    datas=[('ico.ico', '.')] + _JSON_DATAS + _TUN_RUNTIME + qt_datas,
+    hiddenimports=qt_hiddenimports,
+    hookspath=[],
+    hooksconfig={},
+    runtime_hooks=[],
+    # 排除 Nuitka 构建链相关模块（venv 里装了 Nuitka，但 PyInstaller 产物不需要）
+    excludes=['nuitka', 'zstandard', 'ordered_set'],
+    noarchive=False,
+    optimize=0,
+)
+pyz = PYZ(a.pure)
+
+exe = EXE(
+    pyz,
+    a.scripts,
+    a.binaries,
+    a.datas,
+    [],
+    name='Royirin Rosmontis Private Proxy Lite Python',
+    debug=False,
+    bootloader_ignore_signals=False,
+    strip=False,
+    # UPX 会压缩资源段（含图标），冷缓存下 Explorer 可能提取不到图标导致任务栏空白
+    upx=False,
+    upx_exclude=[],
+    runtime_tmpdir=None,
+    console=False,
+    disable_windowed_traceback=False,
+    argv_emulation=False,
+    target_arch=None,
+    codesign_identity=None,
+    entitlements_file=None,
+    icon=['ico.ico'],
+    manifest=_MANIFEST,
+)

lite/build_lite.bat

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+@echo off
+cd /d "%~dp0"
+call ..\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m PyInstaller --version >nul 2>&1
+if errorlevel 1 (
+    echo PyInstaller not installed. Run first:
+    echo   ..\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m pip install pyinstaller
+    pause
+    exit /b 1
+)
+call ..\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m PyInstaller RRPP_Lite.spec --noconfirm
+if errorlevel 1 (
+    echo.
+    echo Build failed.
+    pause
+    exit /b 1
+)
+echo.
+echo Build complete. Output: dist\Royirin Rosmontis Private Proxy Lite Python.exe
+pause

lite/build_nuitka.bat

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+@echo off
+cd /d "%~dp0"
+call ..\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m nuitka --version >nul 2>&1
+if errorlevel 1 (
+    echo Nuitka not installed. Run first:
+    echo   ..\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m pip install nuitka zstandard
+    pause
+    exit /b 1
+)
+rem Remove prior artifacts and the SCons incremental state before every build.
+rem The constants blob is embedded outside normal dependency tracking, so reuse
+rem can leave new UI strings and settings keys out of the executable.
+rd /s /q "dist\main.build" 2>nul
+rd /s /q "dist\main.dist" 2>nul
+rd /s /q "dist\main.onefile-build" 2>nul
+rem Use Nuitka COFF objects for embedded constants to avoid compiler cache reuse.
+rem Zig C23 embed caches do not reliably track embedded blob changes.
+set NUITKA_RESOURCE_MODE=coff_obj
+rem Convert config.json version to Windows file-version segments (each <= 65535).
+for /f %%v in ('..\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -c "import json;v=json.load(open('config.json',encoding='utf-8'))['version'];print(f'9999.{int(v[4:8])}.{int(v[8:12])}.0')"') do set "FILEVER=%%v"
+call ..\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m nuitka ^
+  --standalone --onefile ^
+  --enable-plugin=pyqt5 ^
+  --user-package-configuration-file=rrpp-tun.nuitka-package.config.yml ^
+  --include-data-files=config.json=config.json ^
+  --include-data-files=runtime/LICENSE.tun2socks.txt=LICENSE.tun2socks.txt ^
+  --include-data-files=runtime/LICENSE.wintun.txt=LICENSE.wintun.txt ^
+  --include-data-files=runtime/README.txt=README.txt ^
+  --include-data-files=runtime/tun2socks.exe=tun2socks.exe ^
+  --include-data-files=runtime/wintun.dll=wintun.dll ^
+  --windows-icon-from-ico=ico.ico ^
+  --windows-console-mode=disable ^
+  --company-name="Global Rosmanka Cloud Nexus Inc" ^
+  --product-name="R.R.P.P." ^
+  --file-version=%FILEVER% ^
+  --output-dir=dist ^
+  --output-filename="Royirin Rosmontis Private Proxy Lite.exe" ^
+  --assume-yes-for-downloads ^
+  main.py
+if errorlevel 1 (
+    echo.
+    echo Build failed.
+    pause
+    exit /b 1
+)
+echo.
+echo Build complete. Output: dist\Royirin Rosmontis Private Proxy Lite.exe
+pause

lite/config.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
-  "version": "",
+  "version": "999909190441",
-  "update_url": "",
+  "pac_base_url": "https://cdn.rrrosmontis.icu/RRPP/PAC/",
-  "pac_base_url": "",
+  "nodes_url": "https://api.rrrosmontis.icu/v1/rrpp/subscription?method=rrpp_client",
-  "nodes_url": ""
+  "update_url": "https://git.rrrosmontis.icu/api/v1/repos/RoyirinRosmontis/Private-Proxy/releases/latest"
 }

lite/pac_direct_domains.json

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+{
+  "version": "",
+  "date": "",
+  "description": "PAC 智能分流的明确直连域名模板。强制代理规则和用户白名单优先级更高。",
+  "domains": []
+}

lite/rrpp-tun.nuitka-package.config.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+- module-name: 'main'
+  dlls:
+    - from_filenames:
+        relative_path: 'runtime'
+        prefixes:
+          - 'tun2socks'
+        suffixes:
+          - 'exe'
+        executable: 'yes'
+      dest_path: '.'
+      when: 'win32'
+    - from_filenames:
+        relative_path: 'runtime'
+        prefixes:
+          - 'wintun'
+        suffixes:
+          - 'dll'
+      dest_path: '.'
+      when: 'win32'

lite/rrpp_core/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"""RRPP Lite 的无 GUI 核心逻辑。"""

lite/rrpp_core/dns_observer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+"""轻量 DNS 观察器，用于把 TUN 里的目标 IP 关联回解析域名。
+
+TUN 送到 SOCKS5 的请求通常只带目标 IP。这里观察经 UoT 或直连的
+UDP DNS 回包，保存短期的 ``IP -> 域名`` 映射供分流和日志使用。
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import struct
+import threading
+import time
+from typing import Callable
+
+
+def _read_name(packet: bytes, offset: int) -> tuple[str, int]:
+    labels: list[str] = []
+    cursor = offset
+    next_offset = None
+    jumps = 0
+    while True:
+        if cursor >= len(packet):
+            raise ValueError("DNS 名称超出数据包")
+        length = packet[cursor]
+        if length == 0:
+            cursor += 1
+            if next_offset is None:
+                next_offset = cursor
+            break
+        if length & 0xC0 == 0xC0:
+            if cursor + 1 >= len(packet):
+                raise ValueError("DNS 压缩指针不完整")
+            pointer = ((length & 0x3F) << 8) | packet[cursor + 1]
+            if next_offset is None:
+                next_offset = cursor + 2
+            cursor = pointer
+            jumps += 1
+            if jumps > 16:
+                raise ValueError("DNS 名称压缩指针循环")
+            continue
+        if length > 63 or cursor + 1 + length > len(packet):
+            raise ValueError("DNS 标签不完整")
+        labels.append(packet[cursor + 1:cursor + 1 + length].decode("idna"))
+        cursor += 1 + length
+    return ".".join(labels).rstrip(".").lower(), int(next_offset)
+
+
+def _question(packet: bytes) -> tuple[int, str, int]:
+    if len(packet) < 12:
+        raise ValueError("DNS 头不完整")
+    txid, flags, questions, _answers, _authority, _additional = struct.unpack(
+        "!HHHHHH", packet[:12]
+    )
+    if flags & 0x8000 or questions < 1:
+        raise ValueError("不是 DNS 查询")
+    name, offset = _read_name(packet, 12)
+    if offset + 4 > len(packet):
+        raise ValueError("DNS 问题段不完整")
+    return txid, name, offset + 4
+
+
+class DnsObserver:
+    def __init__(self, log: Callable[[str], None] | None = None,
+                 max_ttl: int = 300):
+        self.log = log or (lambda _message: None)
+        self.max_ttl = max(1, int(max_ttl))
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._domain_to_ips: dict[str, tuple[float, tuple[str, ...]]] = {}
+        # 一个 CDN IP 可能同时服务多个域名；不能把最后一次 DNS 回包当成唯一身份。
+        self._ip_to_domains: dict[str, tuple[float, set[str]]] = {}
+
+    def observe_query(self, packet: bytes) -> str | None:
+        try:
+            _txid, domain, _ = _question(packet)
+            return domain or None
+        except (ValueError, UnicodeError):
+            return None
+
+    def observe_response(self, packet: bytes) -> tuple[str, tuple[str, ...]] | None:
+        try:
+            if len(packet) < 12:
+                raise ValueError("DNS 头不完整")
+            _txid, flags, questions, answers, _authority, _additional = struct.unpack(
+                "!HHHHHH", packet[:12]
+            )
+            if not (flags & 0x8000) or questions < 1:
+                raise ValueError("不是 DNS 回包")
+            domain, offset = _read_name(packet, 12)
+            if offset + 4 > len(packet):
+                raise ValueError("DNS 问题段不完整")
+            offset += 4
+            ips: list[str] = []
+            ttl = self.max_ttl
+            for _ in range(answers):
+                _owner, offset = _read_name(packet, offset)
+                if offset + 10 > len(packet):
+                    raise ValueError("DNS 答案头不完整")
+                rtype, rclass, record_ttl, size = struct.unpack(
+                    "!HHIH", packet[offset:offset + 10]
+                )
+                offset += 10
+                if offset + size > len(packet):
+                    raise ValueError("DNS 答案数据不完整")
+                raw = packet[offset:offset + size]
+                offset += size
+                if rclass != 1 or rtype not in (1, 28):
+                    continue
+                if (rtype == 1 and size != 4) or (rtype == 28 and size != 16):
+                    continue
+                ips.append(str(ipaddress.ip_address(raw)))
+                ttl = min(ttl, max(1, int(record_ttl)))
+            if not domain or not ips:
+                return None
+            expires = time.monotonic() + min(ttl, self.max_ttl)
+            unique = tuple(dict.fromkeys(ips))
+            with self._lock:
+                self._domain_to_ips[domain] = (expires, unique)
+                for ip in unique:
+                    previous = self._ip_to_domains.get(ip)
+                    domains = set(previous[1]) if previous and previous[0] > time.monotonic() else set()
+                    domains.add(domain)
+                    self._ip_to_domains[ip] = (expires, domains)
+            return domain, unique
+        except (ValueError, UnicodeError, OSError):
+            return None
+
+    def lookup_ip(self, ip: str) -> str | None:
+        try:
+            normalized = str(ipaddress.ip_address(ip))
+        except ValueError:
+            return None
+        now = time.monotonic()
+        with self._lock:
+            item = self._ip_to_domains.get(normalized)
+            if not item:
+                return None
+            if item[0] <= now:
+                self._ip_to_domains.pop(normalized, None)
+                return None
+            return next(iter(item[1])) if len(item[1]) == 1 else None
+
+    def lookup_domain(self, domain: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        key = str(domain).rstrip(".").lower()
+        now = time.monotonic()
+        with self._lock:
+            item = self._domain_to_ips.get(key)
+            if not item:
+                return ()
+            if item[0] <= now:
+                self._domain_to_ips.pop(key, None)
+                return ()
+            return item[1]

lite/rrpp_core/forwarder_primitives.py

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+"""本地转发器的无状态报文解析与改写函数。"""
+
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+
+HTTP_METHODS = (
+    b"CONNECT ", b"GET ", b"POST ", b"PUT ", b"DELETE ",
+    b"HEAD ", b"OPTIONS ", b"PATCH ",
+)
+
+
+def starts_with_http_method(data: bytes) -> bool:
+    return any(data.startswith(method) for method in HTTP_METHODS)
+
+
+def inject_proxy_auth(data: bytes, basic_auth: str) -> bytes:
+    """为完整 HTTP 代理请求注入上游 Basic Authorization。"""
+    if not starts_with_http_method(data):
+        return data
+    end = data.find(b"\r\n\r\n")
+    if end == -1:
+        return data
+    head = data[:end]
+    first_end = head.find(b"\r\n")
+    request_line = head if first_end == -1 else head[:first_end]
+    headers = b"" if first_end == -1 else head[first_end + 2:]
+    for line in headers.split(b"\r\n"):
+        if b":" not in line:
+            continue
+        name = line[:line.index(b":")].strip().lower()
+        if name == b"authorization":
+            return data
+    auth_line = f"Authorization: Basic {basic_auth}\r\n".encode()
+    return request_line + b"\r\n" + auth_line + headers + data[end:]
+
+
+def parse_connect_authority(first_line: str):
+    """从 CONNECT 首行提取 ``(host, port)``，失败时返回 ``None``。"""
+    parts = first_line.split(" ")
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    authority = parts[1]
+    if authority.startswith("[") and "]" in authority:
+        try:
+            host = authority[1:authority.index("]")]
+            tail = authority[authority.index("]") + 1:]
+            if tail.startswith(":") and tail[1:].isdigit():
+                return host, int(tail[1:])
+        except ValueError:
+            pass
+    if ":" not in authority:
+        return None
+    host, _, port_s = authority.rpartition(":")
+    if not host or not port_s.isdigit():
+        return None
+    return host, int(port_s)
+
+
+def parse_http_absolute(first_line: str):
+    """从明文 HTTP 代理首行提取 ``(host, port)``，失败时返回 ``None``。"""
+    parts = first_line.split(" ")
+    if len(parts) < 2 or not parts[1].lower().startswith(("http://", "https://")):
+        return None
+    parsed = urlsplit(parts[1])
+    if not parsed.hostname:
+        return None
+    port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80)
+    return parsed.hostname, port
+
+
+def force_http_close(buffer: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """直连明文 HTTP 时强制 Connection: close，避免错复用连接。"""
+    end = buffer.find(b"\r\n\r\n")
+    if end == -1:
+        return buffer
+    head, tail = buffer[:end], buffer[end:]
+    lines = head.split(b"\r\n")
+    out = [lines[0]]
+    conn_seen = False
+    for line in lines[1:]:
+        low = line.lower()
+        if low.startswith(b"connection:"):
+            out.append(b"Connection: close")
+            conn_seen = True
+        elif low.startswith(b"proxy-connection:"):
+            continue
+        else:
+            out.append(line)
+    if not conn_seen:
+        out.append(b"Connection: close")
+    return b"\r\n".join(out) + tail

lite/rrpp_core/network_primitives.py

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+"""路由、白名单和转发器共用的网络基础函数。"""
+
+import functools
+import ipaddress
+import socket
+import threading
+import time
+
+
+def ttl_cache(seconds: int, maxsize: int = 16384):
+    """带 TTL 的小型线程安全缓存，并保留 ``cache_clear`` 兼容接口。"""
+    def decorator(function):
+        store = {}
+        lock = threading.Lock()
+
+        @functools.wraps(function)
+        def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
+            key = (args, tuple(sorted(kwargs.items())))
+            now = time.time()
+            with lock:
+                hit = store.get(key)
+            if hit and now - hit[0] < seconds:
+                return hit[1]
+            value = function(*args, **kwargs)
+            with lock:
+                store[key] = (now, value)
+                if len(store) > maxsize:
+                    cutoff = now - seconds
+                    for cached_key, (timestamp, _) in list(store.items()):
+                        if timestamp < cutoff:
+                            del store[cached_key]
+                    if len(store) > maxsize:
+                        store.clear()
+            return value
+
+        def cache_clear():
+            with lock:
+                store.clear()
+
+        wrapper.cache_clear = cache_clear
+        return wrapper
+    return decorator
+
+
+def is_private_ipv4_int(value: int) -> bool:
+    """整数形式 IPv4 是否属于常见私网、回环或链路本地段。"""
+    return (
+        (value & 0xFF000000) == 0x0A000000
+        or (value & 0xFFF00000) == 0xAC100000
+        or (value & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000
+        or (value & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000
+        or (value & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xA9FE0000
+    )
+
+
+def resolve_host_ips(host: str):
+    """解析主机名的 IPv4/IPv6 集合；字面量 IP 返回自身，失败返回空集合。"""
+    try:
+        return {ipaddress.ip_address(host)}
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    try:
+        return {
+            ipaddress.ip_address(address[4][0])
+            for address in socket.getaddrinfo(host, None, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        }
+    except Exception:
+        return set()
+
+
+def is_private_host(host: str) -> bool:
+    """目标是否命中私网、回环或 IPv6 ULA/链路本地地址。"""
+    for address in resolve_host_ips(host):
+        if address.version == 4 and is_private_ipv4_int(int(address)):
+            return True
+        if address.version == 6 and (
+            address.is_loopback
+            or address.is_link_local
+            or address in ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7")
+        ):
+            return True
+    return False

lite/rrpp_core/node_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""节点订阅的认证请求协议。"""
+
+import base64
+import json
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+
+class NodeAuthError(Exception):
+    """订阅服务拒绝请求时携带的 HTTP 状态和用户可读原因。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, message, code=0):
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def b64url(value: str) -> str:
+    """SSO 查询参数使用的无 padding URL-safe Base64。"""
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(str(value).encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
+
+
+def fetch_nodes_auth(url, user, password, timeout=10):
+    """直连拉取需 SSO 查询参数认证的 nodes.json。"""
+    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}))
+    separator = "&" if "?" in url else "?"
+    request_url = f"{url}{separator}user={b64url(user)}&password={b64url(password)}"
+    try:
+        with opener.open(request_url, timeout=timeout) as response:
+            return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+        body = ""
+        try:
+            body = error.read().decode("utf-8", "replace").strip()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        raise NodeAuthError(body or f"请求被拒绝 (HTTP {error.code})", error.code) from None

lite/rrpp_core/node_secrets.py

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+"""节点与登录凭据的本机加密存储。"""
+
+import ctypes
+import json
+import os
+
+
+class _DpapiBlob(ctypes.Structure):
+    _fields_ = [
+        ("cbData", ctypes.c_uint32),
+        ("pbData", ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_char)),
+    ]
+
+
+class NodeSecretsStore:
+    """使用 Windows DPAPI 保存节点和 SSO 凭据；非 Windows 保持明文兼容。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, user_dir_getter):
+        self._user_dir_getter = user_dir_getter
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def protect_bytes(data: bytes) -> bytes:
+        crypt32 = ctypes.WinDLL("crypt32")
+        kernel32 = ctypes.WinDLL("kernel32")
+        crypt32.CryptProtectData.argtypes = [
+            ctypes.POINTER(_DpapiBlob), ctypes.c_wchar_p, ctypes.POINTER(_DpapiBlob),
+            ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_uint32, ctypes.POINTER(_DpapiBlob),
+        ]
+        crypt32.CryptProtectData.restype = ctypes.c_bool
+        kernel32.LocalFree.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p]
+        buffer = ctypes.create_string_buffer(data, len(data))
+        blob_in = _DpapiBlob(len(data), ctypes.cast(buffer, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_char)))
+        blob_out = _DpapiBlob()
+        if not crypt32.CryptProtectData(ctypes.byref(blob_in), "RRPP nodes.json", None,
+                                        None, None, 0, ctypes.byref(blob_out)):
+            raise OSError("CryptProtectData 调用失败")
+        try:
+            return ctypes.string_at(blob_out.pbData, blob_out.cbData)
+        finally:
+            kernel32.LocalFree(blob_out.pbData)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def unprotect_bytes(data: bytes) -> bytes:
+        crypt32 = ctypes.WinDLL("crypt32")
+        kernel32 = ctypes.WinDLL("kernel32")
+        crypt32.CryptUnprotectData.argtypes = [
+            ctypes.POINTER(_DpapiBlob), ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_wchar_p), ctypes.POINTER(_DpapiBlob),
+            ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_uint32, ctypes.POINTER(_DpapiBlob),
+        ]
+        crypt32.CryptUnprotectData.restype = ctypes.c_bool
+        kernel32.LocalFree.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p]
+        buffer = ctypes.create_string_buffer(data, len(data))
+        blob_in = _DpapiBlob(len(data), ctypes.cast(buffer, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_char)))
+        description = ctypes.c_wchar_p()
+        blob_out = _DpapiBlob()
+        if not crypt32.CryptUnprotectData(ctypes.byref(blob_in), ctypes.byref(description), None,
+                                          None, None, 0, ctypes.byref(blob_out)):
+            raise OSError("CryptUnprotectData 调用失败")
+        try:
+            return ctypes.string_at(blob_out.pbData, blob_out.cbData)
+        finally:
+            kernel32.LocalFree(blob_out.pbData)
+            if description.value:
+                kernel32.LocalFree(description)
+
+    def encrypt_text(self, text: str) -> bytes:
+        if os.name != "nt":
+            return text.encode("utf-8")
+        return self.protect_bytes(text.encode("utf-8"))
+
+    def decrypt_bytes(self, blob: bytes) -> str:
+        if os.name != "nt":
+            return blob.decode("utf-8")
+        try:
+            return self.unprotect_bytes(blob).decode("utf-8")
+        except Exception:
+            return blob.decode("utf-8")
+
+    def save_auth(self, username, password):
+        directory = self._user_dir_getter()
+        directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        text = json.dumps({"username": username, "password": password}, ensure_ascii=False)
+        (directory / "auth.json").write_bytes(self.encrypt_text(text))
+
+    def load_auth(self):
+        try:
+            path = self._user_dir_getter() / "auth.json"
+            if not path.is_file():
+                return None
+            data = json.loads(self.decrypt_bytes(path.read_bytes()))
+            if not (isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("username") and data.get("password")):
+                return None
+            return data
+        except Exception:
+            return None

lite/rrpp_core/pac_data.py

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"""PAC 数据文件的网络传输与安全落盘。"""
+
+import json
+import os
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def read_version(path):
+    """读取 PAC JSON 的 version/date；无效文件返回空字符串。"""
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(Path(path).read_text("utf-8"))
+        return str(data.get("version") or ""), str(data.get("date") or "")
+    except Exception:
+        return "", ""
+
+
+def no_proxy_opener():
+    """创建忽略环境/系统代理的直连 HTTP opener。"""
+    return urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}))
+
+
+def fetch_json(url, timeout=15, tries=2):
+    """以直连方式拉取 JSON；最后一次失败时保留原始异常。"""
+    opener = no_proxy_opener()
+    for attempt in range(tries):
+        try:
+            with opener.open(url, timeout=timeout) as response:
+                return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+        except Exception:
+            if attempt == tries - 1:
+                raise
+
+
+def validate_document(name, data):
+    """校验各 PAC 文件的最小结构，避免错误响应覆盖有效缓存。"""
+    if not isinstance(data, dict):
+        return False
+    if name in ("pac_domains", "pac_direct_domains"):
+        return isinstance(data.get("domains"), list)
+    if name == "pac_ip_cn":
+        return isinstance(data.get("cidrs"), list)
+    return False
+
+
+def atomic_write(directory, name, data):
+    """将 PAC JSON 以 tmp + replace 原子写入指定用户目录。"""
+    directory = Path(directory)
+    directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    target = directory / f"{name}.json"
+    temporary_path = directory / f"{name}.json.tmp"
+    temporary_path.write_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False), "utf-8")
+    os.replace(temporary_path, target)

lite/rrpp_core/routing_primitives.py

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+"""PAC 路由引擎使用的纯算法，不依赖文件、网络或 Qt。"""
+
+import ipaddress
+import re
+
+
+def merge_ip_ranges(cidrs, version):
+    """将指定 IP 版本的 CIDR 合并为整数闭区间，供二分查找。"""
+    ranges = []
+    for cidr in cidrs:
+        network = ipaddress.ip_network(str(cidr).strip(), strict=False)
+        if network.version == version:
+            ranges.append((int(network.network_address), int(network.broadcast_address)))
+    ranges.sort()
+    merged = []
+    for start, end in ranges:
+        if merged and start <= merged[-1][1] + 1:
+            if end > merged[-1][1]:
+                merged[-1] = (merged[-1][0], end)
+        else:
+            merged.append((start, end))
+    return merged
+
+
+def build_suffix_trie(suffixes):
+    """按反向域名标签建立 Trie，适合大规模后缀规则的 O(标签数) 匹配。"""
+    root = {}
+    for suffix in suffixes:
+        node = root
+        for label in reversed(suffix.split(".")):
+            node = node.setdefault(label, {})
+        node[""] = True
+    return root
+
+
+def suffix_trie_matches(host: str, trie) -> bool:
+    """判断主机名是否命中一个后缀 Trie。"""
+    node = trie
+    for label in reversed(host.rstrip(".").lower().split(".")):
+        node = node.get(label)
+        if node is None:
+            return False
+        if node.get(""):
+            return True
+    return bool(node and node.get(""))
+
+
+def parse_domain_rules(raw_rules, seed_suffixes=()):
+    """解析后缀、``full:`` 与 ``regexp:`` 三种 PAC 域名规则。
+
+    返回 ``(suffixes, exact, regexes, invalid_regex_count)``。调用方决定
+    这些规则是“强制代理”还是“明确直连”，从而避免解析层携带业务策略。
+    """
+    suffixes = set(seed_suffixes)
+    exact = set()
+    regexes = []
+    invalid_regexes = 0
+    for raw in raw_rules or ():
+        raw_rule = str(raw).strip()
+        rule = raw_rule.lower()
+        if not raw_rule:
+            continue
+        if rule.startswith("full:"):
+            host = rule[len("full:"):].rstrip(".")
+            if host:
+                exact.add(host)
+            continue
+        if rule.startswith("regexp:"):
+            pattern = raw_rule[len("regexp:"):]
+            if not pattern:
+                invalid_regexes += 1
+                continue
+            try:
+                regexes.append(re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE))
+            except re.error:
+                invalid_regexes += 1
+            continue
+        suffix = rule.lstrip("*.").rstrip(".")
+        if suffix:
+            suffixes.add(suffix)
+    return suffixes, frozenset(exact), tuple(regexes), invalid_regexes

lite/rrpp_core/settings_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+"""用户设置的 JSON 存储实现。"""
+
+import json
+import os
+
+
+class JsonSettingsStore:
+    """读取与原子写回一个 JSON 对象。
+
+    ``path_getter`` 在每次操作时调用，保证测试或运行时切换用户目录后不会
+    意外写到旧目录。
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, path_getter):
+        self._path_getter = path_getter
+
+    def load(self):
+        path = self._path_getter()
+        try:
+            if not path.is_file():
+                return {}
+            data = json.loads(path.read_text("utf-8"))
+            return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
+        except Exception:
+            return {}
+
+    def save(self, data):
+        path = self._path_getter()
+        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        temporary_path = path.with_suffix(path.suffix + ".tmp")
+        temporary_path.write_text(
+            json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n", "utf-8"
+        )
+        os.replace(temporary_path, path)

lite/rrpp_core/socks_bridge.py

@@ -0,0 +1,857 @@
+"""本地 SOCKS5 → HTTP CONNECT/UoT v2 桥接。
+
+tun2socks 只需要一个标准 SOCKS5 出口；TCP 连接转成当前节点的 HTTP
+CONNECT，UDP 连接转成 magic address 上的 UoT v2 流。系统代理设置完全不参与。
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import ipaddress
+import select
+import socket
+import ssl
+import struct
+import threading
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from .dns_observer import DnsObserver
+from .uot_protocol import (
+    Address, MAGIC_ADDRESS, encode_datagram_frame, encode_request,
+    read_datagram_frame,
+)
+
+# relay 的内网监听端口与外层 CONNECT 端口是两个概念：nginx 接收
+# CONNECT magic-host:443 后，将字节流转发到 127.0.0.1:15201。
+DEFAULT_UOT_RELAY_PORT = 15201
+DEFAULT_UOT_CONNECT_PORT = 443
+
+
+def _recv_exact(stream: socket.socket, size: int) -> bytes:
+    """按 SOCKS5/TCP 协议长度读取，不能假设一次 recv 就拿全。"""
+    data = bytearray()
+    while len(data) < size:
+        chunk = stream.recv(size - len(data))
+        if not chunk:
+            raise ConnectionError("SOCKS5 连接在握手中断开")
+        data.extend(chunk)
+    return bytes(data)
+
+
+def _node_http(node: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[str, int, str, str]:
+    methods = (node.get("methods") or {}).get("http") or {}
+    host = str(node.get("domain") or "").strip()
+    port = methods.get("port") or node.get("port") or 443
+    username = methods.get("username") or node.get("username") or ""
+    password = methods.get("password") or node.get("password") or ""
+    if not host:
+        raise ValueError("节点缺少 HTTP CONNECT 地址")
+    return host, int(port), str(username), str(password)
+
+
+def _node_uot_connect_port(node: dict[str, Any]) -> int:
+    """返回 magic CONNECT 的对外端口，不能使用 0。"""
+    chain = node.get("_jump_chain") if isinstance(node, dict) else None
+    if isinstance(chain, list) and chain:
+        return _node_uot_connect_port(chain[-1])
+    methods = (node.get("methods") or {}).get("http") or {}
+    raw = methods.get("uot_connect_port")
+    if raw is None:
+        raw = node.get("uot_connect_port")
+    # 兼容早期把 uot_port 当作 CONNECT 端口的本地配置；服务端 nginx
+    # 会按 magic host 映射到隐藏的 15201 relay 端口。
+    if raw is None:
+        raw = methods.get("uot_port")
+    if raw is None:
+        raw = node.get("uot_port")
+    if raw is None:
+        raw = DEFAULT_UOT_CONNECT_PORT
+    port = int(raw)
+    if not 1 <= port <= 65535:
+        raise ValueError("UoT CONNECT 端口超出范围")
+    return port
+
+
+def _socks_address(stream: socket.socket, kind: int | None = None) -> Address:
+    # SOCKS5 请求头已经读取过 ATYP 时直接传入；独立解析时才从流中读取。
+    if kind is None:
+        kind = _recv_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+    if kind == 1:
+        host = socket.inet_ntoa(_recv_exact(stream, 4))
+    elif kind == 4:
+        host = socket.inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET6, _recv_exact(stream, 16))
+    elif kind == 3:
+        size = _recv_exact(stream, 1)[0]
+        host = _recv_exact(stream, size).decode("idna")
+    else:
+        raise ValueError("SOCKS5 地址类型不支持")
+    port = struct.unpack("!H", _recv_exact(stream, 2))[0]
+    return Address(host, port)
+
+
+def _pack_socks_udp(destination: Address, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(destination.host)
+    except ValueError:
+        raw = destination.host.encode("idna")
+        return b"\x00\x00\x00\x03" + bytes([len(raw)]) + raw + struct.pack("!H", destination.port) + payload
+    atyp = 1 if ip.version == 4 else 4
+    return b"\x00\x00\x00" + bytes([atyp]) + ip.packed + struct.pack("!H", destination.port) + payload
+
+
+def _unpack_socks_udp(packet: bytes) -> tuple[Address, bytes]:
+    if len(packet) < 4 or packet[:2] != b"\x00\x00":
+        raise ValueError("SOCKS5 UDP 包头无效")
+    if packet[2] != 0:
+        # RFC 1928 允许分片，但 tun2socks 当前不会发送分片；静默拼接会把
+        # 不完整的报文当成 DNS/QUIC 数据，造成更难排查的协议损坏。
+        raise ValueError("暂不支持 SOCKS5 UDP 分片")
+    atyp = packet[3]
+    offset = 4
+    if atyp == 1:
+        if len(packet) < offset + 4:
+            raise ValueError("SOCKS5 UDP IPv4 地址不完整")
+        host = socket.inet_ntoa(packet[offset:offset + 4]); offset += 4
+    elif atyp == 4:
+        if len(packet) < offset + 16:
+            raise ValueError("SOCKS5 UDP IPv6 地址不完整")
+        host = socket.inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET6, packet[offset:offset + 16]); offset += 16
+    elif atyp == 3:
+        if len(packet) < offset + 1:
+            raise ValueError("SOCKS5 UDP 域名长度不完整")
+        size = packet[offset]; offset += 1
+        if len(packet) < offset + size:
+            raise ValueError("SOCKS5 UDP 域名地址不完整")
+        host = packet[offset:offset + size].decode("idna"); offset += size
+    else:
+        raise ValueError("SOCKS5 UDP 地址类型不支持")
+    if len(packet) < offset + 2:
+        raise ValueError("SOCKS5 UDP 端口不完整")
+    port = struct.unpack("!H", packet[offset:offset + 2])[0]
+    return Address(host, port), packet[offset + 2:]
+
+
+class HttpConnectDialer:
+    def __init__(self, node: dict[str, Any], timeout: float = 15.0,
+                 source_address: str | None = None,
+                 proxy_addresses: list[tuple] | None = None,
+                 proxy_addresses_by_node: dict[str, list[tuple]] | None = None):
+        self.node = node
+        self.timeout = timeout
+        # TUN 启动后默认路由会指向虚拟网卡。节点本身必须从物理网卡发出，
+        # 否则上游 CONNECT 会再次进入本地 SOCKS，形成递归回环。
+        self.source_address = source_address
+        self.proxy_addresses = proxy_addresses
+        self.proxy_addresses_by_node = proxy_addresses_by_node or {}
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _node_key(node: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+        methods = (node.get("methods") or {}).get("http") or {}
+        return "|".join((str(node.get("domain") or ""),
+                         str(methods.get("port") or node.get("port") or 443),
+                         str(methods.get("username") or node.get("username") or "")))
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _node_credentials(node: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[str, str]:
+        methods = (node.get("methods") or {}).get("http") or {}
+        username = methods.get("username") or node.get("username") or ""
+        password = methods.get("password") or node.get("password") or ""
+        return str(username), str(password)
+
+    def _open_proxy_socket(self, host: str, port: int,
+                           addresses: list[tuple] | None = None) -> socket.socket:
+        addresses = addresses or self.proxy_addresses
+        if not addresses:
+            addresses = [item[4] for item in socket.getaddrinfo(
+                host, port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM)]
+        last_error: OSError | None = None
+        for sockaddr in addresses:
+            family = socket.AF_INET6 if len(sockaddr) == 4 else socket.AF_INET
+            raw = socket.socket(family, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+            try:
+                raw.settimeout(self.timeout)
+                if self.source_address:
+                    if family == socket.AF_INET and ":" not in self.source_address:
+                        raw.bind((self.source_address, 0))
+                    elif family == socket.AF_INET6 and ":" in self.source_address:
+                        raw.bind((self.source_address, 0, 0, 0))
+                raw.connect(sockaddr)
+                return raw
+            except OSError as exc:
+                last_error = exc
+                raw.close()
+        if last_error:
+            raise last_error
+        raise OSError(f"无法解析 HTTP CONNECT 节点: {host}")
+
+    def _jump_addresses(self, node: dict[str, Any]) -> list[tuple] | None:
+        return self.proxy_addresses_by_node.get(self._node_key(node))
+
+    def _open_jump(self, target: Address) -> socket.socket:
+        """通过 2-3 个 HTTP CONNECT 节点逐层建立 TLS，再连接最终目标。"""
+        chain = list(self.node.get("_jump_chain") or [])
+        if not 2 <= len(chain) <= 3:
+            raise RuntimeError("跳板链路必须包含 2-3 个节点")
+        ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+        first = chain[0]
+        first_host, first_port, _username, _password = _node_http(first)
+        stream = self._open_proxy_socket(
+            first_host, first_port, self._jump_addresses(first))
+        try:
+            stream = ctx.wrap_socket(stream, server_hostname=first_host)
+            for index, next_node in enumerate(chain[1:], 1):
+                next_host, next_port, _username, _password = _node_http(next_node)
+                leftover = _http_connect_over(
+                    stream, chain[index - 1], next_host, next_port, resolve_target=True)
+                stream = _LayeredTlsTransport(stream, ctx, next_host, leftover)
+            _http_connect_over(
+                stream, chain[-1], target.host, target.port, resolve_target=False)
+            return stream
+        except Exception:
+            try:
+                stream.close()
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+            raise
+
+    def open(self, target: Address) -> socket.socket:
+        if self.node.get("_jump_chain"):
+            return self._open_jump(target)
+        host, port, username, password = _node_http(self.node)
+        raw = self._open_proxy_socket(host, port)
+        ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+        stream = ctx.wrap_socket(raw, server_hostname=host)
+        authority = f"[{target.host}]:{target.port}" if ":" in target.host else f"{target.host}:{target.port}"
+        auth = ""
+        if username or password:
+            token = base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode("ascii")
+            auth = f"Authorization: Basic {token}\r\n"
+        request = (
+            f"CONNECT {authority} HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+            f"Host: {authority}\r\n"
+            f"{auth}Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n\r\n"
+        ).encode("ascii")
+        stream.sendall(request)
+        response = b""
+        while b"\r\n\r\n" not in response and len(response) < 65536:
+            chunk = stream.recv(4096)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            response += chunk
+        first = response.split(b"\r\n", 1)[0].decode("latin1", "replace")
+        if not first.startswith(("HTTP/1.1 200", "HTTP/1.0 200")):
+            stream.close()
+            raise ConnectionError(f"HTTP CONNECT 失败: {first[:160]}")
+        return stream
+
+
+def _resolve_jump_address(host: str, port: int) -> tuple:
+    infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    infos.sort(key=lambda item: 0 if item[0] == socket.AF_INET else 1)
+    if not infos:
+        raise OSError(f"无法解析跳板地址: {host}")
+    return infos[0][4]
+
+
+def _http_connect_over(transport, proxy_node: dict[str, Any], target_host: str,
+                       target_port: int, *, resolve_target: bool) -> bytes:
+    """在当前 TLS 层发送 CONNECT；中间跳板使用解析后的 IP，末跳保留目标名。"""
+    username, password = HttpConnectDialer._node_credentials(proxy_node)
+    auth_header = ""
+    if username or password:
+        token = base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode("ascii")
+        auth_header = f"Authorization: Basic {token}\r\n"
+    if resolve_target:
+        address = _resolve_jump_address(target_host, target_port)
+        authority = f"[{address[0]}]:{address[1]}" if ":" in address[0] else f"{address[0]}:{address[1]}"
+    else:
+        authority = f"[{target_host}]:{target_port}" if ":" in target_host else f"{target_host}:{target_port}"
+    request = (
+        f"CONNECT {authority} HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+        f"Host: {authority}\r\n"
+        f"{auth_header}Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n\r\n"
+    ).encode("ascii")
+    transport.sendall(request)
+    response = b""
+    while b"\r\n\r\n" not in response and len(response) < 65536:
+        chunk = transport.recv(4096)
+        if not chunk:
+            break
+        response += chunk
+    marker = b"\r\n\r\n"
+    end = response.find(marker)
+    first = response.split(b"\r\n", 1)[0].decode("latin-1", "replace")
+    if not (first.startswith("HTTP/1.1 200") or first.startswith("HTTP/1.0 200")):
+        raise ConnectionError(f"跳板 CONNECT 失败: {first[:160]}")
+    return response[end + len(marker):] if end >= 0 else b""
+
+
+class _LayeredTlsTransport:
+    """在已有 TLS 字节流上承载下一层 TLS。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, transport, ctx, server_hostname: str, initial: bytes = b""):
+        self._transport = transport
+        self._incoming = ssl.MemoryBIO()
+        self._outgoing = ssl.MemoryBIO()
+        self._pending = initial
+        self._ssl = ctx.wrap_bio(
+            self._incoming, self._outgoing, server_side=False,
+            server_hostname=server_hostname)
+        self._handshake()
+
+    def _flush(self):
+        data = self._outgoing.read()
+        if data:
+            self._transport.sendall(data)
+
+    def _feed(self):
+        if self._pending:
+            data, self._pending = self._pending, b""
+        else:
+            data = self._transport.recv(16384)
+        if not data:
+            raise ConnectionError("分层 TLS 下层连接已关闭")
+        self._incoming.write(data)
+
+    def _handshake(self):
+        while True:
+            try:
+                self._ssl.do_handshake()
+                self._flush()
+                return
+            except ssl.SSLWantReadError:
+                self._flush()
+                self._feed()
+            except ssl.SSLWantWriteError:
+                self._flush()
+
+    def sendall(self, data):
+        view = memoryview(data)
+        while view:
+            try:
+                written = self._ssl.write(view)
+                view = view[written:]
+                self._flush()
+            except ssl.SSLWantReadError:
+                self._flush()
+                self._feed()
+            except ssl.SSLWantWriteError:
+                self._flush()
+
+    def recv(self, size):
+        while True:
+            try:
+                return self._ssl.read(size)
+            except ssl.SSLWantReadError:
+                self._flush()
+                self._feed()
+            except ssl.SSLWantWriteError:
+                self._flush()
+
+    def settimeout(self, value):
+        self._transport.settimeout(value)
+
+    def gettimeout(self):
+        return self._transport.gettimeout()
+
+    def close(self):
+        self._transport.close()
+
+
+class Socks5Bridge:
+    def __init__(self, node: dict[str, Any], bypass_lan: bool = True,
+                 route_rules: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+                 log: Callable[[str], None] | None = None,
+                 source_address: str | None = None,
+                 proxy_addresses: list[tuple] | None = None,
+                 direct_target_resolver: Callable[[str, str, int], tuple[str, int] | None] | None = None,
+                 route_rule_resolver: Callable[[str], dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+                 route_node_resolver: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+                 proxy_addresses_by_node: dict[str, list[tuple]] | None = None,
+                 direct_route_ensurer: Callable[[str], None] | None = None):
+        self.node = node
+        self.bypass_lan = bypass_lan
+        self.route_rules = route_rules or []
+        self.log = log or (lambda _message: None)
+        self.source_address = source_address
+        self.proxy_addresses = proxy_addresses
+        # 由 main.py 注入 Lite 的同一套 PAC/路由判定，TUN 不复制另一份规则语义。
+        self.direct_target_resolver = direct_target_resolver
+        self.route_rule_resolver = route_rule_resolver
+        self.route_node_resolver = route_node_resolver
+        self.proxy_addresses_by_node = proxy_addresses_by_node or {}
+        self.direct_route_ensurer = direct_route_ensurer
+        self.listener: socket.socket | None = None
+        self._running = threading.Event()
+        self._threads: list[threading.Thread] = []
+        self._up = 0
+        self._down = 0
+        self._counter_lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._dns = DnsObserver(log=self.log)
+        self._udp_resources: list[socket.socket] = []
+        self._udp_resources_lock = threading.RLock()
+
+    def start(self) -> int:
+        self.listener = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        self.listener.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
+        self.listener.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+        self.listener.listen(32)
+        self.listener.settimeout(1)
+        self._running.set()
+        thread = threading.Thread(target=self._accept_loop, daemon=True)
+        thread.start(); self._threads.append(thread)
+        return self.listener.getsockname()[1]
+
+    def _accept_loop(self):
+        while self._running.is_set() and self.listener:
+            try:
+                client, _ = self.listener.accept()
+            except socket.timeout:
+                continue
+            except OSError:
+                break
+            thread = threading.Thread(target=self._client, args=(client,), daemon=True)
+            thread.start(); self._threads.append(thread)
+
+    def _client(self, client: socket.socket):
+        try:
+            client.settimeout(15)
+            greeting = _recv_exact(client, 2)
+            if greeting[0] != 5:
+                return
+            methods = _recv_exact(client, greeting[1])
+            if 0 not in methods:
+                client.sendall(b"\x05\xff")
+                return
+            client.sendall(b"\x05\x00")
+            header = _recv_exact(client, 4)
+            if header[0] != 5:
+                return
+            command = header[1]
+            destination = _socks_address(client, header[3])
+            if command == 1:
+                self.log(f"[桥接] TCP 目标: {self._target_label(destination)}")
+                self._tcp(client, destination)
+            elif command == 3:
+                self._udp(client)
+            else:
+                client.sendall(b"\x05\x07\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")
+        except Exception as exc:
+            # 停止 TUN 时主动关闭仍在转发的连接，Windows 可能返回
+            # WSAECONNRESET (10054)；这是收尾动作，不应作为用户错误记录。
+            if self._running.is_set():
+                self.log(f"[桥接] SOCKS5 请求失败: {exc}")
+        finally:
+            try: client.close()
+            except OSError: pass
+
+    def _target_label(self, target: Address) -> str:
+        host = target.host
+        try:
+            ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+        except ValueError:
+            ips = self._dns.lookup_domain(host)
+            resolved = ",".join(ips) if ips else "未知"
+            return f"domain={host} ip={resolved} port={target.port}"
+        domain = self._dns.lookup_ip(host) or "未知"
+        return f"domain={domain} ip={host} port={target.port}"
+
+    def _policy_host(self, host: str) -> str:
+        """对已观察到的唯一 DNS 映射应用域名规则；实际连接仍使用原目标 IP。"""
+        try:
+            ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+        except ValueError:
+            return host
+        return self._dns.lookup_ip(host) or host
+
+    def _direct_target(self, host: str, port: int) -> tuple[str, int] | None:
+        explicit = False
+        normalized = str(host).rstrip(".").lower()
+        for rule in self.route_rules:
+            if not isinstance(rule, dict) or not rule.get("enabled", True):
+                continue
+            if str(rule.get("action") or "direct").lower() != "direct":
+                continue
+            value = str(rule.get("domain") or rule.get("value") or "").strip().lower().rstrip(".")
+            if value.startswith("*."):
+                value = value[2:]
+            try:
+                if ipaddress.ip_address(normalized) in ipaddress.ip_network(value, strict=False):
+                    explicit = True
+            except ValueError:
+                if normalized == value or normalized.endswith("." + value):
+                    explicit = True
+            if explicit:
+                break
+        if not self.bypass_lan and not explicit:
+            return None
+        try:
+            address = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+            return (host, port) if explicit or address.is_private else None
+        except ValueError:
+            try:
+                for item in socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM):
+                    address = item[4][0].split("%", 1)[0]
+                    if explicit or ipaddress.ip_address(address).is_private:
+                        return address, port
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+        return None
+
+    def _route_rule(self, host: str, original_host: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        if self.route_rule_resolver is not None:
+            try:
+                rule = self.route_rule_resolver(host)
+                if isinstance(rule, dict):
+                    return rule
+                if original_host and original_host != host:
+                    rule = self.route_rule_resolver(original_host)
+                    if isinstance(rule, dict):
+                        return rule
+            except Exception as exc:
+                self.log(f"[路由] 规则判断失败: {exc}")
+        for rule in self.route_rules:
+            if not isinstance(rule, dict) or not rule.get("enabled", True):
+                continue
+            value = str(rule.get("domain") or rule.get("value") or "").strip().lower().rstrip(".")
+            normalized = str(host).rstrip(".").lower()
+            base = value[2:] if value.startswith("*.") else value
+            if base and (normalized == base or normalized.endswith("." + base)):
+                return rule
+        return None
+
+    def _direct_target_for(self, host: str, port: int,
+                           policy_host: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, int] | None:
+        policy_host = policy_host or self._policy_host(host)
+        rule = self._route_rule(policy_host, host)
+        action = str((rule or {}).get("action") or "").lower()
+        if action == "node":
+            return None
+        if self.direct_target_resolver is not None:
+            try:
+                return self.direct_target_resolver(policy_host, host, port)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                self.log(f"[路由] PAC 直连判断失败: {exc}")
+                return None
+        if action == "direct":
+            return (host, port)
+        return self._direct_target(host, port)
+
+    def _route_node(self, rule: dict[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        if not rule or str(rule.get("action") or "").lower() != "node":
+            return None
+        if self.route_node_resolver is None:
+            return None
+        try:
+            node = self.route_node_resolver(rule)
+            return node if isinstance(node, dict) else None
+        except Exception as exc:
+            self.log(f"[路由] 固定节点解析失败: {exc}")
+            return None
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _node_key(node: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+        chain = node.get("_jump_chain")
+        if isinstance(chain, list) and chain:
+            return "jump|" + ">".join(
+                Socks5Bridge._node_key(item) for item in chain if isinstance(item, dict)
+            )
+        methods = (node.get("methods") or {}).get("http") or {}
+        return "|".join((str(node.get("domain") or ""), str(methods.get("port") or node.get("port") or 443),
+                         str(methods.get("username") or node.get("username") or "")))
+
+    def _dialer(self, node: dict[str, Any]) -> HttpConnectDialer:
+        proxy_addresses = self.proxy_addresses
+        chain = node.get("_jump_chain")
+        if isinstance(chain, list) and chain:
+            proxy_addresses = self.proxy_addresses_by_node.get(
+                self._node_key(chain[0]))
+        return HttpConnectDialer(
+            node, source_address=self.source_address,
+            proxy_addresses=(proxy_addresses if node is self.node else
+                             self.proxy_addresses_by_node.get(self._node_key(node), proxy_addresses)),
+            proxy_addresses_by_node=self.proxy_addresses_by_node,
+        )
+
+    def _ensure_direct_routes(self, host: str, port: int) -> None:
+        if self.direct_route_ensurer is None:
+            return
+        try:
+            self.direct_route_ensurer(str(ipaddress.ip_address(host)))
+            return
+        except ValueError:
+            pass
+        try:
+            for item in socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM):
+                self.direct_route_ensurer(str(item[4][0]).split("%", 1)[0])
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+    def _proxy_target(self, target: Address) -> Address:
+        """为上游 CONNECT 恢复唯一 DNS 域名，给 IPv6 目标提供 IPv4 回退。"""
+        try:
+            ipaddress.ip_address(target.host)
+        except ValueError:
+            return target
+        domain = self._dns.lookup_ip(target.host)
+        if not domain:
+            return target
+        self.log(
+            f"[桥接] IPv6 目标回退域名解析: {target.host} -> {domain}:{target.port}"
+        )
+        return Address(domain, target.port)
+
+    def _open_target(self, target: Address) -> socket.socket:
+        policy_host = self._policy_host(target.host)
+        rule = self._route_rule(policy_host, target.host)
+        route_node = self._route_node(rule)
+        if rule and str(rule.get("action") or "").lower() == "node":
+            if route_node is None:
+                raise ConnectionError("域名路由指定的节点不可用")
+            return self._dialer(route_node).open(self._proxy_target(target))
+        direct = self._direct_target_for(target.host, target.port, policy_host)
+        if direct is not None:
+            self._ensure_direct_routes(direct[0], direct[1])
+            return socket.create_connection(direct, 15)
+        return self._dialer(self.node).open(self._proxy_target(target))
+
+    def _tcp(self, client: socket.socket, target: Address):
+        upstream = self._open_target(target)
+        upstream.settimeout(None); client.settimeout(None)
+        client.sendall(b"\x05\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")
+        self._relay(client, upstream)
+
+    def _relay(self, left: socket.socket, right: socket.socket):
+        sockets = [left, right]
+        try:
+            while self._running.is_set():
+                readable, _, _ = select.select(sockets, [], [], 1)
+                for source in readable:
+                    data = source.recv(65536)
+                    if not data: return
+                    target = right if source is left else left
+                    target.sendall(data)
+                    with self._counter_lock:
+                        if source is left: self._up += len(data)
+                        else: self._down += len(data)
+        finally:
+            for item in sockets:
+                try: item.close()
+                except OSError: pass
+
+    def _udp(self, control: socket.socket):
+        # tun2socks v2.7 在 Windows 上通过 ListenPacket("udp", "")
+        # 创建 IPv6 wildcard socket（日志形如 [::]:port）。SOCKS5 返回的
+        # UDP relay 地址必须与这个地址族一致，否则 Windows 会在
+        # wsasendto 阶段以 WSAEINVAL 拒绝向 127.0.0.1:port 发包。
+        # 优先使用 IPv6 loopback；老系统没有 IPv6 时再回退 IPv4。
+        try:
+            udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+            udp.bind(("::1", 0))
+            relay_address = b"\x04" + socket.inet_pton(socket.AF_INET6, "::1")
+            relay_bind = f"[::1]:{udp.getsockname()[1]}"
+        except OSError:
+            udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+            udp.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+            relay_address = b"\x01" + socket.inet_aton("127.0.0.1")
+            relay_bind = f"127.0.0.1:{udp.getsockname()[1]}"
+        port = udp.getsockname()[1]
+        udp.settimeout(1)
+        with self._udp_resources_lock:
+            self._udp_resources.append(udp)
+        control.sendall(b"\x05\x00\x00" + relay_address + struct.pack("!H", port))
+        self.log(f"[桥接] SOCKS5 UDP 关联已建立: {relay_bind}")
+        control.settimeout(1)
+        streams: dict[str, socket.socket] = {}
+        direct_flows: dict[tuple[str, int], tuple[socket.socket, tuple, Address]] = {}
+        malformed = 0
+        try:
+            while self._running.is_set():
+                try:
+                    packet, peer = udp.recvfrom(65535)
+                except socket.timeout:
+                    try:
+                        if not control.recv(1): break
+                    except socket.timeout:
+                        continue
+                    continue
+                try:
+                    destination, payload = _unpack_socks_udp(packet)
+                except Exception as exc:
+                    malformed += 1
+                    if malformed <= 5:
+                        self.log(
+                            f"[桥接] SOCKS5 UDP 数据包解析失败: {exc} len={len(packet)}"
+                        )
+                    continue
+                if malformed:
+                    malformed = 0
+                if not streams and not direct_flows:
+                    self.log(
+                        f"[桥接] SOCKS5 UDP 数据报: target={destination.host}:{destination.port} "
+                        f"bytes={len(payload)}"
+                    )
+                if destination.port == 53:
+                    domain = self._dns.observe_query(payload)
+                    if domain:
+                        self.log(
+                            f"[DNS] 查询: domain={domain} server={destination.host}:{destination.port}"
+                        )
+                policy_host = self._policy_host(destination.host)
+                rule = self._route_rule(policy_host, destination.host)
+                route_node = self._route_node(rule)
+                if rule and str(rule.get("action") or "").lower() == "node" and route_node is None:
+                    raise ConnectionError("UDP 域名路由指定的节点不可用")
+                direct = None if route_node is not None else self._direct_target_for(
+                    destination.host, destination.port, policy_host)
+                if direct is not None:
+                    key = (str(direct[0]), int(direct[1]))
+                    flow = direct_flows.get(key)
+                    if flow is None:
+                        flow_socket, sockaddr = self._open_direct_udp(direct)
+                        flow = (flow_socket, sockaddr, destination)
+                        direct_flows[key] = flow
+                        threading.Thread(
+                            target=self._direct_udp_reader,
+                            args=(flow_socket, udp, destination, peer),
+                            daemon=True,
+                        ).start()
+                        self.log(f"[UDP] 直连通道: target={destination.host}:{destination.port}")
+                    flow_socket, direct_addr, _flow_destination = flow
+                    flow_socket.sendto(payload, direct_addr)
+                    with self._counter_lock:
+                        self._up += len(payload)
+                    continue
+
+                selected_node = route_node or self.node
+                stream_key = self._node_key(selected_node)
+                stream = streams.get(stream_key)
+                if stream is None:
+                    self.log(
+                        f"[UoT] 建立 UDP 通道: target={destination.host}:{destination.port}"
+                        + ("（固定节点）" if route_node is not None else "")
+                    )
+                    stream = self._dialer(selected_node).open(
+                        Address(MAGIC_ADDRESS, _node_uot_connect_port(selected_node))
+                    )
+                    stream.settimeout(None)
+                    stream.sendall(encode_request(False, destination))
+                    streams[stream_key] = stream
+                    with self._udp_resources_lock:
+                        self._udp_resources.append(stream)
+                    threading.Thread(
+                        target=self._uot_reader, args=(stream, udp, peer), daemon=True
+                    ).start()
+                # UoT v2 non-connect 模式每个数据报都带目标地址。
+                stream.sendall(encode_datagram_frame(destination, payload))
+                with self._counter_lock:
+                    self._up += len(payload)
+        finally:
+            udp.close()
+            for stream in streams.values():
+                try:
+                    stream.close()
+                except OSError:
+                    pass
+            for flow_socket, _sockaddr, _destination in direct_flows.values():
+                try:
+                    flow_socket.close()
+                except OSError:
+                    pass
+            with self._udp_resources_lock:
+                self._udp_resources = [
+                    item for item in self._udp_resources
+                    if item is not udp and item not in streams.values()
+                ]
+
+    def _open_direct_udp_target(self, target: tuple[str, int]) -> tuple[socket.socket, tuple]:
+        host, port = target
+        last_error = None
+        for item in socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_DGRAM):
+            family, socktype, proto, _canonname, sockaddr = item
+            raw = socket.socket(family, socktype, proto)
+            try:
+                destination_ip = str(sockaddr[0]).split("%", 1)[0]
+                if self.direct_route_ensurer is not None:
+                    self.direct_route_ensurer(destination_ip)
+                is_loopback = False
+                try:
+                    is_loopback = ipaddress.ip_address(destination_ip).is_loopback
+                except ValueError:
+                    pass
+                if (family == socket.AF_INET and self.source_address and ":" not in self.source_address
+                        and not is_loopback):
+                    raw.bind((self.source_address, 0))
+                elif (family == socket.AF_INET6 and self.source_address and ":" in self.source_address
+                      and not is_loopback):
+                    raw.bind((self.source_address, 0, 0, 0))
+                if family == socket.AF_INET:
+                    try:
+                        raw.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_BROADCAST, 1)
+                    except OSError:
+                        pass
+                raw.settimeout(1)
+                return raw, sockaddr
+            except OSError as exc:
+                last_error = exc
+                raw.close()
+        raise last_error or OSError(f"无法解析 UDP 目标: {host}")
+
+    def _open_direct_udp(self, target: tuple[str, int]) -> tuple[socket.socket, tuple]:
+        raw, sockaddr = self._open_direct_udp_target(target)
+        # 解析后的 sockaddr 直接用于 sendto，保留 IPv6 scope id。
+        return raw, sockaddr
+
+    def _direct_udp_reader(self, raw: socket.socket, udp: socket.socket,
+                           destination: Address, peer):
+        try:
+            while self._running.is_set():
+                try:
+                    payload, _source = raw.recvfrom(65535)
+                except socket.timeout:
+                    continue
+                if not payload:
+                    continue
+                if destination.port == 53:
+                    observed = self._dns.observe_response(payload)
+                    if observed:
+                        domain, ips = observed
+                        self.log(f"[DNS] 直连回包: domain={domain} ip={','.join(ips)}")
+                udp.sendto(_pack_socks_udp(destination, payload), peer)
+                with self._counter_lock:
+                    self._down += len(payload)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+    def _uot_reader(self, stream, udp, peer):
+        try:
+            while self._running.is_set():
+                destination, payload = read_datagram_frame(stream)
+                observed = self._dns.observe_response(payload)
+                if observed:
+                    domain, ips = observed
+                    self.log(f"[DNS] 回包: domain={domain} ip={','.join(ips)}")
+                udp.sendto(_pack_socks_udp(destination, payload), peer)
+                with self._counter_lock: self._down += len(payload)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            if self._running.is_set():
+                self.log(f"[UoT] UDP 回包读取失败: {exc}")
+
+    def stop(self):
+        self._running.clear()
+        if self.listener:
+            try: self.listener.close()
+            except OSError: pass
+            self.listener = None
+        with self._udp_resources_lock:
+            resources = list(self._udp_resources)
+            self._udp_resources.clear()
+        for resource in resources:
+            try:
+                resource.close()
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+
+    def traffic(self) -> tuple[int, int, int, int]:
+        with self._counter_lock:
+            return self._up, self._down, self._up, self._down

lite/rrpp_core/system_proxy_mode.py

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+"""Windows 系统代理模式：注册表切换、原状态保存与异常退出恢复。"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ctypes
+import re
+from typing import Callable
+
+
+PROXY_REG = r"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"
+BACKUP_KEY = "prev_proxy_state"
+_VALUE_NAMES = ("ProxyEnable", "ProxyServer", "ProxyOverride", "AutoConfigURL")
+
+
+def is_our_pac_url(value: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(re.fullmatch(r"http://127\.0\.0\.1:\d+/proxy\.pac", str(value).strip()))
+
+
+def notify_proxy_change() -> None:
+    """通知 WinINET 和顶层窗口重新读取系统代理。"""
+    try:
+        ctypes.windll.Wininet.InternetSetOptionW(None, 39, None, 0)
+        ctypes.windll.Wininet.InternetSetOptionW(None, 37, None, 0)
+        result = ctypes.c_ulong()
+        ctypes.windll.user32.SendMessageTimeoutW(
+            0xFFFF, 0x001A, 0, ctypes.c_wchar_p("InternetSettings"),
+            0x0002, 5000, ctypes.byref(result))
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+
+class SystemProxyMode:
+    def __init__(self, *, run: Callable, settings_load: Callable,
+                 settings_save: Callable, log: Callable,
+                 endpoint: Callable[[], tuple[str, int]],
+                 proxy_override: Callable[[bool], str]):
+        self.run = run
+        self.settings_load = settings_load
+        self.settings_save = settings_save
+        self.log = log
+        self.endpoint = endpoint
+        self.proxy_override = proxy_override
+        self._previous = None
+
+    def reg_query(self, name: str):
+        result = self.run(["reg", "query", PROXY_REG, "/v", name], warn=False)
+        if result.returncode:
+            return None
+        for line in (result.stdout or "").splitlines():
+            parts = line.strip().split(None, 2)
+            if len(parts) >= 3 and parts[0].lower() == name.lower():
+                return parts[1], parts[2]
+        return None
+
+    def _backup(self):
+        if self._previous is not None:
+            return
+        state = {name: list(value) if (value := self.reg_query(name)) else None
+                 for name in _VALUE_NAMES}
+        self._previous = state
+        try:
+            self.settings_save({**self.settings_load(), BACKUP_KEY: state})
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    def _restore(self):
+        state = self._previous
+        if state is None:
+            state = self.settings_load().get(BACKUP_KEY)
+        if isinstance(state, dict):
+            for name in _VALUE_NAMES:
+                value = state.get(name)
+                if value:
+                    self.run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", name, "/t", value[0],
+                              "/d", value[1], "/f"], warn=False)
+                else:
+                    self.run(["reg", "delete", PROXY_REG, "/v", name, "/f"], warn=False)
+            self.log("已恢复开启代理前的系统代理设置")
+        else:
+            for name in ("ProxyServer", "ProxyOverride", "AutoConfigURL"):
+                self.run(["reg", "delete", PROXY_REG, "/v", name, "/f"], warn=False)
+            self.run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyEnable", "/t",
+                      "REG_DWORD", "/d", "0", "/f"])
+        self._previous = None
+        try:
+            data = self.settings_load()
+            if BACKUP_KEY in data:
+                del data[BACKUP_KEY]
+                self.settings_save(data)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    def enable(self, pac_url=None, bypass_lan=False):
+        self._backup()
+        if pac_url:
+            self.run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyEnable", "/t",
+                      "REG_DWORD", "/d", "0", "/f"])
+            for name in ("ProxyServer", "ProxyOverride"):
+                self.run(["reg", "delete", PROXY_REG, "/v", name, "/f"], warn=False)
+            self.run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", "AutoConfigURL", "/t",
+                      "REG_SZ", "/d", pac_url, "/f"])
+            self.log("系统代理已设置 (PAC)")
+        else:
+            host, port = self.endpoint()
+            address = f"{host}:{port}"
+            self.run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyEnable", "/t",
+                      "REG_DWORD", "/d", "1", "/f"])
+            self.run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyServer", "/t",
+                      "REG_SZ", "/d", address, "/f"])
+            self.run(["reg", "add", PROXY_REG, "/v", "ProxyOverride", "/t",
+                      "REG_SZ", "/d", self.proxy_override(bypass_lan), "/f"])
+            self.log(f"系统代理已设置: {address}")
+        notify_proxy_change()
+
+    def disable(self):
+        self._restore()
+        notify_proxy_change()
+
+    def is_on(self):
+        host, port = self.endpoint()
+        enabled = self.reg_query("ProxyEnable")
+        try:
+            fixed_enabled = bool(enabled and int(str(enabled[1]).strip(), 0) == 1)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            fixed_enabled = False
+        if fixed_enabled:
+            server = self.reg_query("ProxyServer")
+            return bool(server and (server[1] or "").strip() == f"{host}:{port}")
+        pac = self.reg_query("AutoConfigURL")
+        return bool(pac) and is_our_pac_url(pac[1] or "")
+
+    def is_stale(self):
+        host, port = self.endpoint()
+        server = self.reg_query("ProxyServer")
+        pac = self.reg_query("AutoConfigURL")
+        return (bool(server) and (server[1] or "").strip() == f"{host}:{port}") or \
+               (bool(pac) and is_our_pac_url(pac[1] or ""))

lite/rrpp_core/third_party_subscriptions.py

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"""第三方 RRPP Client JSON 订阅的下载、校验与展示辅助。"""
+
+import json
+import urllib.request
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
+
+
+def fetch_nodes(url: str, timeout=15):
+    """直连读取一个第三方订阅，避免首次导入受系统代理残留影响。"""
+    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}))
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        url,
+        headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "RRPP-Lite"},
+    )
+    with opener.open(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
+        return validate_nodes(json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8-sig")))
+
+
+def validate_nodes(data):
+    """校验 RRPP Client 节点数组，返回可安全写入本地缓存的副本。"""
+    if not isinstance(data, list) or not data:
+        raise ValueError("订阅应为非空的 JSON 节点数组")
+    result = []
+    for index, node in enumerate(data, 1):
+        if not isinstance(node, dict):
+            raise ValueError(f"第 {index} 项不是节点对象")
+        domain = str(node.get("domain") or "").strip()
+        method = (node.get("methods") or {}).get("http") or {}
+        port = method.get("port", node.get("port"))
+        try:
+            port = int(port)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            port = 0
+        if not domain:
+            raise ValueError(f"第 {index} 项缺少 domain")
+        if not 1 <= port <= 65535:
+            raise ValueError(f"第 {index} 项的 HTTP 代理端口无效")
+        result.append(dict(node))
+    return result
+
+
+def mask_url(url: str) -> str:
+    """用于 UI 展示，隐藏查询参数和 URL 用户信息中的敏感令牌。"""
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(str(url))
+        host = parts.hostname or ""
+        if parts.port:
+            host = f"{host}:{parts.port}"
+        if parts.username:
+            host = "***@" + host
+        return urlunsplit((parts.scheme, host, parts.path, "…" if parts.query else "", ""))
+    except Exception:
+        return "已隐藏订阅地址"

lite/rrpp_core/traffic.py

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+"""线程安全的本地转发流量统计。"""
+
+import threading
+import time
+
+
+class TrafficStats:
+    """记录单次代理会话的上下行总量与采样速率。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, clock=time.time):
+        self._clock = clock
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._up = 0
+        self._down = 0
+        self._prev_up = 0
+        self._prev_down = 0
+        self._prev_ts = 0.0
+
+    def add(self, up=0, down=0):
+        with self._lock:
+            self._up += up
+            self._down += down
+
+    def reset(self):
+        with self._lock:
+            self._up = self._down = 0
+            self._prev_up = self._prev_down = 0
+            self._prev_ts = self._clock()
+
+    def rate(self):
+        with self._lock:
+            now = self._clock()
+            if self._prev_ts > 0 and now > self._prev_ts:
+                elapsed = now - self._prev_ts
+                up_rate = int((self._up - self._prev_up) / elapsed)
+                down_rate = int((self._down - self._prev_down) / elapsed)
+            else:
+                up_rate = down_rate = 0
+            self._prev_up = self._up
+            self._prev_down = self._down
+            self._prev_ts = now
+            return up_rate, down_rate, self._up, self._down
+
+    def snapshot(self):
+        with self._lock:
+            return self._up, self._down
+
+
+def format_bytes(value):
+    """将字节数格式化为 UI 展示文本。"""
+    number = float(value)
+    for unit in ("B", "KB", "MB", "GB", "TB"):
+        if number < 1024 or unit == "TB":
+            return f"{int(number)} {unit}" if unit == "B" else f"{number:.1f} {unit}"
+        number /= 1024

lite/rrpp_core/tun_backend.py

@@ -0,0 +1,802 @@
+"""路线 B 的 Windows TUN 后端：tun2socks + 自有 SOCKS5/UoT 桥接。
+
+这里不启动 sing-box。tun2socks 只负责 Wintun 和用户态 TCP/IP 栈，
+所有上游协议由本项目的 ``socks_bridge`` 处理：TCP 使用 HTTP CONNECT，
+UDP 使用裸 UoT v2。
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ctypes
+import ipaddress
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import threading
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from .socks_bridge import Socks5Bridge
+
+
+class TunBackendError(RuntimeError):
+    """TUN 后端无法启动或停止。"""
+
+
+def _run_hidden(command, **kwargs):
+    """运行 Windows 网络命令时隐藏控制台窗口。
+
+    源码通过 test.bat 启动时这些子进程复用已有控制台；Nuitka GUI 没有父控制台，
+    未设置 CREATE_NO_WINDOW 就会为每次 PowerShell 查询弹出一个窗口。
+    """
+    kwargs.setdefault("creationflags", getattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NO_WINDOW", 0))
+    return subprocess.run(command, **kwargs)
+
+
+class TunBackend:
+    def __init__(self, user_dir: str | Path, engine_path: str | Path | None = None,
+                 log: Callable[[str], None] | None = None,
+                 detail_log: Callable[[str], None] | None = None):
+        self.user_dir = Path(user_dir)
+        self.engine_path = Path(engine_path) if engine_path else None
+        self.log = log or (lambda _message: None)
+        self.detail_log = detail_log or self.log
+        self._process: subprocess.Popen[str] | None = None
+        self._bridge: Socks5Bridge | None = None
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._route_added = False
+        self._ipv6_route_added = False
+        self._lan_routes: list[str] = []
+        self._lan_ipv6_routes: list[str] = []
+        self._node_routes: list[str] = []
+        self._node_ipv6_routes: list[str] = []
+        self._physical_gateway = ""
+        self._physical_ifindex = ""
+        self._physical_ipv6_gateway = ""
+        self._physical_ipv6_ifindex = ""
+        self._device = "RRPP-TUN"
+        self._address = "10.255.0.1"
+        self._ipv6_address = "fd42:7272:5050::1"
+        self._dns_configured = False
+        self._tun_dns_servers = ("8.8.8.8", "1.1.1.1")
+        self._ipv6_enabled = False
+        self._bypass_lan = True
+        self._cleanup_pending = False
+        self._state_path = self.user_dir / "tun_state.json"
+        # Wintun 是三层虚拟接口，默认路由的下一跳使用接口自身地址。
+        self._gateway = self._address
+        self._ipv6_gateway = self._ipv6_address
+        self._recover_stale_state()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def is_admin() -> bool:
+        if os.name != "nt":
+            return True
+        try:
+            return bool(ctypes.windll.shell32.IsUserAnAdmin())
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+    def resolve_engine(self) -> Path:
+        candidates: list[Path] = []
+        if self.engine_path:
+            candidates.append(self.engine_path)
+        # 目录式发布：主 EXE 与 tun2socks.exe、wintun.dll 放在同一目录。
+        # PyInstaller onefile：主程序会把内置文件解压到 _MEIPASS。
+        executable_dir = Path(sys.executable).resolve().parent
+        meipass = getattr(sys, "_MEIPASS", None)
+        package_dir = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+        candidates.extend([
+            self.user_dir / "tun2socks.exe",
+            self.user_dir.parent / "tun2socks.exe",
+            executable_dir / "tun2socks.exe",
+            Path(meipass) / "tun2socks.exe" if meipass else Path("__rrpp_no_meipass__"),
+            package_dir / "tun2socks.exe",
+            package_dir / "runtime" / "tun2socks.exe",
+        ])
+        found = shutil.which("tun2socks")
+        if found:
+            candidates.append(Path(found))
+        for candidate in candidates:
+            try:
+                path = candidate.expanduser().resolve()
+            except OSError:
+                continue
+            if path.is_file():
+                return path
+        raise TunBackendError(
+            "未找到 tun2socks.exe。请将 tun2socks.exe 和 wintun.dll 放在 TUN 程序目录，"
+            "或在 config.json 的 tun_engine_path 中填写完整路径。"
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _physical_interface() -> str:
+        command = ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command",
+                   "(Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix '0.0.0.0/0' | "
+                   "Where-Object InterfaceAlias -ne 'RRPP-TUN' | "
+                   "Sort-Object RouteMetric | Select-Object -First 1 -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias)"]
+        try:
+            result = _run_hidden(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
+            value = (result.stdout or "").strip().splitlines()
+            if value and value[0].strip():
+                return value[0].strip()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        return ""
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _physical_source_address(interface: str) -> str:
+        if not interface:
+            return ""
+        escaped = interface.replace("'", "''")
+        command = ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command",
+                   f"(Get-NetIPAddress -InterfaceAlias '{escaped}' -AddressFamily IPv4 "
+                   "-AddressState Preferred | Select-Object -First 1 -ExpandProperty IPAddress)"]
+        try:
+            result = _run_hidden(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
+            value = (result.stdout or "").strip().splitlines()
+            if value and value[0].strip():
+                return value[0].strip()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        return ""
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _physical_route_info() -> tuple[str, str]:
+        """返回当前物理默认路由的网关和接口索引。"""
+        command = ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command",
+                   "Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix '0.0.0.0/0' | "
+                   "Where-Object InterfaceAlias -ne 'RRPP-TUN' | "
+                   "Sort-Object RouteMetric | Select-Object -First 1 "
+                   "NextHop,InterfaceIndex | ConvertTo-Json -Compress"]
+        try:
+            result = _run_hidden(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
+            data = json.loads((result.stdout or "").strip())
+            if isinstance(data, dict):
+                return str(data.get("NextHop") or ""), str(data.get("InterfaceIndex") or "")
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        return "", ""
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _physical_ipv6_route_info() -> tuple[str, str]:
+        """返回当前物理 IPv6 默认路由的下一跳和接口索引。"""
+        command = ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command",
+                   "Get-NetRoute -AddressFamily IPv6 -DestinationPrefix '::/0' | "
+                   "Where-Object InterfaceAlias -ne 'RRPP-TUN' | "
+                   "Sort-Object RouteMetric | Select-Object -First 1 "
+                   "NextHop,InterfaceIndex | ConvertTo-Json -Compress"]
+        try:
+            result = _run_hidden(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
+            data = json.loads((result.stdout or "").strip())
+            if isinstance(data, dict):
+                return str(data.get("NextHop") or ""), str(data.get("InterfaceIndex") or "")
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        return "", ""
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _active_global_ipv6() -> bool | None:
+        """返回是否存在公网 IPv6；无法查询时返回 None，避免误报已接管。"""
+        if os.name != "nt":
+            return False
+        command = [
+            "powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command",
+            "@(Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv6 -AddressState Preferred | "
+            "Where-Object { $_.IPAddress -notlike 'fe80:*' -and "
+            "$_.IPAddress -ne '::1' -and $_.IPAddress -notlike 'fc*' -and "
+            "$_.IPAddress -notlike 'fd*' }).IPAddress | ConvertTo-Json -Compress",
+        ]
+        try:
+            result = _run_hidden(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
+            if result.returncode:
+                return None
+            value = json.loads((result.stdout or "").strip() or "[]")
+            if isinstance(value, str):
+                return bool(value.strip())
+            return bool(value)
+        except Exception:
+            return None
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _resolve_proxy_addresses(node: dict[str, Any]) -> list[tuple]:
+        methods = (node.get("methods") or {}).get("http") or {}
+        host = str(node.get("domain") or "").strip()
+        port = int(methods.get("port") or node.get("port") or 443)
+        if not host:
+            return []
+        addresses: list[tuple] = []
+        for item in socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM):
+            if item[4] not in addresses:
+                addresses.append(item[4])
+        return addresses
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _node_chain(node: dict[str, Any]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        chain = node.get("_jump_chain") if isinstance(node, dict) else None
+        if isinstance(chain, list) and chain:
+            return [item for item in chain if isinstance(item, dict)]
+        return [node] if isinstance(node, dict) else []
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _node_key(node: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+        methods = (node.get("methods") or {}).get("http") or {}
+        return "|".join((str(node.get("domain") or ""),
+                         str(methods.get("port") or node.get("port") or 443),
+                         str(methods.get("username") or node.get("username") or "")))
+
+    def _add_node_routes(self, proxy_addresses: list[tuple]) -> None:
+        """把 HTTP CONNECT 节点固定走物理网卡，防止默认 TUN 路由形成回环。"""
+        candidates_v4: list[str] = []
+        candidates_v6: list[str] = []
+        for sockaddr in proxy_addresses:
+            address = str(sockaddr[0])
+            try:
+                parsed = ipaddress.ip_address(address.split("%", 1)[0])
+            except ValueError:
+                continue
+            target = candidates_v4 if parsed.version == 4 else candidates_v6
+            normalized = parsed.compressed
+            if normalized not in target:
+                target.append(normalized)
+        if candidates_v4 and not self._physical_ifindex:
+            raise TunBackendError("找不到物理 IPv4 接口，无法固定代理节点路由")
+        for address in candidates_v4:
+            if address in self._node_routes:
+                continue
+            command = ["route", "ADD", address, "MASK", "255.255.255.255"]
+            if self._physical_gateway:
+                command.append(self._physical_gateway)
+            command.extend(["METRIC", "1", "IF", self._physical_ifindex])
+            result = _run_hidden(command, capture_output=True, text=True,
+                                    encoding="mbcs", errors="replace", timeout=15)
+            if result.returncode:
+                detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
+                # 已存在的等价路由不影响启动；其它错误继续暴露，避免静默回环。
+                if "already exists" not in detail.lower() and "已存在" not in detail:
+                    raise TunBackendError(f"节点物理路由添加失败 ({address}): {detail[:200]}")
+                continue
+            self._node_routes.append(address)
+            self._write_state()
+        if candidates_v6 and not self._ipv6_enabled:
+            if not candidates_v4:
+                raise TunBackendError("IPv6 模式已关闭，代理节点仅包含 IPv6 地址")
+            candidates_v6 = []
+        if candidates_v6 and not self._physical_ipv6_ifindex:
+            # 双栈节点仍可使用 IPv4 地址；只有 IPv6-only 节点需要物理 IPv6 出口。
+            if candidates_v4:
+                candidates_v6 = []
+            else:
+                raise TunBackendError("代理节点仅包含 IPv6 地址，但找不到物理 IPv6 默认路由")
+        for address in candidates_v6:
+            if address in self._node_ipv6_routes:
+                continue
+            self._add_ipv6_physical_route(address)
+
+    def _add_ipv6_physical_route(self, address: str) -> None:
+        if not self._physical_ipv6_ifindex:
+            raise TunBackendError("找不到物理 IPv6 接口，无法固定 IPv6 路由")
+        command = ["interface", "ipv6", "add", "route", f"prefix={address}/128",
+                   f"interface={self._physical_ipv6_ifindex}"]
+        if self._physical_ipv6_gateway and self._physical_ipv6_gateway != "::":
+            command.append(f"nexthop={self._physical_ipv6_gateway}")
+        command.append("metric=1")
+        result = _run_hidden(["netsh", *command], capture_output=True, text=True,
+                                encoding="mbcs", errors="replace", timeout=15)
+        if result.returncode:
+            detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
+            if "already exists" not in detail.lower() and "已存在" not in detail:
+                raise TunBackendError(f"IPv6 节点物理路由添加失败 ({address}): {detail[:200]}")
+            return
+        self._node_ipv6_routes.append(address)
+        self._write_state()
+
+    def _ensure_physical_route(self, address: str) -> None:
+        """为 TUN 内部的直连目标补一条物理出口 /32 路由。"""
+        if os.name != "nt":
+            return
+        try:
+            parsed = ipaddress.ip_address(str(address).split("%", 1)[0])
+        except ValueError:
+            return
+        if parsed.version == 6:
+            if not self._ipv6_enabled:
+                raise TunBackendError("IPv6 模式未启用，无法添加 IPv6 物理路由")
+            normalized = parsed.compressed
+            if normalized in self._node_ipv6_routes:
+                return
+            self._add_ipv6_physical_route(normalized)
+            return
+        if not self._physical_ifindex:
+            raise TunBackendError("找不到物理 IPv4 接口，无法固定直连路由")
+        normalized = parsed.compressed
+        if normalized in self._node_routes:
+            return
+        command = ["route", "ADD", normalized, "MASK", "255.255.255.255"]
+        if self._physical_gateway:
+            command.append(self._physical_gateway)
+        command.extend(["METRIC", "1", "IF", self._physical_ifindex])
+        result = _run_hidden(command, capture_output=True, text=True,
+                                encoding="mbcs", errors="replace", timeout=15)
+        detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
+        if result.returncode:
+            if "already exists" in detail.lower() or "已存在" in detail:
+                return
+            raise TunBackendError(f"直连目标物理路由添加失败 ({normalized}): {detail[:200]}")
+        self._node_routes.append(normalized)
+        self._write_state()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _cleanup_succeeded(result: subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]) -> bool:
+        if result.returncode == 0:
+            return True
+        detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip().lower()
+        # 清理是幂等操作：路由或网卡已经消失时，目标状态已经达到。
+        return any(marker in detail for marker in (
+            "not found", "does not exist", "cannot find", "no such",
+            "找不到", "不存在", "未找到", "没有找到",
+        ))
+
+    def _cleanup_netsh(self, args: list[str]) -> bool:
+        try:
+            result = _run_hidden(["netsh", *args], capture_output=True, text=True,
+                                    encoding="mbcs", errors="replace", timeout=15)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            self.detail_log(f"[TUN] 清理 netsh 失败: {exc}")
+            return False
+        if self._cleanup_succeeded(result):
+            return True
+        detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
+        self.detail_log(f"[TUN] 清理 netsh 未完成: {detail[:300]}")
+        return False
+
+    def _remove_node_routes(self) -> bool:
+        remaining: list[str] = []
+        for address in self._node_routes:
+            try:
+                result = _run_hidden(["route", "DELETE", address], capture_output=True,
+                                        text=True, encoding="mbcs", errors="replace", timeout=15)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                self.detail_log(f"[TUN] 清理节点路由失败 ({address}): {exc}")
+                remaining.append(address)
+                continue
+            if not self._cleanup_succeeded(result):
+                detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
+                self.detail_log(f"[TUN] 清理节点路由未完成 ({address}): {detail[:200]}")
+                remaining.append(address)
+        self._node_routes = remaining
+        remaining_v6: list[str] = []
+        for address in self._node_ipv6_routes:
+            command = ["interface", "ipv6", "delete", "route", f"prefix={address}/128"]
+            if self._physical_ipv6_ifindex:
+                command.append(f"interface={self._physical_ipv6_ifindex}")
+            try:
+                result = _run_hidden(["netsh", *command], capture_output=True, text=True,
+                                        encoding="mbcs", errors="replace", timeout=15)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                self.detail_log(f"[TUN] 清理 IPv6 节点路由失败 ({address}): {exc}")
+                remaining_v6.append(address)
+                continue
+            if not self._cleanup_succeeded(result):
+                detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
+                self.detail_log(f"[TUN] 清理 IPv6 节点路由未完成 ({address}): {detail[:200]}")
+                remaining_v6.append(address)
+        self._node_ipv6_routes = remaining_v6
+        return not remaining and not remaining_v6
+
+    def _netsh(self, args: list[str], *, ignore_error: bool = False) -> None:
+        result = _run_hidden(["netsh", *args], capture_output=True, text=True,
+                                encoding="mbcs", errors="replace", timeout=15)
+        if result.returncode and not ignore_error:
+            detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
+            raise TunBackendError(f"netsh 操作失败: {detail[:300]}")
+
+    def _configure_routes(self) -> None:
+        for _ in range(20):
+            try:
+                probe = _run_hidden(
+                    ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command",
+                     f"Get-NetAdapter -Name '{self._device}' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue"],
+                    capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=3,
+                )
+                if probe.stdout and self._device.lower() in probe.stdout.lower():
+                    break
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+            time.sleep(0.25)
+        else:
+            raise TunBackendError(f"tun2socks 未创建虚拟网卡: {self._device}")
+        self._netsh(["interface", "ipv4", "set", "address",
+                     f"name={self._device}", "source=static",
+                     f"addr={self._address}", "mask=255.255.255.252"])
+        self._netsh(["interface", "ipv4", "add", "route", "0.0.0.0/0",
+                     f"{self._device}", self._gateway, "metric=1"])
+        self._route_added = True
+        self._write_state()
+        if self._ipv6_enabled:
+            self._netsh(["interface", "ipv6", "set", "address",
+                         f"interface={self._device}", f"address={self._ipv6_address}",
+                         "store=active"])
+            self._netsh(["interface", "ipv6", "add", "route", "prefix=::/0",
+                         f"interface={self._device}", f"nexthop={self._ipv6_gateway}",
+                         "metric=1"])
+            self._ipv6_route_added = True
+            self._write_state()
+        if not self._bypass_lan:
+            # Windows 物理网卡通常已有更具体的私网路由；补同前缀的 TUN
+            # 路由，确保“内网也代理”不会在进入 tun2socks 前被物理网卡截走。
+            for network in ("10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16",
+                            "169.254.0.0/16"):
+                self._netsh(["interface", "ipv4", "add", "route", network,
+                             f"{self._device}", self._gateway, "metric=1"])
+                self._lan_routes.append(network)
+                self._write_state()
+            if self._ipv6_enabled:
+                for network in ("fc00::/7",):
+                    self._netsh(["interface", "ipv6", "add", "route", f"prefix={network}",
+                                 f"interface={self._device}", f"nexthop={self._ipv6_gateway}",
+                                 "metric=1"])
+                    self._lan_ipv6_routes.append(network)
+                    self._write_state()
+        self._configure_dns()
+
+    def _configure_dns(self) -> None:
+        """让 Windows DNS 请求也进入 TUN，避免沿用物理网卡 DNS。"""
+        if os.name != "nt":
+            return
+        ipv4 = [item for item in self._tun_dns_servers if ":" not in item]
+        ipv6 = [item for item in self._tun_dns_servers if ":" in item] if self._ipv6_enabled else []
+        if ipv4:
+            self._netsh([
+                "interface", "ipv4", "set", "dnsservers",
+                f"name={self._device}", "source=static",
+                f"address={ipv4[0]}", "register=none", "validate=no",
+            ])
+            for index, secondary in enumerate(ipv4[1:], start=2):
+                self._netsh([
+                    "interface", "ipv4", "add", "dnsservers",
+                    f"name={self._device}", f"address={secondary}",
+                    f"index={index}", "validate=no",
+                ], ignore_error=True)
+        if ipv6:
+            self._netsh([
+                "interface", "ipv6", "set", "dnsservers",
+                f"name={self._device}", "source=static",
+                f"address={ipv6[0]}", "register=none", "validate=no",
+            ], ignore_error=True)
+            for index, secondary in enumerate(ipv6[1:], start=2):
+                self._netsh([
+                    "interface", "ipv6", "add", "dnsservers",
+                    f"name={self._device}", f"address={secondary}",
+                    f"index={index}", "validate=no",
+                ], ignore_error=True)
+        self._dns_configured = True
+        self._write_state()
+
+    def _remove_routes(self) -> None:
+        cleanup_ok = True
+        if self._dns_configured:
+            ipv4_ok = self._cleanup_netsh([
+                "interface", "ipv4", "set", "dnsservers",
+                f"name={self._device}", "source=dhcp",
+            ])
+            ipv6_ok = self._cleanup_netsh([
+                "interface", "ipv6", "set", "dnsservers",
+                f"name={self._device}", "source=dhcp",
+            ])
+            cleanup_ok &= ipv4_ok and ipv6_ok
+            if ipv4_ok and ipv6_ok:
+                self._dns_configured = False
+        if self._route_added:
+            route_ok = self._cleanup_netsh(["interface", "ipv4", "delete", "route",
+                                             "0.0.0.0/0", f"{self._device}", self._gateway])
+            cleanup_ok &= route_ok
+            if route_ok:
+                self._route_added = False
+        if self._ipv6_route_added:
+            route_ok = self._cleanup_netsh(["interface", "ipv6", "delete", "route",
+                                             "prefix=::/0", f"interface={self._device}",
+                                             f"nexthop={self._ipv6_gateway}"])
+            cleanup_ok &= route_ok
+            if route_ok:
+                self._ipv6_route_added = False
+        remaining_lan: list[str] = []
+        for network in self._lan_routes:
+            route_ok = self._cleanup_netsh(["interface", "ipv4", "delete", "route",
+                                             network, f"{self._device}", self._gateway])
+            cleanup_ok &= route_ok
+            if not route_ok:
+                remaining_lan.append(network)
+        self._lan_routes = remaining_lan
+        remaining_lan_v6: list[str] = []
+        for network in self._lan_ipv6_routes:
+            route_ok = self._cleanup_netsh(["interface", "ipv6", "delete", "route",
+                                             f"prefix={network}", f"interface={self._device}",
+                                             f"nexthop={self._ipv6_gateway}"])
+            cleanup_ok &= route_ok
+            if not route_ok:
+                remaining_lan_v6.append(network)
+        self._lan_ipv6_routes = remaining_lan_v6
+        cleanup_ok &= self._remove_node_routes()
+        self._cleanup_pending = not cleanup_ok
+        if cleanup_ok:
+            self._clear_state()
+        else:
+            self._write_state()
+            self.detail_log("[TUN] 部分路由/DNS 清理失败，已保留状态并将在下次启动重试")
+
+    def _write_state(self) -> None:
+        """记录本进程改过的路由/DNS，强杀后下次启动可恢复。"""
+        try:
+            self.user_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            payload = {
+                "device": self._device,
+                "address": self._address,
+                "gateway": self._gateway,
+                "ipv6_address": self._ipv6_address,
+                "ipv6_gateway": self._ipv6_gateway,
+                "lan_routes": list(self._lan_routes),
+                "lan_ipv6_routes": list(self._lan_ipv6_routes),
+                "bypass_lan": bool(self._bypass_lan),
+                "physical_gateway": self._physical_gateway,
+                "physical_ifindex": self._physical_ifindex,
+                "physical_ipv6_gateway": self._physical_ipv6_gateway,
+                "physical_ipv6_ifindex": self._physical_ipv6_ifindex,
+                "node_routes": list(self._node_routes),
+                "node_ipv6_routes": list(self._node_ipv6_routes),
+                "route_added": bool(self._route_added),
+                "ipv6_route_added": bool(self._ipv6_route_added),
+                "ipv6_enabled": bool(self._ipv6_enabled),
+                "dns_configured": bool(self._dns_configured),
+                "dns_servers": list(self._tun_dns_servers),
+                "cleanup_pending": bool(self._cleanup_pending),
+                "pid": os.getpid(),
+            }
+            temp = self._state_path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+            temp.write_text(json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False), encoding="utf-8")
+            temp.replace(self._state_path)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            self.detail_log(f"[TUN] 状态记录失败: {exc}")
+
+    def _clear_state(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._state_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _pid_alive(pid: Any) -> bool:
+        """避免合并版误清理仍在运行的旧 TUN 实例。"""
+        if os.name != "nt":
+            return False
+        try:
+            number = int(pid)
+            if number <= 0:
+                return False
+            kernel = ctypes.windll.kernel32
+            kernel.OpenProcess.argtypes = [ctypes.c_ulong, ctypes.c_bool, ctypes.c_ulong]
+            kernel.OpenProcess.restype = ctypes.c_void_p
+            kernel.GetExitCodeProcess.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_ulong)]
+            kernel.CloseHandle.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p]
+            handle = kernel.OpenProcess(0x1000, False, number)
+            if not handle:
+                return False
+            try:
+                code = ctypes.c_ulong()
+                return bool(kernel.GetExitCodeProcess(handle, ctypes.byref(code))
+                            and code.value == 259)
+            finally:
+                kernel.CloseHandle(handle)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError, OSError):
+            return False
+
+    def _recover_stale_state(self) -> None:
+        """启动前清理上次崩溃/强杀留下的 RRPP-TUN 路由和 DNS。"""
+        try:
+            if not self._state_path.is_file():
+                return
+            state = json.loads(self._state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if not state.get("cleanup_pending") and self._pid_alive(state.get("pid")):
+                raise TunBackendError("检测到另一个 TUN 实例仍在运行，请先关闭后再启动")
+            self._device = str(state.get("device") or self._device)
+            self._address = str(state.get("address") or self._address)
+            self._gateway = str(state.get("gateway") or self._gateway)
+            self._ipv6_address = str(state.get("ipv6_address") or self._ipv6_address)
+            self._ipv6_gateway = str(state.get("ipv6_gateway") or self._ipv6_gateway)
+            self._ipv6_enabled = bool(state.get("ipv6_enabled", bool(state.get("ipv6_route_added"))))
+            self._physical_ipv6_gateway = str(state.get("physical_ipv6_gateway") or "")
+            self._physical_ipv6_ifindex = str(state.get("physical_ipv6_ifindex") or "")
+            self._route_added = bool(state.get("route_added"))
+            self._ipv6_route_added = bool(state.get("ipv6_route_added"))
+            self._lan_routes = [str(item).strip() for item in (state.get("lan_routes") or [])
+                                if str(item).strip()]
+            self._lan_ipv6_routes = [str(item).strip() for item in (state.get("lan_ipv6_routes") or [])
+                                     if str(item).strip()]
+            self._node_routes = [str(item).strip() for item in (state.get("node_routes") or [])
+                                 if str(item).strip()]
+            self._node_ipv6_routes = [str(item).strip() for item in (state.get("node_ipv6_routes") or [])
+                                      if str(item).strip()]
+            self._dns_configured = bool(state.get("dns_configured"))
+            self._cleanup_pending = True
+            self._remove_routes()
+            if self._cleanup_pending:
+                self.detail_log("[TUN] 上次异常退出的部分路由/DNS 仍未清理，状态已保留")
+            else:
+                self.log("已清理上次异常退出遗留的 TUN 路由和 DNS")
+        except TunBackendError:
+            raise
+        except Exception as exc:
+            self.detail_log(f"[TUN] 异常退出残留清理失败: {exc}")
+
+    def _read_output(self, process: subprocess.Popen[str]) -> None:
+        if process.stdout is None:
+            return
+        try:
+            for line in process.stdout:
+                line = line.rstrip()
+                if line:
+                    self.detail_log(f"[TUN] {line}")
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+    def start(self, node: dict[str, Any], *, bypass_lan: bool = True,
+              route_rules: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+              dns_servers: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] | None = None,
+              ipv6_enabled: bool = False,
+              direct_target_resolver: Callable[[str, str, int], tuple[str, int] | None] | None = None,
+              route_rule_resolver: Callable[[str], dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+              route_node_resolver: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+              route_nodes: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            if self.status()["running"]:
+                raise TunBackendError("TUN 已经在运行")
+            if not self.is_admin():
+                raise TunBackendError("启动虚拟网卡 TUN 需要管理员权限")
+            self._bypass_lan = bool(bypass_lan)
+            self._ipv6_enabled = bool(ipv6_enabled)
+            if dns_servers is not None:
+                cleaned = tuple(str(item).strip() for item in dns_servers if str(item).strip())
+                if not cleaned:
+                    raise TunBackendError("自定义 DNS 不能为空")
+                try:
+                    for item in cleaned:
+                        address = ipaddress.ip_address(item)
+                        if address.is_unspecified or address.is_multicast:
+                            raise ValueError(item)
+                except ValueError as exc:
+                    raise TunBackendError("自定义 DNS 必须是有效的 IPv4/IPv6 地址") from exc
+                self._tun_dns_servers = cleaned[:3]
+            engine = self.resolve_engine()
+            interface = self._physical_interface()
+            source_address = self._physical_source_address(interface)
+            self._physical_gateway, self._physical_ifindex = self._physical_route_info()
+            if self._ipv6_enabled:
+                self._physical_ipv6_gateway, self._physical_ipv6_ifindex = self._physical_ipv6_route_info()
+            else:
+                self._physical_ipv6_gateway = self._physical_ipv6_ifindex = ""
+            if not self._physical_ifindex:
+                raise TunBackendError("找不到物理默认路由，无法保证代理节点不进入 TUN 回环")
+            if self._ipv6_enabled and not self._physical_ipv6_ifindex:
+                self.log("警告：未找到物理 IPv6 默认路由，IPv6 目标将仅尝试通过 IPv4 代理节点转发")
+            try:
+                proxy_addresses_by_node: dict[str, list[tuple]] = {}
+                connection_nodes = [node]
+                connection_nodes.extend(
+                    (item.get("node") if isinstance(item.get("node"), dict) else item)
+                    for item in (route_nodes or ())
+                    if isinstance(item, dict)
+                )
+                for connection_node in connection_nodes:
+                    for hop in self._node_chain(connection_node):
+                        try:
+                            addresses = self._resolve_proxy_addresses(hop)
+                        except OSError as exc:
+                            raise TunBackendError(f"无法解析 HTTP CONNECT 节点地址: {exc}") from exc
+                        if not addresses:
+                            raise TunBackendError("无法解析 HTTP CONNECT 节点地址")
+                        self._add_node_routes(addresses)
+                        proxy_addresses_by_node[self._node_key(hop)] = addresses
+                first_hop = self._node_chain(node)[0]
+                proxy_addresses = proxy_addresses_by_node.get(self._node_key(first_hop), [])
+                if not proxy_addresses:
+                    raise TunBackendError("无法解析 HTTP CONNECT 节点地址")
+                for route_node in route_nodes or ():
+                    if not isinstance(route_node, dict):
+                        continue
+                    route_value = route_node.get("node") if isinstance(route_node.get("node"), dict) else route_node
+                    for hop in self._node_chain(route_value):
+                        addresses = self._resolve_proxy_addresses(hop)
+                        proxy_addresses_by_node[self._node_key(hop)] = addresses
+                if not source_address:
+                    self.log("警告：未找到物理网卡 IPv4，节点连接可能无法绕过 TUN")
+                bridge = Socks5Bridge(
+                    node, bypass_lan=bypass_lan, route_rules=route_rules, log=self.detail_log,
+                    source_address=source_address or None,
+                    proxy_addresses=proxy_addresses,
+                    direct_target_resolver=direct_target_resolver,
+                    route_rule_resolver=route_rule_resolver,
+                    route_node_resolver=route_node_resolver,
+                    proxy_addresses_by_node=proxy_addresses_by_node,
+                    direct_route_ensurer=self._ensure_physical_route,
+                )
+                socks_port = bridge.start()
+            except Exception:
+                self._remove_routes()
+                raise
+            self._bridge = bridge
+            command = [str(engine), "--device", self._device,
+                       "--proxy", f"socks5://127.0.0.1:{socks_port}"]
+            # tun2socks 的 Windows socket 选项会把 UDP/TCP socket 绑定到
+            # --interface 指定的网卡；本项目的 SOCKS relay 在本机回环地址，
+            # 绑定 WLAN 会让 UDP 回环投递失效。Windows 官方用法也不传该参数。
+            # 节点连接已经通过物理 /32 路由和 source_address 绕过 TUN，
+            # 因此 Windows 不需要 --interface；Linux/macOS 仍保留原行为。
+            if interface and os.name != "nt":
+                command.extend(["--interface", interface])
+                self.detail_log(f"本地 SOCKS5 桥接: 127.0.0.1:{socks_port}")
+            try:
+                self._process = subprocess.Popen(
+                    command, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+                    text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace",
+                    creationflags=getattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NO_WINDOW", 0),
+                )
+                threading.Thread(target=self._read_output, args=(self._process,), daemon=True).start()
+                time.sleep(0.5)
+                if self._process.poll() is not None:
+                    raise TunBackendError(f"tun2socks 启动失败，退出码 {self._process.returncode}")
+                self._configure_routes()
+                self._write_state()
+                self.log(f"虚拟网卡 TUN 已启动，进程 PID={self._process.pid}")
+            except Exception:
+                bridge.stop()
+                self._remove_routes()
+                self._bridge = None
+                process = self._process
+                self._process = None
+                if process is not None and process.poll() is None:
+                    process.terminate()
+                raise
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            process = self._process
+            bridge = self._bridge
+            self._process = None
+            self._bridge = None
+            self._remove_routes()
+        if process is not None and process.poll() is None:
+            process.terminate()
+            try:
+                process.wait(timeout=10)
+            except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+                process.kill()
+                process.wait(timeout=5)
+        if bridge is not None:
+            bridge.stop()
+        if process is not None:
+            self.log("虚拟网卡 TUN 已停止")
+
+    def status(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._lock:
+            process = self._process
+            if process is None:
+                return {"running": False, "pid": None, "exit_code": None}
+            code = process.poll()
+            if code is not None:
+                self._process = None
+                self._remove_routes()
+                bridge = self._bridge
+                self._bridge = None
+                if bridge is not None:
+                    bridge.stop()
+                return {"running": False, "pid": process.pid, "exit_code": code}
+            return {"running": True, "pid": process.pid, "exit_code": None}
+
+    def traffic(self) -> tuple[int, int, int, int]:
+        if self._bridge is None:
+            return 0, 0, 0, 0
+        return self._bridge.traffic()

lite/rrpp_core/tun_mode.py

@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+"""按需提权的 TUN 控制通道；GUI 与管理员工作进程共用同一个入口。"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ctypes
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+import secrets
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import threading
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+
+WORKER_FLAG = "--rrpp-tun-worker"
+_MAX_MESSAGE = 1024 * 1024
+
+
+class TunModeError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _send(sock: socket.socket, value: dict[str, Any], lock: threading.Lock | None = None) -> None:
+    payload = (json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+    if len(payload) > _MAX_MESSAGE:
+        raise TunModeError("TUN 控制消息过大")
+    if lock is None:
+        sock.sendall(payload)
+    else:
+        with lock:
+            sock.sendall(payload)
+
+
+def _receive(reader) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    line = reader.readline(_MAX_MESSAGE + 1)
+    if not line or len(line) > _MAX_MESSAGE or not line.endswith(b"\n"):
+        raise TunModeError("TUN 工作进程连接已断开或消息无效")
+    value = json.loads(line.decode("utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise TunModeError("TUN 控制消息格式错误")
+    return value
+
+
+class TunModeController:
+    """普通权限 GUI 仅在首次开启 TUN 时启动管理员工作进程。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, command: list[str], log: Callable[[str], None],
+                 detail_log: Callable[[str], None] | None = None):
+        self.command = command
+        self.log = log
+        self.detail_log = detail_log or log
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._socket: socket.socket | None = None
+        self._reader = None
+
+    def _launch(self, port: int, token: str) -> None:
+        args = [*self.command[1:], WORKER_FLAG, str(port), token]
+        if os.name == "nt":
+            # PyInstaller onefile 的提权子进程必须独立解包，以便 GUI 退出后仍可清理网络。
+            previous = os.environ.get("PYINSTALLER_RESET_ENVIRONMENT")
+            os.environ["PYINSTALLER_RESET_ENVIRONMENT"] = "1"
+            try:
+                result = ctypes.windll.shell32.ShellExecuteW(
+                    None, "runas", self.command[0], subprocess.list2cmdline(args),
+                    os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(self.command[0])), 0,
+                )
+            finally:
+                if previous is None:
+                    os.environ.pop("PYINSTALLER_RESET_ENVIRONMENT", None)
+                else:
+                    os.environ["PYINSTALLER_RESET_ENVIRONMENT"] = previous
+            if result <= 32:
+                raise TunModeError("管理员授权已取消或无法启动 TUN 工作进程")
+        else:
+            # 非 Windows 仅供无网卡的协议测试；真实 TUN 后端仍限定 Windows。
+            subprocess.Popen([self.command[0], *args], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+                             stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
+
+    def start(self, payload: dict[str, Any], cancel_event=None) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            if self._socket is not None:
+                raise TunModeError("TUN 工作进程已经启动")
+            token = secrets.token_hex(32)
+            listener = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+            listener.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+            listener.listen(2)
+            deadline = time.monotonic() + 90
+            try:
+                self._launch(listener.getsockname()[1], token)
+                while True:
+                    if cancel_event is not None and cancel_event.is_set():
+                        raise TunModeError("用户取消了开启代理")
+                    remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+                    if remaining <= 0:
+                        raise TunModeError("等待 TUN 管理员工作进程超时")
+                    listener.settimeout(min(0.5, remaining))
+                    try:
+                        connection, _peer = listener.accept()
+                    except socket.timeout:
+                        continue
+                    connection.settimeout(3)
+                    reader = connection.makefile("rb")
+                    try:
+                        hello = _receive(reader)
+                        valid = (hello.get("type") == "hello" and
+                                 hmac.compare_digest(str(hello.get("token") or ""), token))
+                    except Exception:
+                        valid = False
+                    if valid:
+                        connection.settimeout(120)
+                        self._socket, self._reader = connection, reader
+                        break
+                    reader.close()
+                    connection.close()
+                if cancel_event is not None and cancel_event.is_set():
+                    raise TunModeError("用户取消了开启代理")
+                self._request("start", payload)
+            except Exception:
+                self.close()
+                raise
+            finally:
+                listener.close()
+
+    def _request(self, command: str, payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> Any:
+        if self._socket is None or self._reader is None:
+            raise TunModeError("TUN 工作进程未连接")
+        try:
+            _send(self._socket, {"command": command, "payload": payload or {}})
+            while True:
+                message = _receive(self._reader)
+                if message.get("type") == "log":
+                    callback = self.detail_log if message.get("detail") else self.log
+                    callback(str(message.get("message") or ""))
+                    continue
+                if message.get("type") != "result":
+                    raise TunModeError("TUN 工作进程响应无效")
+                if not message.get("ok"):
+                    raise TunModeError(str(message.get("error") or "TUN 操作失败"))
+                return message.get("value")
+        except TunModeError:
+            raise
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise TunModeError(f"TUN 工作进程连接中止: {exc}") from exc
+
+    def status(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._lock:
+            if self._socket is None:
+                return {"running": False, "pid": None, "exit_code": None}
+            try:
+                return self._request("status")
+            except (OSError, TunModeError, ValueError):
+                self.close()
+                return {"running": False, "pid": None, "exit_code": None}
+
+    def traffic(self) -> tuple[int, int, int, int]:
+        with self._lock:
+            if self._socket is None:
+                return 0, 0, 0, 0
+            try:
+                return tuple(self._request("traffic"))
+            except (OSError, TunModeError, ValueError):
+                return 0, 0, 0, 0
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                if self._socket is not None:
+                    self._request("stop")
+            finally:
+                self.close()
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            if self._socket is not None:
+                try:
+                    self._request("quit")
+                except (OSError, TunModeError, ValueError):
+                    pass
+            reader, connection = self._reader, self._socket
+            self._reader = self._socket = None
+            if reader is not None:
+                reader.close()
+            if connection is not None:
+                connection.close()
+
+
+def run_tun_worker(port: int, token: str, backend_factory,
+                   start_backend: Callable[[Any, dict[str, Any]], None]) -> None:
+    """管理员进程入口。主 GUI 断开后，必定清理本进程建立的网络状态。"""
+    connection = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", int(port)), timeout=15)
+    connection.settimeout(None)
+    reader = connection.makefile("rb")
+    send_lock = threading.Lock()
+    _send(connection, {"type": "hello", "token": token}, send_lock)
+
+    def emit(message: str, detail: bool = False) -> None:
+        try:
+            _send(connection, {"type": "log", "message": str(message),
+                               "detail": bool(detail)}, send_lock)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+    class _WorkerLogger:
+        def __call__(self, message: str) -> None:
+            emit(message)
+
+        def detail(self, message: str) -> None:
+            emit(message, detail=True)
+
+    logger = _WorkerLogger()
+
+    backend = None
+    try:
+        while True:
+            try:
+                request = _receive(reader)
+            except TunModeError:
+                break
+            command = request.get("command")
+            try:
+                if command == "start":
+                    if not isinstance(request.get("payload"), dict):
+                        raise TunModeError("TUN 启动参数无效")
+                    # 延迟创建后端，使初始化失败也能通过控制协议返回具体原因，
+                    # 避免 GUI 只看到 Windows 的 10053 连接中止错误。
+                    if backend is None:
+                        backend = backend_factory(logger)
+                    start_backend(backend, request["payload"])
+                    value = None
+                elif command == "stop":
+                    backend.stop()
+                    value = None
+                elif command == "status":
+                    value = backend.status()
+                elif command == "traffic":
+                    value = backend.traffic()
+                elif command == "quit":
+                    backend.stop()
+                    value = None
+                else:
+                    raise TunModeError("未知的 TUN 控制命令")
+                _send(connection, {"type": "result", "ok": True, "value": value}, send_lock)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                _send(connection, {"type": "result", "ok": False, "error": str(exc)}, send_lock)
+            if command == "quit":
+                break
+    finally:
+        if backend is not None:
+            backend.stop()
+        reader.close()
+        connection.close()

lite/rrpp_core/uot_protocol.py

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+"""SagerNet UDP over TCP v2 帧编解码。
+
+UoT 只负责把 UDP 数据报装入已有的可靠 TCP 字节流；外层连接仍由
+HTTP CONNECT + TLS 建立。此模块不依赖 sing-box。
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import socket
+import struct
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+MAGIC_ADDRESS = "sp.v2.udp-over-tcp.arpa"
+MAX_DATAGRAM = 65535
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Address:
+    host: str
+    port: int
+
+
+def encode_address(host: str, port: int) -> bytes:
+    host = str(host).strip()
+    if not 0 <= int(port) <= 65535:
+        raise ValueError("端口超出范围")
+    try:
+        addr = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+    except ValueError:
+        raw = host.encode("idna")
+        if not 1 <= len(raw) <= 255:
+            raise ValueError("域名长度超出 UoT 限制")
+        return b"\x02" + bytes([len(raw)]) + raw + struct.pack("!H", int(port))
+    if addr.version == 4:
+        return b"\x00" + addr.packed + struct.pack("!H", int(port))
+    return b"\x01" + addr.packed + struct.pack("!H", int(port))
+
+
+def decode_address(data: bytes, offset: int = 0) -> tuple[Address, int]:
+    if offset >= len(data):
+        raise ValueError("UoT 地址头不完整")
+    atyp = data[offset]
+    offset += 1
+    if atyp == 0:
+        size = 4
+    elif atyp == 1:
+        size = 16
+    elif atyp == 2:
+        if offset >= len(data):
+            raise ValueError("UoT 域名长度缺失")
+        size = data[offset]
+        offset += 1
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f"未知 UoT 地址类型: {atyp}")
+    end = offset + size
+    if end + 2 > len(data):
+        raise ValueError("UoT 地址头不完整")
+    raw = data[offset:end]
+    port = struct.unpack("!H", data[end:end + 2])[0]
+    if atyp == 0:
+        host = str(ipaddress.IPv4Address(raw))
+    elif atyp == 1:
+        host = str(ipaddress.IPv6Address(raw))
+    else:
+        host = raw.decode("idna")
+    return Address(host, port), end + 2
+
+
+def encode_request(is_connect: bool, destination: Address) -> bytes:
+    return (b"\x01" if is_connect else b"\x00") + encode_address(
+        destination.host, destination.port
+    )
+
+
+def encode_connect_frame(payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+    if len(payload) > MAX_DATAGRAM:
+        raise ValueError("UoT 数据报超过 65535 字节")
+    return struct.pack("!H", len(payload)) + payload
+
+
+def encode_datagram_frame(destination: Address, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+    if len(payload) > MAX_DATAGRAM:
+        raise ValueError("UoT 数据报超过 65535 字节")
+    return encode_address(destination.host, destination.port) + struct.pack("!H", len(payload)) + payload
+
+
+def read_exact(stream, size: int) -> bytes:
+    chunks = []
+    remaining = size
+    while remaining:
+        chunk = stream.recv(remaining)
+        if not chunk:
+            raise ConnectionError("UoT TCP 流已关闭")
+        chunks.append(chunk)
+        remaining -= len(chunk)
+    return b"".join(chunks)
+
+
+def read_connect_frame(stream) -> bytes:
+    size = struct.unpack("!H", read_exact(stream, 2))[0]
+    return read_exact(stream, size)
+
+
+def read_datagram_frame(stream) -> tuple[Address, bytes]:
+    # 地址是变长的，只能先读 ATYP，再按类型补齐。
+    head = read_exact(stream, 1)
+    atyp = head[0]
+    if atyp == 0:
+        rest = read_exact(stream, 6)
+    elif atyp == 1:
+        rest = read_exact(stream, 18)
+    elif atyp == 2:
+        length = read_exact(stream, 1)
+        rest = length + read_exact(stream, length[0] + 2)
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f"未知 UoT 地址类型: {atyp}")
+    address, _ = decode_address(head + rest)
+    size = struct.unpack("!H", read_exact(stream, 2))[0]
+    return address, read_exact(stream, size)

lite/rrpp_ui/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+"""RRPP Lite 的 Qt 界面层。
+
+核心代理与 PAC 逻辑不得依赖本包，以便后续在无 GUI 环境中独立测试。
+"""

lite/rrpp_ui/theme.py

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+"""RRPP Lite 界面的共享色彩常量。"""
+
+C_TITLE = "#8899aa"
+C_GREEN = "#51cf66"
+C_YELLOW = "#ffd43b"
+C_RED = "#ff6b6b"
+C_BG = "#ffffff"
+C_CARD = "#f0f2f5"
+C_BORDER = "#d0d5dd"
+C_TEXT = "#333333"
+C_SUBTEXT = "#889099"

lite/rrpp_ui/widgets.py

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+"""无业务状态的可复用 Qt 控件。"""
+
+from PyQt5.QtCore import Qt, QRectF, pyqtSignal
+from PyQt5.QtGui import QColor, QPainter
+from PyQt5.QtWidgets import QCheckBox, QLabel, QFrame, QHBoxLayout
+
+try:
+    from PyQt5.QtWidgets import QGraphicsDropShadowEffect
+except ImportError:  # 轻量测试桩不提供图形效果类，真实 PyQt5 仍使用阴影。
+    class QGraphicsDropShadowEffect:  # type: ignore[no-redef]
+        def __init__(self, *_args, **_kwargs):
+            pass
+
+        def setBlurRadius(self, *_args):
+            pass
+
+        def setOffset(self, *_args):
+            pass
+
+        def setColor(self, *_args):
+            pass
+
+from .theme import C_BORDER, C_GREEN, C_RED, C_TITLE
+
+
+_NL_BASE = f"color: {C_TITLE}; font-size: 12px;"
+
+
+class NodeLabel(QLabel):
+    """可点击标签：hover 显示下划线和手型光标，点击发出 clicked 信号。"""
+
+    clicked = pyqtSignal()
+
+    def __init__(self, text="", tooltip="点击切换节点", base=None, hover=None):
+        super().__init__(text)
+        self._base = base or _NL_BASE
+        self._hover = hover or self._base + " text-decoration: underline;"
+        self.setStyleSheet(self._base)
+        if tooltip:
+            self.setToolTip(tooltip)
+
+    def enterEvent(self, event):
+        self.setStyleSheet(self._hover)
+        self.setCursor(Qt.PointingHandCursor)
+        super().enterEvent(event)
+
+    def leaveEvent(self, event):
+        self.setStyleSheet(self._base)
+        self.unsetCursor()
+        super().leaveEvent(event)
+
+    def mouseReleaseEvent(self, event):
+        if event.button() == Qt.LeftButton:
+            self.clicked.emit()
+        super().mouseReleaseEvent(event)
+
+
+class ToggleSwitch(QCheckBox):
+    """苹果风格开关：绿/灰胶囊加滑动圆钮，自绘且不依赖图片资源。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, checked=False, parent=None):
+        super().__init__(parent)
+        self.setChecked(checked)
+        self.setFixedSize(42, 22)
+        self.setCursor(Qt.PointingHandCursor)
+
+    def paintEvent(self, event):
+        painter = QPainter(self)
+        painter.setRenderHint(QPainter.Antialiasing)
+        painter.setPen(Qt.NoPen)
+        painter.setBrush(QColor(C_GREEN) if self.isChecked() else QColor("#c8ccd4"))
+        painter.drawRoundedRect(QRectF(0, 0, 42, 22), 11, 11)
+        knob_x = 20.0 if self.isChecked() else 2.0
+        painter.setBrush(QColor("#ffffff"))
+        painter.drawEllipse(QRectF(knob_x, 2.0, 18.0, 18.0))
+        painter.end()
+
+    def mousePressEvent(self, event):
+        if event.button() == Qt.LeftButton:
+            self.setChecked(not self.isChecked())
+            self.repaint()
+            event.accept()
+            return
+        super().mousePressEvent(event)
+
+
+class StatusDot(QLabel):
+    """代理状态小圆点。"""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        super().__init__()
+        self.setFixedSize(14, 14)
+        self.set_off()
+
+    def set_on(self):
+        self.setStyleSheet(f"""
+            QLabel {{
+                background-color: {C_GREEN};
+                border-radius: 7px;
+                border: 1px solid rgba(81, 207, 102, 50);
+            }}
+        """)
+
+    def set_off(self):
+        self.setStyleSheet(f"""
+            QLabel {{
+                background-color: {C_RED};
+                border-radius: 7px;
+                border: 1px solid rgba(255, 107, 107, 50);
+            }}
+        """)
+
+    def set_disabled(self):
+        self.setStyleSheet(f"""
+            QLabel {{
+                background-color: {C_BORDER};
+                border-radius: 7px;
+                border: 1px solid rgba(136, 153, 170, 50);
+            }}
+        """)
+
+
+class ProxyModeCard(QFrame):
+    """整个卡片可点击；描边表示选择，圆点表示所选模式的运行状态。"""
+
+    clicked = pyqtSignal()
+
+    def __init__(self, title: str, parent=None):
+        super().__init__(parent)
+        self.setCursor(Qt.PointingHandCursor)
+        self._glow = QGraphicsDropShadowEffect(self)
+        self._glow.setBlurRadius(12)
+        self._glow.setOffset(0, 1)
+        self.setGraphicsEffect(self._glow)
+        row = QHBoxLayout(self)
+        row.setContentsMargins(11, 10, 11, 10)
+        row.setSpacing(5)
+        self.title = QLabel(title)
+        self.title.setStyleSheet("font-weight: bold; background: transparent;")
+        self.dot = StatusDot()
+        for child in (self.title, self.dot):
+            child.setAttribute(Qt.WA_TransparentForMouseEvents)
+        row.addWidget(self.title)
+        row.addStretch()
+        row.addWidget(self.dot)
+        self.set_state(False, False)
+
+    def set_state(self, selected: bool, running: bool) -> None:
+        border = C_TITLE if selected else "#e2e8ef"
+        background = "#f5f7f9" if selected else "#fafcfe"
+        self.setStyleSheet(
+            f"QFrame {{ background-color: {background}; border: {'2px' if selected else '1px'} "
+            f"solid {border}; border-radius: 8px; }}"
+            "QFrame:hover { border-color: #cbd6e2; background-color: #ffffff; }"
+            "QLabel { border: none; }"
+        )
+        self._glow.setColor(QColor(136, 153, 170, 105 if selected else 52))
+        if not selected:
+            self.dot.set_disabled()
+        elif running:
+            self.dot.set_on()
+        else:
+            self.dot.set_off()
+
+    def mouseReleaseEvent(self, event):
+        if event.button() == Qt.LeftButton and self.rect().contains(event.pos()):
+            self.clicked.emit()
+        super().mouseReleaseEvent(event)

lite/runtime/LICENSE.tun2socks.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2019 Jason Lyu
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

lite/runtime/LICENSE.wintun.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+Prebuilt Binaries License
+-------------------------
+
+1. DEFINITIONS. "Software" means the precise contents of the "wintun.dll"
+   files that are included in the .zip file that contains this document as
+   downloaded from wintun.net/builds.
+
+2. LICENSE GRANT. WireGuard LLC grants to you a non-exclusive and
+   non-transferable right to use Software for lawful purposes under certain
+   obligations and limited rights as set forth in this agreement.
+
+3. RESTRICTIONS. Software is owned and copyrighted by WireGuard LLC. It is
+   licensed, not sold. Title to Software and all associated intellectual
+   property rights are retained by WireGuard. You must not:
+   a. reverse engineer, decompile, disassemble, extract from, or otherwise
+      modify the Software;
+   b. modify or create derivative work based upon Software in whole or in
+      parts, except insofar as only the API interfaces of the "wintun.h" file
+      distributed alongside the Software (the "Permitted API") are used;
+   c. remove any proprietary notices, labels, or copyrights from the Software;
+   d. resell, redistribute, lease, rent, transfer, sublicense, or otherwise
+      transfer rights of the Software without the prior written consent of
+      WireGuard LLC, except insofar as the Software is distributed alongside
+      other software that uses the Software only via the Permitted API;
+   e. use the name of WireGuard LLC, the WireGuard project, the Wintun
+      project, or the names of its contributors to endorse or promote products
+      derived from the Software without specific prior written consent.
+
+4. LIMITED WARRANTY. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT WARRANTY OF
+   ANY KIND. WIREGUARD LLC HEREBY EXCLUDES AND DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED OR
+   STATUTORY WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS
+   FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUALITY, NON-INFRINGEMENT, TITLE, RESULTS,
+   EFFORTS, OR QUIET ENJOYMENT. THERE IS NO WARRANTY THAT THE PRODUCT WILL BE
+   ERROR-FREE OR WILL FUNCTION WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. YOU ASSUME THE ENTIRE
+   RISK FOR THE RESULTS OBTAINED USING THE PRODUCT. TO THE EXTENT THAT
+   WIREGUARD LLC MAY NOT DISCLAIM ANY WARRANTY AS A MATTER OF APPLICABLE LAW,
+   THE SCOPE AND DURATION OF SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE MINIMUM PERMITTED UNDER
+   SUCH LAW. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND
+   WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR
+   A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NON-INFRINGEMENT ARE DISCLAIMED, EXCEPT TO THE
+   EXTENT THAT THESE DISCLAIMERS ARE HELD TO BE LEGALLY INVALID.
+
+5. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. To the extent not prohibited by law, in no event
+   WireGuard LLC or any third-party-developer will be liable for any lost
+   revenue, profit or data or for special, indirect, consequential, incidental
+   or punitive damages, however caused regardless of the theory of liability,
+   arising out of or related to the use of or inability to use Software, even
+   if WireGuard LLC has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
+   Solely you are responsible for determining the appropriateness of using
+   Software and accept full responsibility for all risks associated with its
+   exercise of rights under this agreement, including but not limited to the
+   risks and costs of program errors, compliance with applicable laws, damage
+   to or loss of data, programs or equipment, and unavailability or
+   interruption of operations. The foregoing limitations will apply even if
+   the above stated warranty fails of its essential purpose. You acknowledge,
+   that it is in the nature of software that software is complex and not
+   completely free of errors. In no event shall WireGuard LLC or any
+   third-party-developer be liable to you under any theory for any damages
+   suffered by you or any user of Software or for any special, incidental,
+   indirect, consequential or similar damages (including without limitation
+   damages for loss of business profits, business interruption, loss of
+   business information or any other pecuniary loss) arising out of the use or
+   inability to use Software, even if WireGuard LLC has been advised of the
+   possibility of such damages and regardless of the legal or quitable theory
+   (contract, tort, or otherwise) upon which the claim is based.
+
+6. TERMINATION. This agreement is affected until terminated. You may
+   terminate this agreement at any time. This agreement will terminate
+   immediately without notice from WireGuard LLC if you fail to comply with
+   the terms and conditions of this agreement. Upon termination, you must
+   delete Software and all copies of Software and cease all forms of
+   distribution of Software.
+
+7. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this agreement is held to be
+   unenforceable, this agreement will remain in effect with the provision
+   omitted, unless omission would frustrate the intent of the parties, in
+   which case this agreement will immediately terminate.
+
+8. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS. All rights not expressly granted in this agreement
+   are reserved by WireGuard LLC. For example, WireGuard LLC reserves the
+   right at any time to cease development of Software, to alter distribution
+   details, features, specifications, capabilities, functions, licensing
+   terms, release dates, APIs, ABIs, general availability, or other
+   characteristics of the Software.

lite/runtime/README.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+RRPP Lite TUN 目录验证运行时
+
+- tun2socks.exe: xjasonlyu/tun2socks v2.7.0, Windows amd64
+  SHA-256: 076b3c3d6a372ba3ef49f2b415a4105f70c30a3ed3caaed7979390e649892559
+- wintun.dll: WireGuard Wintun 0.14.1, amd64
+  SHA-256: e5da8447dc2c320edc0fc52fa01885c103de8c118481f683643cacc3220dafce
+
+来源：
+https://github.com/xjasonlyu/tun2socks/releases/tag/v2.7.0
+https://www.wintun.net/
+
+许可证文件见 LICENSE.tun2socks.txt 和 LICENSE.wintun.txt。

lite/test/check_node_menu.py

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
-"""离屏验证节点菜单：IPv6-only 节点的标注与置灰（真实 PyQt5，不出窗口）。
-
-需要 Windows venv 的真实 PyQt5：
-  ..\\.venv\\Scripts\\python.exe test\\check_node_menu.py
-读取 test/nodes.json 作为节点数据，只构建菜单不进事件循环。
-"""
-import os, sys
-os.environ["QT_QPA_PLATFORM"] = "offscreen"
-from pathlib import Path
-
-LITE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
-# 脚本所在目录（test/）会被解释器自动放到 sys.path 首位，那里有 PyQt5 桩，
-# 会顶掉真实 PyQt5 —— 必须移除，改用本程序自己的 venv
-sys.path = [str(LITE)] + [p for p in sys.path if Path(p).resolve() != Path(__file__).resolve().parent]
-
-sys.stdout.reconfigure(encoding="utf-8")
-
-import proxy_lite as pp
-from PyQt5.QtWidgets import QApplication
-
-# 构造窗口时不写用户数据目录（避免污染），构造后再指向真实 nodes.json
-pp._user_init_local = lambda: None
-
-app = QApplication(sys.argv)
-w = pp.MainWindow()
-w.timer.stop()                      # 停掉状态轮询，纯静态检查
-
-pp._USER_DIR = LITE / "test"        # 真实 nodes.json 所在目录
-nodes = pp._reload_nodes()
-print(f"本机有全局 IPv6: {pp._local_has_ipv6()}")
-print(f"节点数: {len(nodes)}")
-
-menu = w._build_node_menu(nodes)
-print("\n菜单项（enabled / 文案 / tooltip）:")
-for act in menu.actions():
-    print(f"  {str(act.isEnabled()):5} | {act.text()}")
-    if act.toolTip():
-        print(f"        └ {act.toolTip()}")
-
-# 点击被禁用的项不应切换节点
-before = pp._selected_index()
-for act in menu.actions():
-    if not act.isEnabled():
-        act.trigger()
-print(f"\n点击禁用项后节点下标: {before} -> {pp._selected_index()} (应不变)")
-
-# ── 上次选中的节点已不可用：启动时自动回退到第一个可达节点 ──────────
-print("\n启动校验（_verify_selected_node）:")
-bad = [i for i, n in enumerate(nodes) if not pp._node_reachable(n)]
-if not bad:
-    print("  本机所有节点均可达，无法验证回退（本机有 IPv6？）")
-else:
-    import json
-    _bak = (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").read_bytes() if (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").is_file() else None
-    bad_idx = bad[0]
-    pp._SELECTED_NODE = bad_idx           # 模拟上次选了不可用节点
-    switched = pp._verify_selected_node()
-    expect = pp._first_reachable_index(nodes)
-    ok = switched and pp._selected_index() == expect
-    print(f"  上次选中 {nodes[bad_idx].get('domain')}(下标 {bad_idx}) 不可用 -> "
-          f"回退到下标 {pp._selected_index()} ({nodes[pp._selected_index()].get('domain')}) "
-          f"{'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-    saved = json.loads((pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").read_text("utf-8")).get("current_node") if (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").is_file() else ""
-    ok2 = saved == str(nodes[expect].get("domain") or "")
-    print(f"  回退结果已写入设置 current_node={saved!r} {'PASS' if ok2 else 'FAIL'}")
-    # 再校验一次：已经是可达节点，不应再切换
-    ok3 = pp._verify_selected_node() is False
-    print(f"  再次校验不重复切换 {'PASS' if ok3 else 'FAIL'}")
-    if _bak is None:
-        (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").unlink(missing_ok=True)
-    else:
-        (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").write_bytes(_bak)
-
-# ── 服务端调整节点顺序：按域名重匹配而不是死守下标 ──────────────────
-print("\n服务端调序（_rematch_saved_domain）:")
-if len(nodes) < 2:
-    print("  节点不足 2 个，跳过")
-else:
-    import json
-    dom_old = nodes[0].get("domain")
-    ordered = [nodes[1], nodes[0]] + nodes[2:]     # 模拟服务端交换了前两个节点
-    pp._NODES = ordered
-    # 设置里记录的是原下标 0 的域名，重匹配后下标应跟随域名（新列表里是 1）
-    pp._settings_save({**pp._settings_load(), "current_node": dom_old})
-    switched = pp._rematch_saved_domain()
-    ok = switched and ordered[pp._selected_index()].get("domain") == dom_old
-    print(f"  current_node={dom_old} 调序后跟随域名 -> 下标 {pp._selected_index()} "
-          f"{'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-    # 已是正确域名时再跑一次：不应重复切换
-    ok2 = pp._rematch_saved_domain() is False
-    print(f"  再次重匹配不重复切换 {'PASS' if ok2 else 'FAIL'}")
-    # 域名已不在列表（节点被移除）：不切换，保持现状
-    pp._settings_save({**pp._settings_load(), "current_node": "gone.example.com"})
-    ok3 = pp._rematch_saved_domain() is False
-    print(f"  节点被移除时不动 {'PASS' if ok3 else 'FAIL'}")
-    pp._NODES = None   # 还原缓存，后续用例重读文件
-    # 还原 settings.json，避免测试污染
-    if _bak is None:
-        (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").unlink(missing_ok=True)
-    else:
-        (pp._USER_DIR / "settings.json").write_bytes(_bak)
-
-print("OK")

lite/test/test_pac_routing.py

@@ -1,738 +0,0 @@
-# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
-"""PAC（智能分流）模式路由决策测试。
-
-核心问题：PAC 模式下，目标域名解析为国外 IP 时，是否强制走隧道代理？
-
-判定链（proxy_lite._decide_direct）：
-  0. 代理白名单命中 -> 强制直连（最优先，PAC/固定模式均生效）
-  1. pac_domains.json 域名表命中 -> 强制隧道（优先于 IP 判定）
-  2. 内网 IP 且勾选 bypass_lan -> 直连
-  3. 智能分流：中国 IP -> 直连；其余（国外 IP）-> 走隧道
-
-直接 import proxy_lite 调用真实决策函数，数据用真实的 pac_ip_cn.json /
-pac_domains.json；PyQt5 用桩替代（决策逻辑不依赖 Qt）。
-"""
-
-import sys
-import threading
-from pathlib import Path
-
-TEST_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
-LITE_DIR = TEST_DIR.parent
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(TEST_DIR))  # 假 PyQt5 桩
-sys.path.insert(0, str(LITE_DIR))
-
-import json
-import socket
-import proxy_lite as pp
-from proxy_lite import _decide_direct, _is_china_ip, _is_force_proxy, _is_private_ip, _is_whitelisted
-
-# PAC 数据已不再随项目保留：从 CDN 拉取到临时用户目录（真实数据端到端）
-import tempfile
-pp._USER_DIR = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp()) / "RRPP"
-pp._user_init_remote(base_url="https://cdn.rrrosmontis.icu/RRPP/PAC/")
-
-pp._load_cn_ranges()
-pp._load_force_proxy_suffixes()
-if not pp._CN_RANGES:
-    print("警告: 未能获取 pac_ip_cn.json（CDN 不可达？），中国 IP 判定将失效")
-print(f"中国IP段: {len(pp._CN_RANGES or [])} 段, 强制域名表: {len(pp._FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES or [])} 条\n")
-
-
-def resolved_ips(host):
-    try:
-        return sorted({a[4][0] for a in socket.getaddrinfo(host, 443, socket.AF_INET)})
-    except Exception:
-        return []
-
-
-def mark(ip):
-    if _is_private_ip(ip):
-        return "内网"
-    if _is_china_ip(ip):
-        return "中国IP"
-    return "国外IP"
-
-
-PATH = {True: "直连", False: "隧道"}
-MODES = [
-    ("PAC+bypass_lan", dict(bypass_lan=True, smart=True)),   # 默认勾选状态
-    ("PAC无bypass_lan", dict(bypass_lan=False, smart=True)),
-    ("固定代理模式",    dict(bypass_lan=False, smart=False)),  # 全部走隧道
-]
-
-# (名称, host, 期望 PAC+bypass_lan 决策: True=直连 / False=隧道)
-cases = [
-    ("境外域名 google.com",       "google.com",          False),
-    ("境外域名 github.com",       "github.com",          False),
-    ("境外域名 youtube.com",      "youtube.com",         False),
-    ("域名表强制 claude.ai",      "claude.ai",           False),
-    ("域名表强制 *.google 后缀",  "antigravity.google",  False),
-    ("国内域名 www.baidu.com",    "www.baidu.com",       True),
-    ("国内域名 www.qq.com",       "www.qq.com",          True),
-    ("内网 localhost",            "localhost",           True),
-    ("内网 IP 192.168.1.1",       "192.168.1.1",         True),
-    ("境外 IP 8.8.8.8",           "8.8.8.8",             False),
-    ("国内 IP 114.114.114.114",   "114.114.114.114",     True),
-]
-
-failed = 0
-for name, host, expect in cases:
-    ips = resolved_ips(host)
-    force = _is_force_proxy(host)
-    marks = f"[{','.join(mark(ip) for ip in ips)}]" if ips else "[解析失败]"
-    row = f"{name:<22} {host:<18} {str(ips) if ips else '无IP':<45} {marks}"
-    results = []
-    for mode_name, kw in MODES:
-        got = _decide_direct(host, **kw)
-        results.append(f"{mode_name}={PATH[got]}")
-    pac = _decide_direct(host, **MODES[0][1])
-    ok = pac == expect
-    failed += 0 if ok else 1
-    print(f"{row}\n    {'域名表命中' if force else '域名表未命中':<10} | {'  '.join(results)} | 期望 {PATH[expect]} -> {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-
-print(f"\n{'='*70}")
-print(f"结论: {'全部 PASS' if not failed else f'{failed} 个 FAIL'}")
-print("=" * 70)
-print("PAC 模式(智能分流)下: 域名解析结果全部为国外 IP -> 走隧道代理 ✓"
-      if not failed else "存在 FAIL，请检查上方明细")
-
-# ── 附加测试：不在域名表的被墙境外站 ─────────────────────
-# 这类站点不能靠域名表兜底，必须仅凭「解析结果为国外 IP」强制走隧道，
-# 否则会尝试直连 -> 被墙。
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("附加: 不在 pac_domains.json 的被墙境外站（只能靠 IP 判定走隧道）")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-extra_candidates = [
-    "dailymotion.com", "vimeo.com", "notion.so", "linear.app",
-    "quora.com", "feedly.com", "dropbox.com", "tumblr.com",
-    "flickr.com", "pastebin.com", "fandom.com", "archive.org",
-    "godaddy.com", "imgur.com", "kickstarter.com", "shopify.com",
-]
-
-extra_failed = 0
-skipped = 0
-for host in extra_candidates:
-    if _is_force_proxy(host):
-        print(f"{host:<20} 已在域名表中，跳过")
-        skipped += 1
-        continue
-    ips = resolved_ips(host)
-    if not ips:
-        print(f"{host:<20} 解析失败，跳过")
-        skipped += 1
-        continue
-    foreign = all(not _is_private_ip(ip) and not _is_china_ip(ip) for ip in ips)
-    if not foreign:
-        print(f"{host:<20} 解析到非国外 IP {ips}，跳过（不是有效的境外用例）")
-        skipped += 1
-        continue
-    got = _decide_direct(host, bypass_lan=True, smart=True)  # PAC 模式
-    if got is not False:
-        # 决策函数内部会重新解析域名，CDN 轮询 DNS 可能与其上方展示的解析结果
-        # 不一致：清缓存重试一次，仍不一致则按 DNS 不稳定跳过（非代码问题）
-        _is_china_ip.cache_clear()
-        _is_private_ip.cache_clear()
-        ips = resolved_ips(host)
-        got = _decide_direct(host, bypass_lan=True, smart=True)
-        if got is not False:
-            print(f"{host:<20} 解析/判定随 DNS 轮询不一致 {ips}，跳过（非代码问题）")
-            skipped += 1
-            continue
-        print(f"{host:<20} 重试后走隧道（DNS 瞬时差异） PASS")
-        continue
-    extra_failed += 0
-    print(f"{host:<20} {str(ips):<50} [{'，'.join(mark(ip) for ip in ips)}] -> "
-          f"{PATH[got]} (期望隧道) PASS")
-
-print(f"\n附加测试: {len(extra_candidates)} 个候选, 有效用例 {len(extra_candidates) - skipped} 个, "
-      f"{'全部 PASS' if not extra_failed else f'{extra_failed} 个 FAIL'}")
-if extra_failed:
-    failed += extra_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── 代理白名单测试（用户可配置：命中即直连，最优先，含 IPv4/IPv6/CIDR） ─────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("代理白名单: 命中规则强制直连（优先于域名表/固定代理，支持 IPv4/IPv6/CIDR）")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-wl_cases = [
-    # (规则, 测试host, 期望命中)
-    ("example.com",         "example.com",          True),
-    ("example.com",         "www.example.com",      True),
-    ("example.com",         "sub.www.example.com",  True),
-    ("example.com",         "example.org",          False),
-    ("claude.ai",           "claude.ai",            True),   # 域名表强制隧道，白名单优先
-    ("localhost",           "localhost",            True),
-    ("8.8.8.8",             "8.8.8.8",              True),   # IPv4 字面量
-    ("8.8.8.8",             "8.8.4.4",              False),
-    ("10.0.0.0/8",          "10.1.2.3",             True),   # IPv4 CIDR
-    ("192.0.2.0/24",        "192.0.2.55",           True),   # IPv4 CIDR
-    ("2001:db8::/32",       "2001:db8::1",          True),   # IPv6 网段
-    ("fe80::1",             "fe80::1",              True),   # IPv6 单地址
-]
-
-# 注入白名单规则（绕过 settings.json 直接改内存缓存；版本 +1 使匹配缓存失效），
-# 另加一条"禁用"的规则验证不参与匹配
-pp._WHITELIST = [{"value": "203.0.113.0/24", "enabled": False}] + \
-                [{"value": r, "enabled": True} for r, _, _ in wl_cases]
-wl_ver = pp._WHITELIST_VERSION + 1
-pp._WHITELIST_VERSION = wl_ver
-
-wl_failed = 0
-for rule, host, expect in wl_cases:
-    got = _is_whitelisted(host, wl_ver)
-    ok = got == expect
-    wl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-    print(f"规则 {rule:<16} host {host:<22} 命中={got} 期望={expect} -> {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-got = _is_whitelisted("203.0.113.9", wl_ver)  # 禁用的规则不应命中
-print(f"禁用规则 203.0.113.0/24 host 203.0.113.9 -> 命中={got} 期望=False -> {'PASS' if not got else 'FAIL'}")
-wl_failed += 0 if not got else 1
-
-# 白名单在三种模式下都强制直连（固定代理模式原本全部走隧道）
-print("\n白名单在三种模式下的决策（命中白名单应为直连）:")
-for mode_name, kw in MODES:
-    got = _decide_direct("www.example.com", **kw)
-    ok = got is True
-    wl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-    print(f"  {mode_name:<16} www.example.com -> {PATH[got]} (期望 直连) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-# 白名单优先于域名表：claude.ai 在 pac_domains.json 中强制隧道，白名单命中应直连
-got = _decide_direct("claude.ai", bypass_lan=True, smart=True)
-ok = got is True
-wl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-print(f"  {'域名表冲突':<14} claude.ai -> {PATH[got]} (期望 直连，白名单优先) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-# 未命中白名单的境外域名仍走隧道（白名单不影响其他路由）
-got = _decide_direct("google.com", bypass_lan=True, smart=True)
-ok = got is False
-wl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-print(f"  {'未命中白名单':<14} google.com -> {PATH[got]} (期望 隧道) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-
-# 恢复空白名单，避免影响后续用例
-pp._WHITELIST = None
-pp._WHITELIST_VERSION += 1
-if wl_failed:
-    failed += wl_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── IPv6-only 节点标注 ─────────────────────────────────────
-# IPv6 专用节点只提供 AAAA 记录，本机没有 IPv6 出口时连不上：
-# 客户端据此在节点菜单标注并置灰。判定三级：ipv6_only 字段 →
-# remark 里的 "(IPv6)"（服务端 rrpp_client 现网唯一的线索）→ 域名解析兜底。
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("IPv6 专用节点：识别（三级判定）与可达性")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-ipv6_failed = 0
-has_v6 = pp._local_has_ipv6()
-print(f"本机是否有全局 IPv6 地址: {has_v6}")
-
-# 用真实 nodes.json（test 目录）；没有则跳过
-_nodes_file = TEST_DIR / "nodes.json"
-real_nodes = json.loads(_nodes_file.read_text("utf-8")) if _nodes_file.is_file() else []
-if real_nodes:
-    pp._IPV6_OK.clear()   # 清缓存，做真实探测
-    for n in real_nodes:
-        c = n.get("country") or "?"
-        io = pp._node_ipv6_only(n)
-        reach = pp._node_reachable(n)
-        mark = "[IPv6]" if reach else "[不可用：本机无 IPv6]"
-        print(f"  [{c}] {n.get('domain'):<24} ipv6_only={str(io):<6} "
-              f"可达={str(reach):<6} 菜单文案: {n.get('domain')} ({c})"
-              + (f"　{mark}" if io else ""))
-        # ipv6_only 节点在本机无 IPv6 时必须判定为不可达，否则必须可达
-        if io:
-            expect = has_v6 or reach  # 本机有 IPv6 -> 应可达；无 IPv6 -> 不应可达
-            ok = reach == expect
-            ipv6_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-            print(f"        IPv6 专用节点可达性: {reach} (期望 {expect}) "
-                  f"{'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-        else:
-            ok = reach is True
-            ipv6_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-            print(f"        普通节点恒可达: {reach} {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-    # 缓存生效：再次判定不发新探测（结果一致）
-    cached = list(pp._IPV6_OK.items())
-    if cached:
-        print(f"  可达性缓存: {cached}")
-
-# 三级判定：字段 → remark 里的 "(IPv6)" 标记 → 域名解析兜底。
-# 服务端 subscription?method=rrpp_client 只吐旧扁平格式，ipv6_only 字段被丢掉，
-# 只在 remark 里留 "(IPv6)"（后端 countries_to_rrpp_client），故第 2 级是现网主路径。
-synthetic = [
-    ({"domain": "example.com"}, False, "无标记（example.com 有 A 记录）"),
-    ({"domain": "example.com", "ipv6_only": False}, False, "ipv6_only=false"),
-    ({"domain": "example.com", "ipv6_only": True}, True, "ipv6_only=true"),
-    ({"domain": "example.com", "remark": "GlobalVM 350G (IPv6)"}, True, "remark 含 (IPv6)"),
-    ({"domain": "example.com", "remark": "Azure 15G"}, False, "remark 无 IPv6 标记"),
-    ({"domain": "example.com", "remark": "IPv6 专用机"}, True, "remark 含 IPv6（无括号）"),
-    ({"domain": "example.com", "remark": "some_ipv6_thing"}, True, "remark 小写 ipv6"),
-]
-for node, expect, desc in synthetic:
-    got = pp._node_ipv6_only(node)
-    ok = got == expect
-    ipv6_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-    print(f"  {desc:<24} _node_ipv6_only={got} (期望 {expect}) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-pp._IPV6_OK.clear()   # 合成用例可能污染缓存
-
-if ipv6_failed:
-    failed += ipv6_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── CONNECT authority 解析：IPv6 字面量带方括号 ──────────────────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("CONNECT authority 解析（IPv6 字面量剥方括号）")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-conn_cases = [
-    ("CONNECT [::1]:443 HTTP/1.1",           ("::1", 443)),
-    ("CONNECT example.com:443 HTTP/1.1",     ("example.com", 443)),
-    ("CONNECT iam.aeolianchi.me:443 HTTP/1.1", ("iam.aeolianchi.me", 443)),
-    ("CONNECT [::1] HTTP/1.1",               None),   # 无端口
-    ("CONNECT example.com HTTP/1.1",         None),   # 无端口
-    ("CONNECT [fe80::1%25eth0]:8443 HTTP/1.1", ("fe80::1%25eth0", 8443)),
-    ("CONNECT 127.0.0.1:1080 HTTP/1.1",      ("127.0.0.1", 1080)),
-]
-conn_failed = 0
-for line, expect in conn_cases:
-    got = pp._parse_connect_authority(line)
-    ok = got == expect
-    conn_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-    print(f"  {line:<45} -> {got} (期望 {expect}) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-if conn_failed:
-    failed += conn_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── 上游代理认证注入：按完整头名精确匹配 ────────────────────────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("认证注入：仅精确的 authorization 头名阻止注入")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-def _auth_lines(data: bytes):
-    head = data.split(b"\r\n\r\n", 1)[0]
-    return [l for l in head.split(b"\r\n")[1:] if l.lower().startswith(b"authorization:")]
-
-auth_cases = [
-    # (描述, 请求, 期望)：数字=注入后 authorization 行数；"unchanged"=原样跳过
-    ("无任何认证头",      b"CONNECT iam.aeolianchi.me:443 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: iam.aeolianchi.me\r\n\r\n", 1),
-    ("Proxy-Authorization", b"CONNECT iam.aeolianchi.me:443 HTTP/1.1\r\nProxy-Authorization: Basic xyz\r\n\r\n", 1),
-    ("已有 Authorization", b"GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1\r\nAuthorization: Bearer tok\r\n\r\n", "unchanged"),
-    ("小写 authorization", b"GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1\r\nauthorization: basic abc\r\n\r\n", "unchanged"),
-    ("X-Authorization 前缀", b"CONNECT iam.aeolianchi.me:443 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-Authorization-Go: 1\r\n\r\n", 1),
-    ("无头空块",          b"GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n", 1),
-]
-auth_failed = 0
-for desc, req, expect in auth_cases:
-    out = pp._inject_proxy_auth(req)
-    if expect == "unchanged":
-        ok = out == req
-        print(f"  {desc:<22} 原样跳过 {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-    else:
-        lines = _auth_lines(out)
-        ok = len(lines) == expect and out.split(b"\r\n", 2)[1] == lines[0]
-        # 注入位置必须紧跟请求行（上游取首个 Authorization 时读到我们的认证）
-        print(f"  {desc:<22} authorization 行数={len(lines)} (期望 {expect}) "
-              f"{'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-    auth_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-if auth_failed:
-    failed += auth_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── 本程序 PAC 地址判定（启动清理只认自己的残留） ────────────────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("PAC 地址归属判定（_is_our_pac_url）")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-pac_cases = [
-    ("http://127.0.0.1:39453/proxy.pac", True),     # 本程序 PAC 服务
-    ("http://127.0.0.1:7897/pac?auth=xyz", False),  # 其他代理软件（如 Clash）
-    ("http://127.0.0.1:1080/other.pac", False),     # 路径不符
-    ("http://192.168.1.1:8080/proxy.pac", False),   # 非本机
-    ("", False),
-]
-pac_failed = 0
-for url, expect in pac_cases:
-    got = pp._is_our_pac_url(url)
-    ok = got == expect
-    pac_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-    print(f"  {url:<42} 命中={got} (期望 {expect}) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-if pac_failed:
-    failed += pac_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── 强制代理规则格式：后缀 / full / regexp + 关键域名兜底 ───────────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("强制代理规则格式（后缀 / full / regexp / 关键域名兜底）")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-rule_failed = 0
-rule_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp()) / "RRPP"
-rule_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
-(rule_dir / "pac_domains.json").write_text(json.dumps({"domains": [
-    "suffix.example", "full:only.example", "regexp:^edge-[0-9]+\\.example$",
-]}), "utf-8")
-
-# 此段隔离真实 CDN 表，确保三种语义分别受测。
-old_user_dir = pp._USER_DIR
-old_suffixes = pp._FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES
-old_exact = pp._FORCE_PROXY_EXACT
-old_regexes = pp._FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES
-old_loaded = pp._FORCE_PROXY_LOADED
-pp._USER_DIR = rule_dir
-pp._FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES = None
-pp._FORCE_PROXY_EXACT = None
-pp._FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES = None
-pp._FORCE_PROXY_LOADED = False
-pp._is_force_proxy.cache_clear()
-pp._load_force_proxy_suffixes()
-
-rule_cases = [
-    ("普通后缀匹配子域", "cdn.suffix.example", True),
-    ("full 精确匹配", "only.example", True),
-    ("full 不匹配子域", "cdn.only.example", False),
-    ("regexp 匹配", "edge-42.example", True),
-    ("regexp 不匹配", "edge-x.example", False),
-    ("关键 Google CDN 兜底", "assets.googlecdn.com", True),
-    ("无关域名", "unmatched.example", False),
-]
-for desc, host, expect in rule_cases:
-    got = pp._is_force_proxy(host)
-    ok = got == expect
-    rule_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-    print(f"  {desc:<22} {host:<30} 命中={got} (期望 {expect}) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-
-pp._USER_DIR = old_user_dir
-pp._FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES = old_suffixes
-pp._FORCE_PROXY_EXACT = old_exact
-pp._FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES = old_regexes
-pp._FORCE_PROXY_LOADED = old_loaded
-pp._is_force_proxy.cache_clear()
-if rule_failed:
-    failed += rule_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── 明确直连域名：优先级 / Trie / 固定代理隔离 ───────────────────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("明确直连域名（后缀 / full / regexp / 强制代理优先 / 固定代理隔离）")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-direct_failed = 0
-direct_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp()) / "RRPP"
-direct_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
-(direct_dir / "pac_direct_domains.json").write_text(json.dumps({"domains": [
-    "direct.example", "full:only-direct.example", "regexp:^edge-direct-[0-9]+\\.example$",
-    "claude.ai",
-]}), "utf-8")
-old_user_dir = pp._USER_DIR
-old_direct_trie = pp._DIRECT_SUFFIX_TRIE
-old_direct_exact = pp._DIRECT_EXACT
-old_direct_regexes = pp._DIRECT_REGEXES
-old_direct_loaded = pp._DIRECT_LOADED
-old_data_path = pp._data_path
-try:
-    pp._USER_DIR = direct_dir
-    pp._data_path = lambda name: None  # 隔离仓库内置种子，覆盖到临时用户数据。
-    pp._DIRECT_SUFFIX_TRIE = None
-    pp._DIRECT_EXACT = None
-    pp._DIRECT_REGEXES = None
-    pp._DIRECT_LOADED = False
-    pp._is_direct_domain.cache_clear()
-    pp._load_direct_domains()
-    direct_cases = [
-        ("后缀匹配子域", "cdn.direct.example", True),
-        ("full 精确匹配", "only-direct.example", True),
-        ("full 不匹配子域", "cdn.only-direct.example", False),
-        ("regexp 匹配", "edge-direct-42.example", True),
-        ("regexp 不匹配", "edge-direct-x.example", False),
-    ]
-    for desc, host, expect in direct_cases:
-        got = pp._is_direct_domain(host)
-        ok = got == expect
-        direct_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-        print(f"  {desc:<22} {host:<30} 命中={got} (期望 {expect}) {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-    smart_direct = pp._decide_direct("cdn.direct.example", True, True)
-    fixed_proxy = not pp._decide_direct("cdn.direct.example", True, False)
-    force_wins = not pp._decide_direct("claude.ai", True, True)
-    direct_target = pp._direct_connect_target("cdn.direct.example", 443, True, True)
-    target_keeps_host = direct_target == ("cdn.direct.example", 443)
-    print(f"  PAC 模式命中明确直连: {smart_direct} {'PASS' if smart_direct else 'FAIL'}")
-    print(f"  固定代理模式不使用明确直连表: {fixed_proxy} {'PASS' if fixed_proxy else 'FAIL'}")
-    print(f"  强制代理优先于明确直连: {force_wins} {'PASS' if force_wins else 'FAIL'}")
-    print(f"  明确直连保持原始主机名: {target_keeps_host} {'PASS' if target_keeps_host else 'FAIL'}")
-    direct_failed += 0 if smart_direct else 1
-    direct_failed += 0 if fixed_proxy else 1
-    direct_failed += 0 if force_wins else 1
-    direct_failed += 0 if target_keeps_host else 1
-    pp._pac_write("pac_direct_domains", {"domains": ["updated-direct.example"]})
-    pp._invalidate_pac_routing_cache("pac_direct_domains")
-    direct_reloaded = (not pp._is_direct_domain("direct.example")
-                       and pp._is_direct_domain("updated-direct.example"))
-    print(f"  明确直连表热更新立即生效: {direct_reloaded} "
-          f"{'PASS' if direct_reloaded else 'FAIL'}")
-    direct_failed += 0 if direct_reloaded else 1
-finally:
-    pp._USER_DIR = old_user_dir
-    pp._data_path = old_data_path
-    pp._DIRECT_SUFFIX_TRIE = old_direct_trie
-    pp._DIRECT_EXACT = old_direct_exact
-    pp._DIRECT_REGEXES = old_direct_regexes
-    pp._DIRECT_LOADED = old_direct_loaded
-    pp._is_direct_domain.cache_clear()
-if direct_failed:
-    failed += direct_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── PAC 更新立即生效 + DNS 解析一致性 ──────────────────────────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("PAC 热更新缓存失效 + 国内直连使用同一次 DNS 解析结果")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-hot_failed = 0
-hot_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp()) / "RRPP"
-hot_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
-old_user_dir = pp._USER_DIR
-old_cn_ranges = pp._CN_RANGES
-old_cn_ranges_v6 = pp._CN_RANGES_V6
-old_cn_loaded = pp._CN_RANGES_LOADED
-old_suffixes = pp._FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES
-old_exact = pp._FORCE_PROXY_EXACT
-old_regexes = pp._FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES
-old_force_loaded = pp._FORCE_PROXY_LOADED
-old_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo
-try:
-    pp._USER_DIR = hot_dir
-    pp._CN_RANGES = None
-    pp._CN_RANGES_V6 = None
-    pp._CN_RANGES_LOADED = False
-    pp._FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES = None
-    pp._FORCE_PROXY_EXACT = None
-    pp._FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES = None
-    pp._FORCE_PROXY_LOADED = False
-    pp._is_china_ip.cache_clear()
-    pp._is_force_proxy.cache_clear()
-
-    pp._pac_write("pac_domains", {"domains": ["old-rule.example"]})
-    pp._pac_write("pac_ip_cn", {"cidrs": ["114.114.114.0/24"]})
-    pp._load_force_proxy_suffixes()
-    pp._load_cn_ranges()
-    before = pp._is_force_proxy("old-rule.example")
-    pp._pac_write("pac_domains", {"domains": ["new-rule.example"]})
-    pp._invalidate_pac_routing_cache("pac_domains")
-    domains_reloaded = (not pp._is_force_proxy("old-rule.example")
-                        and pp._is_force_proxy("new-rule.example"))
-    print(f"  域名表热更新立即生效: 初始={before}, 更新后={domains_reloaded} "
-          f"{'PASS' if before and domains_reloaded else 'FAIL'}")
-    hot_failed += 0 if before and domains_reloaded else 1
-
-    initial_cn = pp._is_china_ip("114.114.114.114")
-    pp._pac_write("pac_ip_cn", {"cidrs": ["8.8.8.0/24"]})
-    pp._invalidate_pac_routing_cache("pac_ip_cn")
-    ip_reloaded = (not pp._is_china_ip("114.114.114.114")
-                   and pp._is_china_ip("8.8.8.8"))
-    print(f"  IP 段热更新立即生效: 初始={initial_cn}, 更新后={ip_reloaded} "
-          f"{'PASS' if initial_cn and ip_reloaded else 'FAIL'}")
-    hot_failed += 0 if initial_cn and ip_reloaded else 1
-
-    # 固定本次 DNS 返回值；_direct_connect_target 必须只解析一次并直连该 IP。
-    pp._pac_write("pac_ip_cn", {"cidrs": ["114.114.114.0/24"]})
-    pp._invalidate_pac_routing_cache("pac_ip_cn")
-    dns_calls = []
-    def fake_getaddrinfo(host, *args, **kwargs):
-        dns_calls.append(host)
-        if host == "mixed.example":
-            ips = ["114.114.114.114", "8.8.8.8"]
-        else:
-            ips = ["114.114.114.114"]
-        return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", (ip, 0)) for ip in ips]
-    socket.getaddrinfo = fake_getaddrinfo
-    target = pp._direct_connect_target("cn-cdn.example", 443, False, True)
-    stable_dns = target == ("114.114.114.114", 443) and dns_calls == ["cn-cdn.example"]
-    mixed = pp._direct_connect_target("mixed.example", 443, False, True)
-    mixed_safe = mixed is None
-    print(f"  国内 CDN 固定解析 IP 且不二次解析: {stable_dns} {'PASS' if stable_dns else 'FAIL'}")
-    print(f"  混合中国/境外 CDN 记录改走隧道: {mixed_safe} {'PASS' if mixed_safe else 'FAIL'}")
-    hot_failed += 0 if stable_dns else 1
-    hot_failed += 0 if mixed_safe else 1
-
-    # IPv6 中国 CIDR 与 IPv6 私网/回环分流。240e::/16 是测试用的公网 IPv6 段。
-    pp._pac_write("pac_ip_cn", {"cidrs": ["240e::/16"]})
-    pp._invalidate_pac_routing_cache("pac_ip_cn")
-    ipv6_cn = (pp._is_china_ip("240e:1234::1")
-               and pp._direct_connect_target("240e:1234::1", 443, False, True)
-                   == ("240e:1234::1", 443))
-    ipv6_private = all(pp._is_private_ip(ip) for ip in ("::1", "fc00::1", "fe80::1"))
-    ipv6_public = not pp._is_private_ip("2001:4860:4860::8888")
-    print(f"  IPv6 中国 CIDR 智能直连: {ipv6_cn} {'PASS' if ipv6_cn else 'FAIL'}")
-    print(f"  IPv6 回环/ULA/链路本地直连: {ipv6_private and ipv6_public} "
-          f"{'PASS' if ipv6_private and ipv6_public else 'FAIL'}")
-    hot_failed += 0 if ipv6_cn else 1
-    hot_failed += 0 if ipv6_private and ipv6_public else 1
-finally:
-    socket.getaddrinfo = old_getaddrinfo
-    pp._USER_DIR = old_user_dir
-    pp._CN_RANGES = old_cn_ranges
-    pp._CN_RANGES_V6 = old_cn_ranges_v6
-    pp._CN_RANGES_LOADED = old_cn_loaded
-    pp._FORCE_PROXY_SUFFIXES = old_suffixes
-    pp._FORCE_PROXY_EXACT = old_exact
-    pp._FORCE_PROXY_REGEXES = old_regexes
-    pp._FORCE_PROXY_LOADED = old_force_loaded
-    pp._is_china_ip.cache_clear()
-    pp._is_force_proxy.cache_clear()
-if hot_failed:
-    failed += hot_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── 智能国内直连失败回退上游隧道 ───────────────────────────────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("智能国内直连失败：仅该路径回退一次上游隧道")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-fallback_failed = 0
-direct = ("114.114.114.114", 443)
-upstream = ("node.example", 1205)
-calls = []
-remote_obj = object()
-def fake_connect(target, timeout):
-    calls.append((target, timeout))
-    if target == direct:
-        raise OSError("mock direct connect failure")
-    if target == upstream:
-        return remote_obj
-    raise AssertionError(f"unexpected target: {target}")
-
-remote, via_tunnel = pp._connect_route(
-    direct, True, upstream[0], upstream[1], None, False, fake_connect)
-fallback_ok = (remote is remote_obj and via_tunnel is True
-               and calls == [(direct, 10), (upstream, 10)])
-calls.clear()
-try:
-    pp._connect_route(direct, False, upstream[0], upstream[1], None, False, fake_connect)
-    explicit_not_fallback = False
-except OSError:
-    explicit_not_fallback = calls == [(direct, 10)]
-print(f"  智能中国公网直连失败回退隧道: {fallback_ok} {'PASS' if fallback_ok else 'FAIL'}")
-print(f"  显式直连失败不回退: {explicit_not_fallback} "
-      f"{'PASS' if explicit_not_fallback else 'FAIL'}")
-fallback_failed += 0 if fallback_ok else 1
-fallback_failed += 0 if explicit_not_fallback else 1
-if fallback_failed:
-    failed += fallback_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── 启动连通性必须验证境外隧道 ─────────────────────────────────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("启动连通性：google.com 隧道失败必须阻止“开启成功”")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-class _FakeResponse:
-    def __enter__(self):
-        return self
-    def __exit__(self, *args):
-        return False
-    def read(self, size=-1):
-        return b""
-
-class _FakeOpener:
-    def __init__(self, fail_google=False):
-        self.fail_google = fail_google
-    def open(self, url, timeout):
-        if self.fail_google and "www.google.com" in url:
-            raise OSError("mock tunnel failure")
-        return _FakeResponse()
-
-
-class _CancellingResponse(_FakeResponse):
-    def __init__(self, cancel_event):
-        self.cancel_event = cancel_event
-    def read(self, size=-1):
-        self.cancel_event.set()
-        return b""
-
-
-class _CancellingOpener:
-    def __init__(self, cancel_event):
-        self.cancel_event = cancel_event
-        self.urls = []
-    def open(self, url, timeout):
-        self.urls.append(url)
-        return _CancellingResponse(self.cancel_event)
-
-
-class _GoogleCancellingOpener(_CancellingOpener):
-    def open(self, url, timeout):
-        self.urls.append(url)
-        if "www.google.com" in url:
-            return _CancellingResponse(self.cancel_event)
-        return _FakeResponse()
-
-verify_failed = 0
-ok_results = pp._verify_proxy_connectivity(opener=_FakeOpener())
-ok = ok_results.get("google.com") is True
-try:
-    pp._verify_proxy_connectivity(opener=_FakeOpener(fail_google=True))
-    blocked = False
-except RuntimeError:
-    blocked = True
-cancel_event = threading.Event()
-cancelling_opener = _CancellingOpener(cancel_event)
-try:
-    pp._verify_proxy_connectivity(opener=cancelling_opener, cancel_event=cancel_event)
-    cancel_blocked = False
-except pp._StartCancelled:
-    cancel_blocked = True
-google_not_started = all("www.google.com" not in url for url in cancelling_opener.urls)
-google_cancel_event = threading.Event()
-google_cancelling_opener = _GoogleCancellingOpener(google_cancel_event)
-try:
-    pp._verify_proxy_connectivity(opener=google_cancelling_opener,
-                                  cancel_event=google_cancel_event)
-    google_cancelled = False
-except pp._StartCancelled:
-    google_cancelled = True
-google_started = any("www.google.com" in url for url in google_cancelling_opener.urls)
-print(f"  境外隧道成功可通过: {ok} {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-print(f"  境外隧道失败会阻止开启: {blocked} {'PASS' if blocked else 'FAIL'}")
-print(f"  Baidu 探测中取消会中断后续 Google 探测: {cancel_blocked and google_not_started} "
-      f"{'PASS' if cancel_blocked and google_not_started else 'FAIL'}")
-print(f"  Google 探测中取消会终止本次开启: {google_cancelled and google_started} "
-      f"{'PASS' if google_cancelled and google_started else 'FAIL'}")
-verify_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-verify_failed += 0 if blocked else 1
-verify_failed += 0 if cancel_blocked and google_not_started else 1
-verify_failed += 0 if google_cancelled and google_started else 1
-if verify_failed:
-    failed += verify_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-# ── DNS 分流 TTL 缓存 ────────────────────────────────────────
-print("\n" + "=" * 70)
-print("TTL 缓存：cache_clear 兼容 + 缓存命中")
-print("=" * 70)
-
-ttl_failed = 0
-assert hasattr(pp._is_china_ip, "cache_clear"), "cache_clear 缺失"
-assert hasattr(pp._is_private_ip, "cache_clear"), "cache_clear 缺失"
-assert hasattr(pp._is_whitelisted, "cache_clear"), "cache_clear 缺失"
-pp._is_china_ip.cache_clear()
-pp._is_private_ip.cache_clear()
-pp._is_whitelisted.cache_clear()
-a1, a2 = pp._is_private_ip("10.1.2.3"), pp._is_private_ip("10.1.2.3")
-ok = a1 is True and a2 is True
-ttl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-print(f"  内网 IP 判定缓存命中: {a1}/{a2} {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-b1, b2 = pp._is_china_ip("114.114.114.114"), pp._is_china_ip("114.114.114.114")
-ok = b1 is True and b2 is True
-ttl_failed += 0 if ok else 1
-print(f"  中国 IP 判定缓存命中: {b1}/{b2} {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'}")
-pp._is_china_ip.cache_clear()
-pp._is_private_ip.cache_clear()
-print(f"  cache_clear 后重查: {pp._is_china_ip('114.114.114.114')} "
-      f"{'PASS' if pp._is_china_ip('114.114.114.114') is True else 'FAIL'}")
-if ttl_failed:
-    failed += ttl_failed
-print("=" * 70)
-
-print(f"\n最终结论: {'全部 PASS' if not failed else f'{failed} 个 FAIL'}")
-sys.exit(1 if failed else 0)

server_config/README.md

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 - [9. systemd 服务文件](#9-systemd-服务文件)
 - [10. 启动顺序与验证清单](#10-启动顺序与验证清单)
 - [11. 目录结构与文件索引](#11-目录结构与文件索引)
+- [12. RRPP 订阅后端（PAC → 规则集下发）](#12-rrpp-订阅后端pac--规则集下发)
 
 ---
 
@@ -157,6 +158,110 @@ fail2ban-client status sshd   # 确认 jail 在跑
 > - 只加 fail2ban、**不动 sshd 认证方式**（root 登录等现状保留）。
 > - 如需同时护 nginx CONNECT 的 401 爆破，可再加 nginx jail（凭据够强时可不做）。
 
+### 2.6 系统级网络优化（KVM / LXC 差异）与 qdisc 持久化
+
+> 模板：[sysctl/99-zz-rrpp-network.kvm.conf](sysctl/99-zz-rrpp-network.kvm.conf)（完整 VM，含 Azure 等）、
+> [sysctl/99-zz-rrpp-network.lxc.conf](sysctl/99-zz-rrpp-network.lxc.conf)（容器）
+> 落地位置统一为 `/etc/sysctl.d/99-zz-rrpp-network.conf`；
+> qdisc 伴侣：[systemd/rrpp-qdisc.service](systemd/rrpp-qdisc.service) + [scripts/rrpp-qdisc.sh](scripts/rrpp-qdisc.sh)。
+
+```bash
+# KVM / 完整 VM
+install -m 644 sysctl/99-zz-rrpp-network.kvm.conf /etc/sysctl.d/99-zz-rrpp-network.conf
+# LXC / OpenVZ 容器
+install -m 644 sysctl/99-zz-rrpp-network.lxc.conf /etc/sysctl.d/99-zz-rrpp-network.conf
+# qdisc 持久化（仅完整 VM 有意义；容器内网卡是 noqueue，脚本会自动跳过）
+install -m 755 scripts/rrpp-qdisc.sh /usr/local/sbin/rrpp-qdisc.sh
+install -m 644 systemd/rrpp-qdisc.service /etc/systemd/system/
+systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl enable --now rrpp-qdisc
+sysctl --system
+```
+
+**为什么文件名是 `99-zz-`**：sysctl 按文件名字典序加载、**后者覆盖前者**。`99-zz-` 保证本文件排在最后，
+避免被其它 `99-*.conf` 覆盖。
+
+**⚠ 最容易踩的坑：`/etc/sysctl.conf`**。`sysctl --system` 会在**所有 sysctl.d 之后**再加载 `/etc/sysctl.conf`。
+2026-09 实测：某节点（aq）存在 2022 年的一键优化版 `/etc/sysctl.conf`，把 `tcp_mtu_probing` 覆盖回 `0`，
+导致 sysctl.d 里的设置完全不生效（现象：`sysctl -n` 与文件内容不一致）。
+**处理**：该文件里凡是与本规范重叠的键，逐行注释掉（保留其非冲突的调优，如 conntrack、rps、swappiness），
+或直接把本规范内容追加到该文件末尾。排查方法：
+
+```bash
+sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/99-zz-rrpp-network.conf   # 显式加载后应看到期望值
+sysctl --system 2>/dev/null | grep -n tcp_mtu_probing | tail -5   # 看谁在最后覆盖
+```
+
+**KVM / 完整 VM 可写（本规范设置项）**
+
+| 项 | 值 | 作用 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `tcp_congestion_control` / `core.default_qdisc` | `bbr` / `fq` | BBR 需 fq 搭配，否则 bufferbloat |
+| `tcp_mtu_probing` | 1 | PMTUD 黑洞缓解（见 2.4） |
+| `tcp_fastopen` | 3 | 客户端+服务端 TFO，省一次 RTT |
+| `tcp_slow_start_after_idle` | 0 | 空闲后不回退慢启动（长连接代理有益） |
+| `tcp_tw_reuse` / `tcp_fin_timeout` | 2 / 15 | TIME-WAIT 复用与回收 |
+| `tcp_keepalive_time/intvl/probes` | 300 / 30 / 5 | 及时清理死连接（默认 7200 过长） |
+| `ip_local_port_range` | 10240 65000 | 出站端口范围，防高并发端口耗尽 |
+| `core.somaxconn` / `tcp_max_syn_backlog` | 32768 | accept / 半连接队列 |
+| `core.netdev_max_backlog` | 32768 | 网卡收包队列（默认 1000 易突发丢包） |
+| `core.rmem_max` / `wmem_max` | 33554432 | socket 缓冲上限（默认 208KB 偏小） |
+| `tcp_rmem` / `tcp_wmem` | 4K/128K/32M、4K/16K/32M | 自动调优范围 |
+
+**LXC / OpenVZ 容器不可用（由宿主机控制，实测 2026-09）**
+
+| 项 | 现象 |
+|---|---|
+| `core.rmem_max` / `core.wmem_max` | **不存在**或 `-r--r--r--` 只读 |
+| `core.default_qdisc` | **不存在**（`sysctl` 报 cannot stat） |
+| `core.netdev_max_backlog` | 缺失 |
+| 默认路由网卡根 qdisc | `noqueue`，**无法设置 fq** |
+| `/usr/lib/sysctl.d` 的 `kernel.pid_max`、`fs.protected_*` | `permission denied`——容器内属**正常现象**，与本文档无关 |
+
+> 结论：容器节点只能调 **netns 级**项（拥塞算法、MTU 探测、TFO、TW 复用、keepalive、
+> somaxconn、syn backlog、本地端口范围）；socket 缓冲上限与 qdisc 需服务商在**宿主机**设置。
+> 因此容器节点想进一步提升，应优先在**应用层/传输层**做（例如走 UoT 而不是直连 UDP）。
+
+**qdisc 为什么必须单独用 systemd 单元**：`net.core.default_qdisc=fq` **只对新建网卡生效**；
+已存在的网卡即使重启也可能仍是 `pfifo_fast` / `fq_codel`（实测：aq 为 `pfifo_fast`、us 为 `fq_codel`）。
+`rrpp-qdisc.service` 在开机后显式执行 `tc qdisc replace dev <默认路由网卡> root fq` 补齐；
+脚本对容器（`noqueue`）会自动跳过。
+
+**UDP 策略（2026-09-20 定稿）**：UDP 传输（Hysteria2 / TUIC）曾于当日全节点部署并端到端验证，
+但基于「**抗封优先**」的评估，**当晚已全部撤除**（详情与留档见 §6.4）。现行口径：
+
+- **节点不部署 UDP 传输服务**；UDP 需求统一走 **UoT v2**（§5.5）——数据报封装进 TCP CONNECT 隧道，
+  经 nginx magic 地址转本机 `127.0.0.1:15201` relay 解封装；
+- 抗封主路径 = **REALITY + Vision（TCP）**，不做 fallback 组（订阅仍为 `select`）；
+- 节点上的 **UDP 系统调优项保留**（无害，且对 UoT / SS-UDP 有轻微收益）。
+
+撤除理由（实测 + 推演）：非标准 UDP 端口被封对 GFW **几乎零代价**（不像封 TCP 443 会误伤大量正常 HTTPS）；
+UDP 在 CN 长期被 QoS/限速；且一旦 IP 因 UDP 特征被判为代理，会**连带打死同 IP 上的 TCP 服务**（REALITY/SS/nginx）。
+加密性本身没有问题（QUIC=TLS1.3，实测证书校验强制、错凭据被拒）——风险在**可封禁面**，不在密码学。
+
+节点侧 UDP 相关系统调优（保留）：
+
+| 项 | 值 / 说明 |
+|---|---|
+| `net.ipv4.udp_rmem_min` / `udp_wmem_min` | `8192`（容器内可写，实测 LXC 同样生效） |
+| `net.core.rmem_max` / `wmem_max` | `33554432`（KVM 可写；**LXC 缺失/只读**） |
+| `rx-udp-gro-forwarding` / `rx-gro-list`（ethtool） | 由 `rrpp-qdisc.sh` 开机开启；**实测支持情况**：us/jp ✅ 两项；aq（内核 5.10）仅 `rx-gro-list`；**LXC 容器无 netdev 权限，无法设置** |
+| QUIC/UDP 吞吐 | 受宿主机 socket 缓冲上限约束——**LXC 节点上这是硬约束**，需服务商在宿主调 `rmem_max` |
+
+**明确不采用的手段**：锐速/LotServer（闭源、绑定旧内核）、net-speeder（重复包、已废弃）、
+`tcp_tw_recycle`（4.12 起内核已移除，开启会破坏 NAT 后客户端）、`tcp_notsent_lowat` 激进值
+（可能压制高 BDP 吞吐）、`busy_poll`/`busy_read`（1 vCPU 机器上代价大于收益）、各类"一键优化脚本"
+（多为本文档子集 + 心理安慰，且常与 sysctl.d 冲突）。
+
+**落地状态（2026-09-20）**
+
+| 节点 | 虚拟化 | 落地情况 |
+|---|---|---|
+| hk2 | LXC（Debian 12） | LXC 模板；`bbr` + `mtu_probing=1` + `fastopen=3` + 队列/端口项；缓冲与 qdisc 受宿主限制 |
+| ru | LXC（Debian 13 cloud 内核） | 同上（`rmem_max`/`wmem_max` 只读） |
+| us | KVM（Debian 12） | KVM 模板 + fq（原 `fq_codel`） |
+| aq | KVM（Debian 11 cloud） | KVM 模板 + fq（原 `pfifo_fast`）；并注释其 `/etc/sysctl.conf` 中 17 行冲突键（原 `tcp_mtu_probing=0`） |
+| jp | Azure VM（Ubuntu 6.17） | KVM 模板（经 `sudo` 落地；原有 `99-tune.conf` 保留） |
+
 ---
 
 ## 3. 伪装站点页面
@@ -265,8 +370,114 @@ chmod 644 /etc/nginx/.htpasswd   # worker 以 nobody 运行，必须可读
 1. `map` 判定私网/回环段 + cron 维护的本机公网 IP 规则 → 直连伪装页
 2. `/__proxy` 的 Loop-Guard 头兜底 → 二次进入返回 508
 
+### 5.5 路线 B 裸 UoT relay
+
+TUN 客户端的 UDP 会先通过认证 CONNECT 请求
+`sp.v2.udp-over-tcp.arpa:443`。当前 hk2 使用的
+`ngx_http_proxy_connect_module` 没有注册 `$connect_host`，因此在 fallback
+server 实际接收的 CONNECT 请求上用 `$request` 正则匹配，再把连接转到
+`127.0.0.1:15201`；nginx 只负责 TLS、Basic Auth 和字节流转发，不解析 UoT。relay 使用仓库中的
+`[uot_relay.py](uot_relay.py)`，只监听回环地址，不需要 sing-box：
+
+```bash
+install -m 755 uot_relay.py /opt/rrpp-uot-relay/uot_relay.py
+install -m 644 systemd/uot-relay.service /etc/systemd/system/
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl enable --now uot-relay
+ss -lntp | grep 127.0.0.1:15201
+nginx -t && systemctl reload nginx
+```
+
+客户端的 CONNECT 端口必须大于 0，当前统一使用 `443`；`15201` 是服务器回环
+relay 的内部端口，不写入客户端 CONNECT 目标。nginx fallback 块使用
+`proxy_connect_read_timeout 10m` 和 `proxy_connect_send_timeout 10m`，不要再同时
+配置会产生 duplicate 的 `proxy_connect_data_timeout`。
+
 ---
 
+### 5.5 UoT（UDP over TCP）支持
+
+HTTP CONNECT 只隧道 TCP。要让 UDP 应用（DNS/游戏/QUIC 等）走代理，需 **UoT v2**
+（SagerNet 专有协议，见 sing-box 文档 `configuration/shared/udp-over-tcp`）：
+客户端把 UDP 数据报封装进 TCP 流，经 CONNECT 隧道发到 magic 地址
+`sp.v2.udp-over-tcp.arpa`，由本机 **UoT relay** 解封装后转发真实 UDP 目标。
+
+```
+客户端 TUN/UDP ──UoT v2──▶ TLS HTTP CONNECT ──▶ nginx proxy_connect
+    ──▶ 127.0.0.1:15201（uot-relay）──▶ 真实 UDP 目标
+```
+
+**relay 部署**（Python 标准库实现，见 [uot-relay/uot_relay.py](uot-relay/uot_relay.py)）：
+
+```bash
+install -d /opt/rrpp-uot-relay
+install -m 755 uot-relay/uot_relay.py  /opt/rrpp-uot-relay/uot_relay.py
+install -m 644 uot-relay/uot-relay.service /etc/systemd/system/uot-relay.service
+systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl enable --now uot-relay
+```
+
+relay 只监听 `127.0.0.1:15201`，空闲 9 分钟断开（须小于 nginx 隧道超时 10m）。
+支持 UoT v2 两种模式：`isConnect=1` 固定目标、`isConnect=0` 每帧自带目标。
+
+**nginx 侧**（模板已含，[nginx/nginx.conf](nginx/nginx.conf)）：`map $request` 识别
+magic 地址 → `127.0.0.1:15201`，其余 CONNECT 走 `$connect_addr` 默认解析；
+`proxy_connect_address $rrpp_uot_connect_address;` 放在 **default_server 块**。
+
+**四个实测坑（2026-09 全节点部署验证）**：
+1. 该模块版本**未注册 `$connect_host` 变量**（README 有、源码无）→ 必须用
+   `$request` 正则匹配（任何阶段可用）；
+2. `proxy_connect_data_timeout` 与 `proxy_connect_read_timeout` **写同一配置槽**，
+   同时写报 duplicate → 长连接超时用 read/send timeout 设 10m；
+3. **所有 CONNECT 请求都落在 `default_server`（fallback）块**——nginx 按请求
+   Host 头选虚拟主机，CONNECT 的 Host 是目标域名，永远匹配不到 `server_name`；
+4. 模块**拒绝 CONNECT 端口 0**（`port < 1` 返回 400）→ 客户端连 magic 地址时
+   端口必须非 0（用 443 即可，relay 不读 CONNECT 端口，目标取自 UoT 帧头）。
+
+**健壮性要求（2026-09 实测修复，别踩）**：
+- relay 必须用**未连接**的 UDP socket（`sendto`/`recvfrom`）。用连接式 socket 时，
+  目标侧 ICMP（port unreachable 等）会变成 `ConnectionRefusedError` 在 send/recv 上抛出，
+  若被兜底 `except` 接住并 `stop.set()`，**一条数据报出错就杀掉整条 UoT 隧道**
+  （客户端表现为 "UoT TCP 流已关闭"、多条隧道同秒集体死亡）。
+- 数据报级错误（`BlockingIOError`/EAGAIN、`ENETUNREACH`、`EHOSTUNREACH`、`EMSGSIZE`）
+  **只丢当前包**，EAGAIN 先等可写再重试；只有 TCP EOF、协议错误、空闲超时才关隧道。
+- 按地址族惰性建 socket，non-connect 模式可混用 IPv4/IPv6 目标；IPv6 `recvfrom`
+  返回 4 元组需归一化。
+- connect 模式要**预建** socket（否则主循环首轮无可 select 对象，会立刻关连接）。
+
+**节点出口差异（实测）**：RU 节点到境外 DNS（8.8.8.8:53）UDP 成功率仅约 4/10
+（俄 ISP 限制），表现为 UoT DNS 偶发超时——属该节点出口特性，非 relay 故障。
+此类节点的 UDP 业务建议换用当地可达目标，或走其它节点。
+
+**客户端协议**：认证与 TCP CONNECT 相同（TLS + Basic Auth），然后
+`CONNECT sp.v2.udp-over-tcp.arpa:443 HTTP/1.1`，200 之后收发 UoT v2 帧：
+请求头 `| isConnect u8 | ATYP u8 | address | port u16be |`，
+connect 模式帧 `| length u16be | data |`，non-connect 帧每帧自带目标地址。
+
+### 5.6 CONNECT 超时口径（避免客户端"卡死"）
+
+三个超时要按"客户端最没耐心"来配：
+
+| 项 | 值 | 说明 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `proxy_connect_connect_timeout` | **10s** | 出站连接目标；须 < 客户端超时（lite 客户端 15s） |
+| `proxy_connect_read_timeout` / `send_timeout` | 10m | 隧道空闲超时（UoT 长连接需要；注意与 data_timeout 同槽位） |
+
+**典型故障**：目标 IP 是黑洞（不发 RST）时，若 nginx 出站超时设 60s 而客户端 15s 超时，
+客户端会表现为 `The read operation timed out` 而不是收到 502 —— 看起来像"代理卡死"，
+实际是超时错配。2026-09 实测：改为 10s 后，黑洞目标从 >25s 降至 10.2s 返回，
+正常目标（0.4~0.7s）不受影响。
+
+**排查"CONNECT 502"的正确顺序**（重要）：
+1. 先看目标是否**本身就不可达**——从多个网络（国内/日本/美国/香港）实测该 IP:端口，
+   若都失败则是目标问题（服务下线/过期 IP/黑洞），不是代理问题；
+2. 再看 nginx error.log：`Connection refused` / `timed out` / `Network is unreachable`
+   分别对应目标拒绝、目标黑洞、路由不可达；
+3. 最后才怀疑 CONNECT 模块本身。
+
+> 客户端日志只记 IP 不记域名时，无法判断"是不是 DNS 过期解析"。
+> 建议客户端日志同时记录原始域名（实测案例：某 Dropbox 旧 IP 已失效，
+> 域名现已解析到其它地址，客户端仍在拨旧 IP）。
+
 ## 6. sing-box（VLESS+REALITY / Shadowsocks）
 
 ### 6.1 安装
@@ -282,6 +493,16 @@ install -m 755 sing-box-$SINGBOX_VER-linux-amd64/sing-box /usr/local/bin/sing-bo
 
 完整配置见 [sing-box/config.json](sing-box/config.json)。要点：
 - **VLESS+REALITY**：每节点独立 UUID/密钥对/short_id，SNI 全节点统一，flow `xtls-rprx-vision`；REALITY handshake server 用 `<伪装SNI域名>:443`
+- **纯 IPv4 节点**（如 Azure 不给 IPv6 的 jp）：direct 出站**必须**配 `domain_resolver`，
+  否则双栈域名会解析出 AAAA 并拨向不可达的 IPv6（日志刷 `network is unreachable`，
+  jp 实测每小时数十条）。1.12+ 写法（legacy `domain_strategy` 字段在 sing-box 1.13
+  已直接 FATAL 拒绝，勿用）：
+  ```json
+  "dns": {"servers": [{"type": "local", "tag": "local-dns"}]},
+  "outbounds": [{"type": "direct", "tag": "direct",
+                 "domain_resolver": {"server": "local-dns", "strategy": "ipv4_only"}}]
+  ```
+  已验证：jp 需要（2026-10-01 已修）；ru/hk2/us/aq 有 IPv6 出口或实测无此错误，不需要。
 - **Shadowsocks**：`2022-blake3-aes-256-gcm`（SIP022：会话子密钥 + 抗重放探测，显著优于老 AEAD `aes-256-gcm`）+ 每节点独立 PSK，独立端口（兼容不支持 REALITY 的老客户端）
   - **PSK 格式要求**：密码必须是 base64 编码的 32 字节密钥（`openssl rand -base64 32`），不是任意字符串；改错格式 sing-box 启动即报错
   - sing-box / Shadowrocket / mihomo 均支持 2022-blake3 系列
@@ -321,6 +542,94 @@ EOF
 
 ---
 
+### 6.4 Hysteria2 / TUIC（UDP 传输）— ⚠️ 已回滚，本节为留档
+
+> **状态：已回滚（2026-09-20 当晚）。** 当日曾在五节点部署并逐组合端到端验证通过（见下表与「验证方法」），
+> 随后因「**绝对不可以被 GFW 封禁**」这一优先级，**全部撤除**——五节点 sing-box 已恢复为
+> `vless + shadowsocks` 原状，新增的 UDP 入站不再监听。
+>
+> 本节保留作**留档**：配置片段、各节点 NAT/NSG 差异、端到端验证方法（尤其"只看监听不足以证明外部可达"
+> 这个坑）在日后重新启用或换机时仍然有效。若要重新启用，照本节执行即可，**但请先读 §2.6 的撤除理由**。
+
+TCP 系协议在跨境丢包链路上受拥塞控制限制（BBR 已缓解但仍有天花板）；QUIC 系
+（**Hysteria2** 的 Brutal CC、**TUIC v5**）能显著改善高丢包下的吞吐与时延。
+两者都是 **sing-box 内建**，无需额外二进制；UDP 需求也可走 UoT（§5.5）。
+
+```json
+// Hysteria2（sing-box inbound）
+{ "type": "hysteria2", "tag": "hy2-in-<端口>", "listen": "0.0.0.0", "listen_port": "<端口>",
+  "up_mbps": 100, "down_mbps": 100,
+  "obfs": { "type": "salamander", "password": "<obfs密码>" },
+  "users": [ { "name": "<节点>-hy2", "password": "<hy2密码>" } ],
+  "tls": { "enabled": true, "server_name": "<节点域名>",
+           "certificate_path": "/etc/nginx/ssl/<节点域名>/fullchain.pem",
+           "key_path": "/etc/nginx/ssl/<节点域名>/privkey.pem", "alpn": ["h3"] },
+  "masquerade": "file:///var/www/html" }
+
+// TUIC v5
+{ "type": "tuic", "tag": "tuic-in-<端口>", "listen": "0.0.0.0", "listen_port": "<端口>",
+  "users": [ { "name": "<节点>-tuic", "uuid": "<UUID>", "password": "<密码>" } ],
+  "congestion_control": "bbr",
+  "tls": { /* 同上 */ } }
+```
+
+**要点**
+
+- **带宽声明决定 Brutal**：`up_mbps`/`down_mbps` 不写时，服务端会命令客户端改用 BBR；
+  写了才允许 Hysteria CC（Brutal）。默认 100 Mbps，计量流量的节点给 50。
+  Brutal **不遵守拥塞控制**，设错会占满链路甚至被服务商判定异常流量——务必按实际带宽设。
+- `obfs: salamander` 给 QUIC 加一层混淆（对抗 QUIC 特征识别）；`masquerade` 指向伪装页，
+  未认证访问返回与 nginx 一致的页面。
+- TUIC 保持 `zero_rtt_handshake` 关闭（默认，0-RTT 可被重放）。
+- 凭据**每节点独立**，与 VLESS/SS/CONNECT 同策略。
+
+**各节点端口与部署差异（2026-09-20 实测，务必照抄结论）**
+
+| 节点 | 虚拟化 | Hysteria2 (UDP) | TUIC (UDP) | 差异 / 坑 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| hk2 | LXC(NAT) | 4305 | 4306 | NAT 段 4301-4320 UDP 1:1（探针 + 外部回扫实测） |
+| us | KVM | 1208 | 1209 | 公网直连，UDP 任意端口可用 |
+| ru | LXC(NAT) | 23333 | 23334 | **外部只有宿主已映射的 UDP 端口可达**：容器内 bind 任意端口都"正常"，但 23336+ 实测直接 `connection refused`（ICMP port unreachable）；最终复用 **23333/23334**——与 nginx/vless 占用的 **TCP 同号**，UDP 与 TCP 互不冲突 |
+| aq | KVM(IPv6-only) | 8444 | 8445 | 节点为 IPv6 出口，`listen` 用 `"::"`；客户端须走 IPv6 |
+| jp | Azure VM | 未部署 | 8445 | **Azure NSG 只放行 UDP 8445**（443/80/8080/8088/18080/8443/9444 的 UDP 面实测均不可达）→ 单节点只能承载一个 UDP 协议；要加 Hysteria2 须先在 NSG 放行第二个 UDP 端口 |
+
+**客户端链接格式（手工导入用）**
+
+```
+hysteria2://<password>@<域名>:<端口>/?sni=<域名>&alpn=h3&obfs=salamander&obfs-password=<obfs密码>#备注
+tuic://<uuid>:<password>@<域名>:<端口>/?congestion_control=bbr&alpn=h3&sni=<域名>#备注
+```
+
+**接入现状（2026-09-20，务必先读）**
+
+| 层 | 状态 |
+|---|---|
+| 服务端 | ⛔ **已撤除**（原：五节点部署并端到端验证）——2026-09-20 当晚按抗封优先回滚 |
+| **订阅下发** | ❌ 从未下发（`app.py` 无 hysteria2/tuic 生成逻辑，`nodes.json` 无对应字段；订阅里只有 http / vless / ss），且已决定不做 |
+| **代理组** | ❌ 订阅只生成一个 `RRPP`（`type: select`，手动选节点），**没有 fallback / url-test**，因此**不存在"UDP 挂了自动回落 TCP"** |
+| lite 客户端（Windows） | 仅 HTTP CONNECT + UoT v2（UDP 走 magic 地址），**不使用 UDP 入站**，且节点为手动切换、无自动故障转移 |
+| 结论 | UDP 通道目前**只能手工导入**上面的链接使用；抗封主路径仍是 **REALITY+Vision（TCP）**，UDP 属可选加速，未接入客户端链路 |
+
+> 若日后要接入订阅，需要三步：① `nodes.json` 每节点补 `methods.hysteria2` / `methods.tuic`；
+> ② `app.py` 增加 mihomo `type: hysteria2` / `type: tuic` 生成与分享链接；
+> ③ 代理组改为**每节点一个 `fallback` 组、REALITY 排第一**（否则"UDP 挂了回落 TCP"不成立）。
+> 注意 mihomo 的 fallback 依赖健康检查周期（默认 300s），切换不是瞬时的。
+
+**验证方法（端到端，不能只看监听）**
+
+```bash
+# 在任意机器用 sing-box 作客户端：socks 入站 + 上述 outbound，然后
+curl -s -m 20 -x socks5h://127.0.0.1:11080 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://example.com/   # 期望 200
+```
+
+`ss -lunp` 看到端口在听**不足以**证明外部可达：ru（NAT 未映射）与 jp（NSG 未放行）
+都是"监听正常但外部不可达"的真实案例。
+
+⚠️ 代价与限制：UDP 在部分运营商会被 QoS/封禁；Brutal 对同链路其他流量不友好；
+计量流量的节点（如 jp，15GB/月）注意消耗；LXC 容器内 socket 缓冲上限受宿主机约束。
+
+---
+
 ## 7. mtg（MTProto 代理）
 
 Telegram 内置代理，Fake TLS 模式抗封锁。用 [mtg](https://github.com/9seconds/mtg)（Go 单二进制）：
@@ -378,6 +687,8 @@ mtg simple-run --prefer-ip=prefer-ipv4 0.0.0.0:<mtproto端口> <上面生成的s
 | nginx | [systemd/nginx.service](systemd/nginx.service) |
 | sing-box | [systemd/sing-box.service](systemd/sing-box.service) |
 | mtg | [systemd/mtg.service](systemd/mtg.service) |
+| uot-relay | [uot-relay/uot-relay.service](uot-relay/uot-relay.service) |
+| rrpp-qdisc（fq 队列，见 2.6） | [systemd/rrpp-qdisc.service](systemd/rrpp-qdisc.service) |
 
 ```bash
 cp systemd/*.service /etc/systemd/system/
@@ -396,6 +707,7 @@ sysctl --system                      # 1. BBR
 systemctl start sing-box             # 2. VLESS/SS
 systemctl start mtg                  # 3. MTProto
 systemctl start nginx                # 4. nginx（最后，依赖证书/伪装页/规则文件）
+systemctl start uot-relay              # 5. UoT relay（须在 nginx 前可用）
 ```
 
 ### 验证清单
@@ -405,6 +717,13 @@ systemctl start nginx                # 4. nginx（最后，依赖证书/伪装
 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control   # => bbr
 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing          # => 1（PMTUD 黑洞缓解，见 2.4）
 
+# 系统级网络优化（见 2.6）：确认 sysctl.d 的值真的生效（注意 /etc/sysctl.conf 覆盖坑）
+sysctl -n net.core.somaxconn net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen \
+          net.ipv4.tcp_slow_start_after_idle net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range
+# KVM/完整 VM 追加：net.core.netdev_max_backlog / rmem_max / wmem_max
+tc qdisc show | grep -v noqueue         # 期望默认路由网卡为 fq（容器内为 noqueue，属正常）
+systemctl is-active rrpp-qdisc          # 期望 active（容器内该单元会自行跳过）
+
 # fail2ban
 fail2ban-client status sshd              # => jail 存在（见 2.5）
 
@@ -419,6 +738,15 @@ s=socket.connect(('<节点域名>',<mtproto端口>)) if False else socket.create
 s.sendall(b'\x16\x03\x01'+struct.pack('>H',100)+os.urandom(100))
 print('resp:',s.recv(8).hex())"   # 期望首字节 15 (TLS alert)
 
+# UoT relay（127.0.0.1:15201 监听 + CONNECT magic 地址）
+ss -tlnp | grep 15201   # => uot_relay.py 监听 127.0.0.1:15201
+
+# UDP 传输（Hysteria2/TUIC）——已于 2026-09-20 撤除；以下仅当重新启用时才适用
+# 必须端到端验证，不能只看监听
+ss -lunp | grep -E ':<hy2端口>|:<tuic端口>'   # 仅确认服务在听
+# 再用 sing-box 客户端 + curl 经由 socks 实测（见 6.4「验证方法」）
+ethtool -k <网卡> | grep -E 'rx-udp-gro-forwarding|rx-gro-list'   # KVM 期望 on；LXC 容器不可设
+
 # nginx CONNECT（带 Basic Auth，B64 = base64('<代理用户名>:<代理密码>')）
 B64=$(printf '<代理用户名>:<代理密码>' | base64 -w0)
 curl -sk --proxy-insecure -x https://<节点域名>:<nginx端口> \
@@ -436,22 +764,96 @@ curl -sk https://<节点域名>:<nginx端口>/ -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n'
 ```
 server_config/
 ├── README.md                        ← 本文档
+├── sysctl/
+│   ├── 99-zz-rrpp-network.kvm.conf  ← 系统级网络优化（KVM/完整 VM，见 §2.6）
+│   └── 99-zz-rrpp-network.lxc.conf  ← 系统级网络优化（LXC/OpenVZ 容器，见 §2.6）
 ├── nginx/
 │   ├── nginx.conf                   ← 完整 nginx 配置（占位符版）
 │   ├── local_ip_rules.conf.example  ← 本机 IP 规则文件示例（cron 自动生成，勿手改）
 │   └── conf.d/                      ← 预留：额外站点配置
+├── uot-relay/
+│   ├── uot_relay.py                   ← UoT v2 relay（UDP over TCP 解封装）
+│   └── uot-relay.service              ← systemd unit
 ├── sing-box/
 │   └── config.json                  ← sing-box 配置（VLESS+REALITY + SS，占位符版）
 ├── systemd/
 │   ├── nginx.service
 │   ├── sing-box.service
-│   └── mtg.service
+│   ├── mtg.service
+│   └── rrpp-qdisc.service           ← 开机把默认网卡 qdisc 设为 fq（见 §2.6）
 ├── scripts/
-│   └── sync-nginx-local-ips.sh      ← 本机公网 IP 规则自动维护
+│   ├── sync-nginx-local-ips.sh      ← 本机公网 IP 规则自动维护
+│   └── rrpp-qdisc.sh                ← fq 队列设置脚本（rrpp-qdisc.service 调用）
 ├── cron/
 │   └── sync-nginx-local-ips         ← cron 定义（每 5 分钟）
+├── rrpp-subscription/               ← RRPP 订阅后端（bj，见 §12）
+│   ├── API.md                       ← 订阅端点 / method / 分层 / 规则集文档
+│   └── gen_rulesets.py              ← PAC → 客户端规则集转换脚本
 └── fake-site/
     └── index.html                   ← 伪装站点页面（所有节点共用同一份）
 ```
 
 > 旧的 `traffic-monitor/`、`pac/`、`conf.d/*.conf` 已下线或迁移，不再维护，已从本目录移除。
+
+---
+
+## 12. RRPP 订阅后端（PAC → 规则集下发）
+
+订阅服务运行在 **bj**（`C:/BtSoft/nginx/others/backEnd/api-rrrosmontis-icu/RRPP/`，nssm 服务 `RRPPSubBackend`，监听 `127.0.0.1:5010`，由 nginx `api.rrrosmontis.icu` 反代）。
+完整端点说明见 `rrpp-subscription/API.md`（bj 上同名文件为主副本，两处内容保持一致）。
+
+### 12.1 PAC 为什么不能直接下发
+
+PAC 是浏览器/系统用的 JS 自动配置，**mihomo/Clash 与 Shadowrocket 都读不了**。两者唯一共同能吃的格式是
+「每行自带规则类型的规则行文本」（Clash 的 `behavior: classical`）：
+
+- mihomo → `rule-providers`（`behavior: classical` + `format: text`）
+- Shadowrocket → `RULE-SET,<url>,<策略>`（官方手册：规则集内容需包含规则类型）
+
+因此由后端 `gen_rulesets.py` 把 PAC 数据转成三个 `.list`，两种客户端共用同一份文件。
+
+### 12.2 规则集产物
+
+| 规则集 | 文件（`https://cdn.rrrosmontis.icu/RRPP/PAC/`） | 规则数 | 策略 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `rrpp-proxy` | `rrpp-proxy.list` | 3943（`DOMAIN` 539 + `DOMAIN-SUFFIX` 3404） | `RRPP` / `PROXY` |
+| `rrpp-direct` | `rrpp-direct.list` | 16（`DOMAIN-SUFFIX`） | `DIRECT` |
+| `rrpp-cn-ip` | `rrpp-cn-ip.list` | 7456（`IP-CIDR`） | `DIRECT` |
+
+顺序（与 PAC 语义一致）：强制代理 → 直连种子 → 中国 IP 直连 → `MATCH` 全代理。
+
+### 12.3 维护：PAC 更新后重新生成
+
+```bash
+# bj 上执行（Windows：C:/BtSoft/nginx/others/htmlResources/cdn/RRPP/PAC/ 为生成目录，同时即 CDN 根）
+python gen_rulesets.py            # 幂等：内容无变化则不写盘；原子替换
+python gen_rulesets.py --check    # 只预览差异，不写盘
+```
+
+产物文件名与 URL 固定，**订阅端与客户端均无需改动**：mihomo 按 `interval: 86400` 自动更新，
+Shadowrocket 在「配置 → 规则集URL」中自动更新。
+
+### 12.4 客户端接入
+
+```bash
+# mihomo / Clash Verge：规则走 rule-providers（YAML 约 2.4KB）
+...&method=clash
+# 不认 rule-providers，或要「导入一次到位」：规则内联（约 440KB）
+...&method=clash&rules=inline
+# Shadowrocket：只下发规则（[General] + 远程 RULE-SET + FINAL，不含节点）
+...&method=shadowrocket
+# 兜底：全流量走代理（旧行为）
+...&method=clash&rules=global
+```
+
+> `method=shadowrocket` 的 `.conf` 不写 `[Proxy]` 段——Shadowrocket 的 REALITY 参数写法官方未文档化，不猜测；
+> 策略 `PROXY` 指向首页当前选中的节点，节点用 `clash`/`v2ray` 订阅导入。
+> 想在小火箭里「一次导入节点+规则」，用 `method=clash&rules=inline`。
+
+### 12.5 验证口径
+
+- 生成：11415 条规则（`regexp:` 跳过 7、非法 1）
+- CDN：三个 URL HTTP 200，md5 与本地一致（`806808b8` / `8f89397e` / `3e75093d`）
+- mihomo v1.19.31 真实内核：`-t` 通过；运行时 `GET /providers/rules` 报 `3943 / 16 / 7456`（`behavior=Classical`），
+  落地文件字节数与生成一致；`rules=inline` 亦通过 `-t`
+- Shadowrocket 为 iOS 应用，未做实机验证（依官方手册 `RULE-SET` 与 Clash YAML 兼容说明实现）

server_config/nginx/nginx.conf

@@ -16,6 +16,13 @@ http {
         default 0;
         "~^(10\.|127\.|169\.254\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.)" 1;
     }
+    # UoT v2 magic CONNECT 必须在 fallback server 中命中；当前模块版本没有
+    # $connect_host，使用原始请求行匹配。客户端请求 magic-host:443，nginx
+    # 将字节流转到本机裸 relay 127.0.0.1:15201。
+    map $request $rrpp_uot_connect_address {
+        default                                      $connect_addr;
+        "~^CONNECT[[:space:]]+sp\.v2\.udp-over-tcp\.arpa" 127.0.0.1:15201;
+    }
     include mime.types;
     default_type application/octet-stream;
     sendfile on;
@@ -44,9 +51,14 @@ http {
 
         proxy_connect;
         proxy_connect_allow all;
-        proxy_connect_connect_timeout 60s;
+        proxy_connect_address $rrpp_uot_connect_address;
-        proxy_connect_read_timeout 120s;
+        # 出站连接超时须小于客户端超时（lite 客户端 15s）：
-        proxy_connect_send_timeout 120s;
+        # 目标黑洞时快速返回 502，避免客户端"read operation timed out"干等
+        proxy_connect_connect_timeout 10s;
+        # 注：此模块版本 proxy_connect_data_timeout 与 proxy_connect_read_timeout
+        # 写同一字段（同时配置报 duplicate），长连接超时用 read/send timeout 设置
+        proxy_connect_read_timeout 10m;
+        proxy_connect_send_timeout 10m;
 
         location / {
             auth_basic off;
@@ -92,9 +104,14 @@ http {
 
         proxy_connect;
         proxy_connect_allow all;
-        proxy_connect_connect_timeout 60s;
+        proxy_connect_address $rrpp_uot_connect_address;
-        proxy_connect_read_timeout 120s;
+        # 出站连接超时须小于客户端超时（lite 客户端 15s）：
-        proxy_connect_send_timeout 120s;
+        # 目标黑洞时快速返回 502，避免客户端"read operation timed out"干等
+        proxy_connect_connect_timeout 10s;
+        # 注：此模块版本 proxy_connect_data_timeout 与 proxy_connect_read_timeout
+        # 写同一字段（同时配置报 duplicate），长连接超时用 read/send timeout 设置
+        proxy_connect_read_timeout 10m;
+        proxy_connect_send_timeout 10m;
 
         location / {
             auth_basic off;

server_config/rrpp-subscription/API.md

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# RRPP 订阅服务 · SSO 认证接入文档
+
+架构：`客户端 → nginx(api.rrrosmontis.icu) → RRPP 后端(127.0.0.1:5010) → SSO(127.0.0.1:4550) → nodes.json(国家分层)`
+
+## 1. 客户端公开端点
+
+### 统一订阅端点
+```
+GET https://api.rrrosmontis.icu/v1/rrpp/subscription?method=<类型>&user=<b64url邮箱>&password=<b64url密码>[&prefer=<协议>][&rules=<模式>]
+```
+
+| 参数 | 必填 | 说明 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `method` | 是 | `clash` / `v2ray` / `shadowrocket` / `rrpp_client` |
+| `user` | 是 | URL-safe base64 编码的邮箱 |
+| `password` | 是 | URL-safe base64 编码的密码 |
+| `prefer` | 否 | `vless` / `ss` / `http`，指定优先协议；缺省 `vless`，无则回退 vless→ss→http |
+| `rules` | 否 | 仅 `method=clash`：`provider`(默认) / `inline` / `global`，见 §7 |
+| `token` | 否 | SSO 会话 token（免密，代登录态）；与 `user`/`password` 二选一 |
+
+### 旧端点（兼容）
+```
+GET /v1/rrpp/nodes_update?user=<b64>&password=<b64>
+```
+等价于 `method=rrpp_client`。
+
+## 2. method 说明
+
+| method | Content-Type | 内容 | 适用客户端 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `clash` | `text/yaml` | Clash YAML：`proxies` + `proxy-groups(RRPP)` + `rule-providers` + `rules`（备注 `R.R.P.P. - 国家代码`） | mihomo / Clash Verge / ClashX Meta |
+| `v2ray` | `text/plain` | base64 节点串（`vless://` / `ss://` / `http://`） | v2rayN / Shadowrocket / Quantumult |
+| `shadowrocket` | `text/plain` | Shadowrocket `.conf`：`[General]` + 远程 `RULE-SET` + `FINAL`（**不含节点**） | Shadowrocket |
+| `rrpp_client` | `application/json` | 旧格式节点 JSON（仅 http，remark = `服务商 流量`） | RRPP 自建客户端 |
+
+## 3. 返回码
+
+| 码 | 场景 |
+|---|---|
+| 200 | 成功 |
+| 401 | 凭据缺失/SSO 认证失败 |
+| 403 | tier=0（RRPP 未开通） |
+| 404 | method 未知，或 `rules` 取值非法 |
+| 502 | SSO 不可达 |
+| 503 | nodes.json 缺失/损坏，或该 tier 无可用节点 |
+
+## 4. nodes.json 格式（国家分层）
+
+`C:/BtSoft/nginx/others/backEnd/api-rrrosmontis-icu/RRPP/nodes.json`，顶层为国家数组：
+
+```jsonc
+[
+  {
+    "country": "JP",                    // 国家代码
+    "available_level": [1, 2, 3],       // 可见等级
+    "provider": "Azure",                // 服务商
+    "traffic": "15G",                   // 流量限额
+    "domain": "iam.aeolianchi.me",      // 域名
+    "ipv6_only": false,                 // 可选，true 时备注加 (IPv6)
+    "methods": {                        // 可用协议
+      "http":  { "port": ..., "username": ..., "password": ... },
+      "vless": { "port": ..., "uuid": ..., "flow": ..., "sni": ..., "public_key": ..., "short_id": ... },
+      "ss":    { "port": ..., "method": ..., "password": ... }
+    }
+  },
+  ...
+]
+```
+
+## 5. 协议选择逻辑
+
+- `prefer` 指定则优先用该协议
+- 缺省默认 `vless`（最好用）
+- 该国家无 `prefer` 协议时按 `vless → ss → http` 回退
+- `rrpp_client` 固定只用 `http`（兼容性），备注 = `provider + traffic`（IPv6 加 `(IPv6)`）
+
+## 6. SSO 认证
+
+- 后端调 SSO `POST http://127.0.0.1:4550/v1/sso/service/rrpp/nodes`（带 `X-SSO-Service-Token` + `X-Real-IP`）
+- SSO 返回 `{tier: 0|1|2|3}`，0=未开通
+- 服务密钥读 `sso-rrrosmontis-icu/secrets.json` 的 `service_tokens.rrpp`
+
+## 7. 分流规则（PAC → 规则集，随订阅下发）
+
+### 7.1 为什么不是直接下发 PAC
+
+PAC 是给浏览器/操作系统用的 JS 自动配置；**mihomo/Clash 与 Shadowrocket 都不能读 PAC**。
+两者唯一共同能吃的格式是「每行自带规则类型的规则行文本」（Clash 术语 `behavior: classical`）：
+
+- mihomo：`rule-providers`（`behavior: classical` + `format: text`）
+- Shadowrocket：`RULE-SET,<url>,<策略>`（官方手册要求「规则集的内容需包含规则类型」）
+
+因此把 PAC 数据**在后端一次性转换成三个规则集文件**，两种客户端共用同一份文件。
+
+### 7.2 规则集文件（CDN 公开）
+
+生成目录即 CDN 根下的 `RRPP/PAC/`，公开可访问、无鉴权（规则集本身不含节点信息）：
+
+| 规则集 | 文件 | 规则数 | 组成 | 策略 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `rrpp-proxy` | `rrpp-proxy.list` | 3943 | 539 `DOMAIN` + 3404 `DOMAIN-SUFFIX`（强制代理域名） | `RRPP` / `PROXY` |
+| `rrpp-direct` | `rrpp-direct.list` | 16 | 16 `DOMAIN-SUFFIX`（保守直连种子） | `DIRECT` |
+| `rrpp-cn-ip` | `rrpp-cn-ip.list` | 7456 | 7456 `IP-CIDR`（中国 IP 段） | `DIRECT` |
+
+URL：`https://cdn.rrrosmontis.icu/RRPP/PAC/<文件名>`
+体积：120366 / 386 / 177443 字节，合计 11415 条规则。
+
+### 7.3 规则顺序（与 PAC 语义一致）
+
+```
+RULE-SET,rrpp-proxy  → RRPP     # 强制代理优先（PAC 中强制代理规则优先级更高）
+RULE-SET,rrpp-direct → DIRECT   # 直连种子
+RULE-SET,rrpp-cn-ip  → DIRECT   # 中国 IP 直连
+MATCH                → RRPP     # 其余全走代理
+```
+
+### 7.4 维护流程（PAC 更新后）
+
+转换脚本 `gen_rulesets.py`（与本文件同目录，另在仓库 `server_config/rrpp-subscription/` 存有副本）：
+
+```bash
+python gen_rulesets.py                  # 读 PAC 目录 → 原子覆写三个 .list（幂等，内容不变则不写）
+python gen_rulesets.py --check          # 只检查将有哪些变化，不写盘
+python gen_rulesets.py --pac-dir <目录> --out-dir <目录> --quiet
+```
+
+- 输入：`pac_domains.json` / `pac_direct_domains.json` / `pac_ip_cn.json`
+- 转换规则：`full:x`→`DOMAIN,x`；`keyword:x`→`DOMAIN-KEYWORD,x`；`regexp:`/`include:`→跳过并计数；行内 `#` 注释剥离；`*.x`/普通域名→`DOMAIN-SUFFIX,x`
+- 输出排序去重、LF 换行、无注释，写盘用临时文件 + `os.replace` 原子替换
+- **订阅端无需任何改动**：文件名与 URL 固定，客户端按 `interval` 自动拉新规则
+
+### 7.5 客户端接入
+
+| 场景 | 用法 |
+|---|---|
+| mihomo / Clash Verge（推荐） | `&method=clash` → 规则走 `rule-providers`，YAML 约 2.4KB，规则每 24h 自动更新 |
+| 客户端不认 `rule-providers`，或想「导入一次到位」 | `&method=clash&rules=inline` → 规则内联进 YAML（约 440KB），导入即含节点+全部规则 |
+| Shadowrocket（只想要规则，节点另行导入） | `&method=shadowrocket` → `.conf`，规则走远程 `RULE-SET`（在「配置 → 规则集URL」中可见并自动更新） |
+| Shadowrocket（想一次导入节点+规则） | 用 `&method=clash&rules=inline`（小火箭兼容 Clash YAML，含节点信息的标准 Clash 链接可同时导入配置与节点） |
+| 兜底 / 排障 | `&rules=global` → 只有 `MATCH,RRPP`，全流量走代理（等价旧行为） |
+
+> `method=shadowrocket` 的 `.conf` **不写 `[Proxy]` 段**：Shadowrocket 的 REALITY 参数写法官方未文档化，不猜测；
+> 该配置的策略 `PROXY` 指向首页当前选中的节点，节点请用 `clash`/`v2ray` 订阅导入。
+
+### 7.6 验证记录（2026-09-19）
+
+- 生成：11415 条规则；`regexp:` 跳过 7 条、非法 1 条
+- CDN：三个 URL 均 HTTP 200，`md5` 与本地生成一致（`806808b8` / `8f89397e` / `3e75093d`）
+- **mihomo v1.19.31 真实内核运行验证**：`-t` 校验通过；运行时 `GET /providers/rules` 显示
+  `rrpp-proxy=3943`、`rrpp-direct=16`、`rrpp-cn-ip=7456`（`behavior=Classical`），落地文件字节数与生成完全一致；
+  `&rules=inline` 配置亦通过 `-t` 校验
+- Shadowrocket 为 iOS 应用，**未做实机验证**，仅依据官方手册的 `RULE-SET` / Clash YAML 兼容说明实现

server_config/rrpp-subscription/gen_rulesets.py

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+"""
+RRPP PAC → 规则集转换器
+
+把 PAC 数据文件（JSON）转换成 **mihomo(Clash) 与 Shadowrocket 通用**的
+"classical 规则行"文本规则集——每行都含规则类型：
+
+    pac_direct_domains.json  ->  rrpp-direct.list   （DOMAIN-SUFFIX,<域名>）
+    pac_domains.json         ->  rrpp-proxy.list    （DOMAIN-SUFFIX,<域名>）
+    pac_ip_cn.json           ->  rrpp-cn-ip.list    （IP-CIDR,<网段>）
+
+为什么用这个格式（两端通吃）：
+  * mihomo      : rule-providers { behavior: classical, format: text }
+  * Shadowrocket: RULE-SET,<url>,<策略>
+                  （官方要求"规则集的内容需包含规则类型"）
+
+三种规则集由客户端按各自策略引用：
+    rrpp-proxy.list  -> 代理（强制代理域名）
+    rrpp-direct.list -> 直连（保守直连种子）
+    rrpp-cn-ip.list  -> 直连（中国 IP 段）
+
+用法
+----
+    python gen_rulesets.py                 # 就地生成（内容有变化才写盘）
+    python gen_rulesets.py --check          # 只检查/报告，不写盘
+    python gen_rulesets.py --pac-dir DIR --out-dir DIR
+    python gen_rulesets.py --quiet
+
+维护
+----
+PAC 更新后重新执行本脚本即可。脚本是**幂等**的：内容与现有文件一致时不会重写；
+写入采用 临时文件 + 原子替换，失败不会损坏已有文件。输出不含注释，只有规则行。
+"""
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import ipaddress
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+# ---------- 默认路径（bj 生产环境） ----------
+DEFAULT_PAC_DIR = r'C:/BtSoft/nginx/others/htmlResources/cdn/RRPP/PAC'
+DEFAULT_OUT_DIR = DEFAULT_PAC_DIR  # 与 PAC 同目录，由 CDN 直接对外提供
+
+# 映射：PAC 文件 -> (输出文件, JSON 中的列表字段, 类型)
+#   类型 domains = 域名表（含 v2fly 前缀：full:/keyword:/regexp:/行内注释）
+#   类型 cidrs   = IP 网段表
+RULESETS = [
+    ('pac_domains.json',         'rrpp-proxy.list',  'domains'),
+    ('pac_direct_domains.json',  'rrpp-direct.list', 'domains'),
+    ('pac_ip_cn.json',           'rrpp-cn-ip.list',  'cidrs'),
+]
+
+
+def log(msg, quiet=False):
+    if not quiet:
+        print(msg, flush=True)
+
+
+def read_json(path):
+    """读取 JSON；容忍 BOM。"""
+    with open(path, 'r', encoding='utf-8-sig') as f:
+        return json.load(f)
+
+
+def _valid_domain(s):
+    if not s or len(s) > 253 or '.' not in s:
+        return False
+    if any(c in s for c in ' /\\:@?#[]'):
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
+def convert_domain_entry(v):
+    """把一条域名表条目转成规则行。
+
+    支持 v2fly geosite 前缀与行内注释（PAC 数据实测存在）：
+      full:<域名>      -> DOMAIN,<域名>          （精确匹配）
+      keyword:<关键词> -> DOMAIN-KEYWORD,<关键词>
+      regexp:<正则>    -> 跳过（两端都无法表达域名正则）
+      <域名> # 注释     -> DOMAIN-SUFFIX,<域名>
+    返回 (规则行 或 None, 跳过原因 或 None)。
+    """
+    s = str(v or '')
+    if '#' in s:                       # 行内注释（如 "apple.xn--czr694b # apple.商标"）
+        s = s.split('#', 1)[0]
+    s = s.strip().lower()
+    if not s:
+        return None, 'empty'
+
+    if s.startswith('regexp:'):
+        return None, 'regexp'
+    if s.startswith('include:'):
+        return None, 'include'
+
+    if s.startswith('full:'):
+        dom = s[5:].strip().lstrip('*.').rstrip('.')
+        return (f'DOMAIN,{dom}', None) if _valid_domain(dom) else (None, 'invalid')
+
+    if s.startswith('keyword:'):
+        kw = s[8:].strip()
+        return (f'DOMAIN-KEYWORD,{kw}', None) if kw else (None, 'invalid')
+
+    if s.startswith('domain:'):
+        s = s[7:].strip()
+
+    dom = s.lstrip('*.').rstrip('.')   # 通配前缀统一按后缀匹配
+    return (f'DOMAIN-SUFFIX,{dom}', None) if _valid_domain(dom) else (None, 'invalid')
+
+
+def norm_cidr(v):
+    """CIDR 规范化/校验：返回规范化网段，非法返回 None。"""
+    s = str(v or '').strip()
+    if not s:
+        return None
+    try:
+        net = ipaddress.ip_network(s, strict=False)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    return str(net.network_address) + '/' + str(net.prefixlen)
+
+
+def build_lines(kind, data, quiet=False):
+    """由 PAC JSON 生成规则行（排序去重），返回 (lines, stats)。"""
+    field = 'domains' if kind == 'domains' else 'cidrs'
+    raw = data.get(field) if isinstance(data, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(raw, list):
+        raise ValueError(f'字段 {field} 不是列表')
+    seen, stats, out = set(), {}, []
+    for item in raw:
+        if kind == 'domains':
+            line, why = convert_domain_entry(item)
+        else:
+            c = norm_cidr(item)
+            line, why = (f'IP-CIDR,{c}', None) if c else (None, 'invalid')
+        if line is None:
+            stats[why] = stats.get(why, 0) + 1
+            continue
+        if line not in seen:
+            seen.add(line)
+            out.append(line)
+    out.sort()
+    if stats:
+        detail = ' '.join(f'{k}={v}' for k, v in sorted(stats.items()))
+        log(f'    ! 跳过条目: {detail}', quiet)
+    return out, stats
+
+
+
+def write_if_changed(path, text, check_only=False):
+    """内容有变化才原子写入。返回 (changed, md5)。"""
+    data = text.encode('utf-8')
+    md5 = hashlib.md5(data).hexdigest()
+    old = None
+    if os.path.exists(path):
+        with open(path, 'rb') as f:
+            old = f.read()
+    if old == data:
+        return False, md5
+    if check_only:
+        return True, md5
+    tmp = path + '.tmp'
+    with open(tmp, 'wb') as f:          # 二进制写：确保 LF、无 BOM
+        f.write(data)
+    os.replace(tmp, path)
+    return True, md5
+
+
+def main():
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='RRPP PAC -> 规则集转换器')
+    ap.add_argument('--pac-dir', default=DEFAULT_PAC_DIR, help='PAC JSON 所在目录')
+    ap.add_argument('--out-dir', default=DEFAULT_OUT_DIR, help='规则集输出目录')
+    ap.add_argument('--check', action='store_true', help='只检查，不写盘')
+    ap.add_argument('--quiet', action='store_true')
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+
+    if not os.path.isdir(args.pac_dir):
+        print(f'错误：PAC 目录不存在: {args.pac_dir}', file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    os.makedirs(args.out_dir, exist_ok=True)
+
+    total, changed_cnt, failed = 0, 0, 0
+    log(f'PAC 目录 : {args.pac_dir}')
+    log(f'输出目录 : {args.out_dir}{"  (--check 模式，不写盘)" if args.check else ""}')
+    log('')
+
+    for src_name, out_name, kind in RULESETS:
+        src_path = os.path.join(args.pac_dir, src_name)
+        out_path = os.path.join(args.out_dir, out_name)
+        if not os.path.exists(src_path):
+            print(f'  [跳过] {src_name} 不存在', file=sys.stderr)
+            failed += 1
+            continue
+        try:
+            data = read_json(src_path)
+            lines, _stats = build_lines(kind, data, args.quiet)
+            text = '\n'.join(lines) + '\n'
+            changed, md5 = write_if_changed(out_path, text, args.check)
+            size = len(text.encode('utf-8'))
+            ver = data.get('version', '-') if isinstance(data, dict) else '-'
+            state = ('已更新' if changed else '无变化') if not args.check else ('需更新' if changed else '无变化')
+            log(f'  {src_name:26s} -> {out_name:18s} {len(lines):5d} 行  {size/1024:7.1f} KB  '
+                f'ver={ver:12s} md5={md5[:8]}  [{state}]')
+            total += len(lines)
+            changed_cnt += 1 if changed else 0
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f'  [失败] {src_name}: {type(e).__name__}: {e}', file=sys.stderr)
+            failed += 1
+
+    log('')
+    log(f'合计 {total} 条规则，{changed_cnt} 个文件{"需更新" if args.check else "已更新"}，{failed} 个失败')
+    return 1 if failed else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    sys.exit(main())

server_config/scripts/rrpp-qdisc.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# ============================================================
+# RRPP 网络接口调优脚本（开机执行）
+#   1) 把默认路由网卡的根 qdisc 设为 fq —— BBR 的最佳搭档
+#      （net.core.default_qdisc=fq 只对"新创建"网卡生效，已存在网卡需显式 replace）
+#   2) 开启 UDP GRO 转发 —— QUIC 系协议（Hysteria2 / TUIC）转发性能
+# 容器（LXC/OpenVZ）内网卡为 noqueue、且无 netdev 权限，本脚本自动跳过。
+# ============================================================
+set -uo pipefail
+IFACE=$(ip -4 route show default | awk '{print $5; exit}')
+[ -n "${IFACE:-}" ] || { echo "未找到默认路由网卡，跳过"; exit 0; }
+if tc qdisc show dev "$IFACE" 2>/dev/null | grep -q " noqueue"; then
+  echo "$IFACE 为 noqueue（容器环境），跳过 qdisc 与网卡 offload 设置"
+  exit 0
+fi
+tc qdisc replace dev "$IFACE" root fq 2>/dev/null && echo "已设置 $IFACE root qdisc = fq" || echo "设置 qdisc 失败（可忽略）"
+ethtool -K "$IFACE" rx-udp-gro-forwarding on 2>/dev/null && echo "已开启 $IFACE rx-udp-gro-forwarding" || echo "$IFACE 不支持 rx-udp-gro-forwarding"
+ethtool -K "$IFACE" rx-gro-list on 2>/dev/null && echo "已开启 $IFACE rx-gro-list" || echo "$IFACE 不支持 rx-gro-list"

server_config/sysctl/99-zz-rrpp-network.kvm.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# ============================================================
+# RRPP 节点系统级网络优化（KVM / 完整虚拟机版）
+# 部署位置：/etc/sysctl.d/99-zz-rrpp-network.conf
+# 配套：systemd/rrpp-qdisc.service + scripts/rrpp-qdisc.sh（fq 队列 + UDP GRO）
+# 文件名 99-zz- 前缀保证最后生效；注意 /etc/sysctl.conf 会更晚加载（见 README §2.6）
+# ============================================================
+
+# --- 拥塞控制与队列 ---
+net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control = bbr
+net.core.default_qdisc = fq
+
+# --- PMTUD 黑洞缓解 ---
+net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing = 1
+
+# --- 握手 / 时延 ---
+net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen = 3
+net.ipv4.tcp_slow_start_after_idle = 0
+
+# --- 连接生命周期 ---
+net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse = 2
+net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 15
+net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 300
+net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl = 30
+net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes = 5
+net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 10240 65000
+
+# --- 队列深度与缓冲（TCP）---
+net.core.somaxconn = 32768
+net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 32768
+net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 32768
+net.core.rmem_max = 33554432
+net.core.wmem_max = 33554432
+net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 131072 33554432
+net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 16384 33554432
+
+# --- UDP（Hysteria2 / TUIC / UoT 的 socket 缓冲下限）---
+net.ipv4.udp_rmem_min = 8192
+net.ipv4.udp_wmem_min = 8192

server_config/sysctl/99-zz-rrpp-network.lxc.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# ============================================================
+# RRPP 节点系统级网络优化（LXC / OpenVZ 容器版）
+# 部署位置：/etc/sysctl.d/99-zz-rrpp-network.conf
+# 容器差异：net.core.rmem_max / wmem_max / default_qdisc / netdev_max_backlog
+#   缺失或只读；eth0 为 noqueue，qdisc/网卡 offload 不可设（由宿主机控制）。
+#   net.ipv4.udp_rmem_min / udp_wmem_min 在部分容器内只读，若报错可忽略。
+# ============================================================
+
+net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control = bbr
+net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing = 1
+net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen = 3
+net.ipv4.tcp_slow_start_after_idle = 0
+net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse = 2
+net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 15
+net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 300
+net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl = 30
+net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes = 5
+net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 10240 65000
+net.core.somaxconn = 32768
+net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 32768
+net.ipv4.udp_rmem_min = 8192
+net.ipv4.udp_wmem_min = 8192

server_config/systemd/rrpp-qdisc.service

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=RRPP: set fq qdisc on default-route interface (BBR companion)
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/rrpp-qdisc.sh
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

server_config/systemd/rrpp-uot-relay.service

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=RRPP bare UDP over TCP v2 relay
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/rrpp-uot-relay/uot_relay.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+User=rrpp
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/rrpp
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

server_config/systemd/uot-relay.service

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=RRPP bare UDP over TCP v2 relay
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/rrpp-uot-relay/uot_relay.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+User=rrpp
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/rrpp
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

server_config/uot-relay/uot-relay.service

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=RRPP UoT v2 relay (UDP over TCP decapsulator, localhost only)
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/rrpp-uot-relay/uot_relay.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=5
+# 双保险：只许监听本机（脚本本身 bind 127.0.0.1）
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

server_config/uot-relay/uot_relay.py

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+"""
+RRPP UoT v2 relay — UDP over TCP 解封装服务（sing-box UoT v2 协议）
+
+协议（SagerNet 专有，见 sing-box 文档 configuration/shared/udp-over-tcp）：
+
+  请求头:  | isConnect u8 | ATYP u8 | address | port u16be |
+    isConnect=1: 固定目标模式，后续帧全部是 length+data，发往请求头里的目标
+    isConnect=0: 每帧自带目标，帧格式同 v1: | ATYP | address | port | length u16be | data |
+
+  connect 帧:      | length u16be | data |
+  non-connect 帧:  | ATYP | address | port | length u16be | data |
+
+监听 127.0.0.1，仅供本机 nginx proxy_connect 转发，不对公网开放。
+
+健壮性设计（2026-09 修复，实测复现过隧道被误杀）：
+  * 一律使用「未连接」UDP socket（sendto/recvfrom）——连接式 socket 会把目标侧
+    ICMP（port unreachable 等）转成 ConnectionRefusedError，在 send/recv 上抛异常，
+    旧实现因此把整条 UoT 隧道关掉（客户端表现为 "UoT TCP 流已关闭"）。
+  * 数据报级错误（BlockingIOError/EAGAIN、ENETUNREACH、EHOSTUNREACH、EMSGSIZE
+    等）只丢当前包并继续；EAGAIN 先等可写再重试（有总时限）。
+  * 只有 TCP 侧 EOF、UoT 协议错误或空闲超时才关闭隧道。
+  * 按地址族惰性建 socket，non-connect 模式可混用 IPv4/IPv6 目标。
+"""
+import errno
+import select
+import socket
+import struct
+import threading
+import time
+
+LISTEN_HOST = "127.0.0.1"
+LISTEN_PORT = 15201
+IDLE_TIMEOUT = 540          # 9 分钟无流量断开（须 < nginx proxy_connect 隧道超时 10m）
+MAX_DGRAM = 65507           # UDP over IPv4 单包上限
+SEND_RETRY_TOTAL = 1.0      # EAGAIN 时最多等待 1 秒可写，超时则丢弃该包
+RECV_ERROR_STREAK_LIMIT = 200   # 连续 recv 错误上限（防病态自旋），超过视为隧道异常
+LOG_PREFIX = "[uot-relay]"
+
+
+def log(msg):
+    print(f"{LOG_PREFIX} {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')} {msg}", flush=True)
+
+
+def read_exact(f, n):
+    buf = b""
+    while len(buf) < n:
+        chunk = f.read(n - len(buf))
+        if not chunk:
+            raise EOFError("connection closed")
+        buf += chunk
+    return buf
+
+
+def parse_addr(f):
+    """从流中读取 SOCKS 格式地址（ATYP + address + port）。"""
+    atyp = read_exact(f, 1)[0]
+    if atyp == 0x00:
+        addr = socket.inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET, read_exact(f, 4))
+    elif atyp == 0x01:
+        addr = socket.inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET6, read_exact(f, 16))
+    elif atyp == 0x02:
+        ln = read_exact(f, 1)[0]
+        addr = read_exact(f, ln).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f"bad ATYP {atyp:#x}")
+    port = struct.unpack(">H", read_exact(f, 2))[0]
+    return addr, port
+
+
+def encode_addr(addr, port):
+    """SOCKS 格式地址编码（用于 non-connect 模式的回包）。"""
+    try:
+        return b"\x00" + socket.inet_pton(socket.AF_INET, addr) + struct.pack(">H", port)
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    try:
+        return b"\x01" + socket.inet_pton(socket.AF_INET6, addr) + struct.pack(">H", port)
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    d = addr.encode("utf-8")
+    if len(d) > 255:
+        raise ValueError("domain too long")
+    return b"\x02" + bytes([len(d)]) + d + struct.pack(">H", port)
+
+
+def norm_src(src):
+    """recvfrom 地址归一化：IPv4 为 (host, port)，IPv6 为 4 元组。"""
+    return src[0], src[1]
+
+
+class UdpPool:
+    """按地址族惰性创建「未连接」UDP socket（v4/v6 可混用）。"""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.socks = {}
+
+    def get(self, addr):
+        fam = socket.AF_INET6 if ":" in addr else socket.AF_INET
+        s = self.socks.get(fam)
+        if s is None:
+            s = socket.socket(fam, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+            s.setblocking(False)
+            self.socks[fam] = s
+        return s
+
+    def all(self):
+        return list(self.socks.values())
+
+    def close(self):
+        for s in self.socks.values():
+            try:
+                s.close()
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+        self.socks.clear()
+
+
+def send_dgram(sock, data, dst):
+    """发送一个 UDP 数据报。
+
+    返回 True=已发出，False=本包丢弃（**不是**连接级错误，调用方继续跑）。
+    EAGAIN 时等可写重试（有总时限）；其余 OSError 一律丢弃本包。
+    """
+    deadline = time.time() + SEND_RETRY_TOTAL
+    while True:
+        try:
+            sock.sendto(data, dst)
+            return True
+        except BlockingIOError:
+            if time.time() >= deadline:
+                return False
+            try:
+                select.select([], [sock], [], 0.1)
+            except Exception:
+                return False
+        except InterruptedError:
+            continue
+        except OSError:
+            # ENETUNREACH / EHOSTUNREACH / EMSGSIZE / EACCES ...
+            return False
+
+
+def handle(conn, peer):
+    conn.settimeout(IDLE_TIMEOUT)
+    f = conn.makefile("rb")
+    pool = UdpPool()
+    stop = threading.Event()
+    fixed_dst = None
+    try:
+        is_connect = read_exact(f, 1)[0]
+        req_dst = parse_addr(f)
+        log(f"conn from nginx: isConnect={is_connect} dst={req_dst}")
+        if is_connect:
+            fixed_dst = req_dst
+            pool.get(fixed_dst[0])   # 预建 socket：主循环首轮才有可 select 的对象
+
+        write_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+        def tcp_write(data):
+            with write_lock:
+                conn.sendall(data)
+
+        def uplink():
+            """TCP -> UDP：逐帧解析并发送；单包错误只丢包，不关隧道。"""
+            try:
+                while not stop.is_set():
+                    if is_connect:
+                        ln = struct.unpack(">H", read_exact(f, 2))[0]
+                        if ln > MAX_DGRAM:
+                            raise ValueError(f"datagram too large: {ln}")
+                        data = read_exact(f, ln)
+                        send_dgram(pool.get(fixed_dst[0]), data, fixed_dst)
+                    else:
+                        dst = parse_addr(f)
+                        ln = struct.unpack(">H", read_exact(f, 2))[0]
+                        if ln > MAX_DGRAM:
+                            raise ValueError(f"datagram too large: {ln}")
+                        data = read_exact(f, ln)
+                        send_dgram(pool.get(dst[0]), data, dst)
+            except Exception as e:
+                if not stop.is_set():
+                    log(f"uplink end: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
+            finally:
+                stop.set()
+
+        threading.Thread(target=uplink, daemon=True).start()
+
+        # 主循环：UDP -> TCP（带空闲超时）
+        last = time.time()
+        err_streak = 0
+        while not stop.is_set():
+            socks = pool.all()
+            if not socks:
+                # non-connect 模式：socket 由第一帧触发创建，空池时等待而非关连接
+                if time.time() - last > IDLE_TIMEOUT:
+                    log("idle timeout (no datagram), closing")
+                    break
+                time.sleep(0.2)
+                continue
+            try:
+                r, _, _ = select.select(socks, [], [], 2.0)
+            except OSError:
+                break
+            got = False
+            for s in r:
+                try:
+                    data, src = s.recvfrom(MAX_DGRAM)
+                except (BlockingIOError, InterruptedError):
+                    continue
+                except OSError as e:
+                    # 单包级错误（含 ICMP 触发的错误）：丢包继续，不关隧道
+                    err_streak += 1
+                    if err_streak % 50 == 1:
+                        log(f"recv error (datagram dropped, streak={err_streak}): "
+                            f"{errno.errorcode.get(e.errno, e.errno)} {e}")
+                    if err_streak >= RECV_ERROR_STREAK_LIMIT:
+                        log("recv error streak limit reached, closing tunnel")
+                        stop.set()
+                        break
+                    continue
+                err_streak = 0
+                a, p = norm_src(src)
+                if is_connect:
+                    if (a, p) != fixed_dst:
+                        continue      # 固定目标模式：只回传目标自身的包
+                    tcp_write(struct.pack(">H", len(data)) + data)
+                else:
+                    tcp_write(encode_addr(a, p) + struct.pack(">H", len(data)) + data)
+                got = True
+            if got:
+                last = time.time()
+            elif time.time() - last > IDLE_TIMEOUT:
+                log("idle timeout, closing")
+                break
+    except Exception as e:
+        log(f"conn error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
+    finally:
+        stop.set()
+        try:
+            f.close()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        try:
+            conn.close()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        pool.close()
+
+
+def main():
+    srv = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
+    srv.bind((LISTEN_HOST, LISTEN_PORT))
+    srv.listen(128)
+    log(f"listening on {LISTEN_HOST}:{LISTEN_PORT}")
+    while True:
+        conn, peer = srv.accept()
+        threading.Thread(target=handle, args=(conn, peer), daemon=True).start()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

server_config/uot_relay.py

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""RRPP 裸 UoT v2 relay。
+
+nginx 的 proxy_connect 模块负责 TLS、Basic Auth 和 CONNECT，relay 只监听
+127.0.0.1:15201，收到的首字节就是 UoT v2 request，不再解析 HTTP。
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import logging
+import socket
+import struct
+import threading
+
+MAGIC = "sp.v2.udp-over-tcp.arpa"
+LISTEN_HOST = "127.0.0.1"
+LISTEN_PORT = 15201
+MAX_PACKET = 65535
+IDLE_TIMEOUT = 9 * 60
+
+
+def read_exact(conn: socket.socket, size: int) -> bytes:
+    data = bytearray()
+    while len(data) < size:
+        chunk = conn.recv(size - len(data))
+        if not chunk:
+            raise ConnectionError("客户端连接已关闭")
+        data.extend(chunk)
+    return bytes(data)
+
+
+def read_address(conn: socket.socket):
+    atyp = read_exact(conn, 1)[0]
+    if atyp == 0:
+        host = str(ipaddress.IPv4Address(read_exact(conn, 4)))
+    elif atyp == 1:
+        host = str(ipaddress.IPv6Address(read_exact(conn, 16)))
+    elif atyp == 2:
+        size = read_exact(conn, 1)[0]
+        host = read_exact(conn, size).decode("idna")
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f"未知 UoT 地址类型: {atyp}")
+    return host, struct.unpack("!H", read_exact(conn, 2))[0]
+
+
+def encode_address(host: str, port: int) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        addr = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+    except ValueError:
+        raw = host.encode("idna")
+        return b"\x02" + bytes([len(raw)]) + raw + struct.pack("!H", port)
+    return (b"\x00" if addr.version == 4 else b"\x01") + addr.packed + struct.pack("!H", port)
+
+
+def resolve_destination(host: str, port: int):
+    return socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)[0][4]
+
+
+def handle(conn: socket.socket, peer):
+    udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+    udp.settimeout(0.2)
+    # 与 nginx 的 10 分钟读写超时错开，空闲连接由 relay 先回收。
+    conn.settimeout(IDLE_TIMEOUT)
+    send_lock = threading.Lock()
+    try:
+        is_connect = read_exact(conn, 1)[0]
+        first_target = read_address(conn)
+        logging.info("UoT client %s target=%s:%s connect=%s", peer, *first_target, is_connect)
+
+        def udp_reader():
+            while True:
+                try:
+                    data, source = udp.recvfrom(MAX_PACKET)
+                except socket.timeout:
+                    continue
+                except OSError:
+                    return
+                try:
+                    with send_lock:
+                        if is_connect:
+                            conn.sendall(struct.pack("!H", len(data)) + data)
+                        else:
+                            conn.sendall(encode_address(source[0], source[1]) +
+                                          struct.pack("!H", len(data)) + data)
+                except OSError:
+                    return
+
+        threading.Thread(target=udp_reader, daemon=True).start()
+        if is_connect:
+            while True:
+                length = struct.unpack("!H", read_exact(conn, 2))[0]
+                payload = read_exact(conn, length)
+                udp.sendto(payload, resolve_destination(*first_target))
+        else:
+            while True:
+                destination = read_address(conn)
+                length = struct.unpack("!H", read_exact(conn, 2))[0]
+                payload = read_exact(conn, length)
+                udp.sendto(payload, resolve_destination(*destination))
+    except (ConnectionError, OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+        logging.info("UoT client %s closed: %s", peer, exc)
+    finally:
+        udp.close()
+        conn.close()
+
+
+def main():
+    logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(message)s")
+    listener = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    listener.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
+    listener.bind((LISTEN_HOST, LISTEN_PORT))
+    listener.listen(128)
+    logging.info("RRPP UoT relay listening on %s:%d", LISTEN_HOST, LISTEN_PORT)
+    while True:
+        conn, peer = listener.accept()
+        threading.Thread(target=handle, args=(conn, peer), daemon=True).start()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()